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ABSTRACT

Small businesses are recognized for their potential role in advancing economic growth,
generation o f employment (Storey, 1994) and assistance in recovery from persistent recessions
(Deakin, 1996). The important role played by venture capital in the formation and development
o f such new and high technology businesses is established and recognized (Kirchhoff & Phillips,
1998; Tim m ons et al, 1983). During the 1990s, venture capital has recorded extraordinary growth
at the international level. The research on venture capital has not only lagged behind the
development in this industry (Wright and Robbie, 1997) but has remained dominated by the
United States.
Within the venture capital field, while researchers have, to some extent, already covered several
aspects o f venture capital operation, the post-funding era of the venture capitalists/portfolio
companies remains a rich area for research. (Gorman and Sahlman 1989; Rosenstien et al, 1993;
Stier and Greenwood, 1995; Gompers, 1998; Barney, 1994).
Venture capitalists usually claim that, unlike other financiers, they provide more than finance.
This means that through active involvement in the portfolio company, they provide valuable
assistance in areas like finance, networking, strategy formulation and operations. Research
scholars, in recent years, have turned their attention to the confirmation of the substance o f this
claim. During the process of this research many factors have been uncovered which have some
bearing on the value-added relationship between a venture capital firm and a portfolio company.
However, the final verdict on the value-added role of venture capitalists has remained elusive.
M ost of the research studies in the area of value-addition by venture capital firms have confined
themselves to verifying whether certain factors, affect the relationship between a venture capital
firm and its portfolio company. Their disparate findings seem somewhat disjointed and need to
be fully coalesced into an integral whole. There has been a noticeable dearth of literature relating
to the development of a theory, which explains the basic dynamics governing this relationship.
This thesis is an attempt to fill this gap in venture capital research.

vn

To make this research study more robust, a theoretical base is adopted The resource exchange
theory was found ideally suited to explain the relationship between venture capitalists and their
portfolio companies. While this concept has been applied in some popular works, there have
been only moderate attempts to link it with venture capital.
A model o f the value-added relationship is built in this thesis. During the process o f developing
this model different factors affecting this relationship are identified, examined and classified
These factors are placed in a logical set-up within the basic model. An attempt is also made to
explain the important role played by organizational resources in a value-added relationship.
While the validity of the proposed resource-exchange model could not be proven beyond doubt,
it has been established that the resource pool o f venture capital firms and their portfolio
companies differ. The relevant resource pool may not be the only reason behind a value-added
relationship, however, venture capital firms consider themselves to be better equipped if they
have more experience in the industry of the portfolio company. Overall, venture capital firms’
involvement is guided by perceived need rather than their resource pool. While willingness to be
involved depends on other factors, firm policy is the primary motive behind an active
involvement o f venture capital firms in their portfolio companies.

vm
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1.1

Chapter 1: The Problem and its Setting

Background Information

Venture capital, sometimes also called risk capital or private equity, is one source of equity
investment. Venture capital, in essence, has evolved as a result of an equity supply gap, which
exists fo r high-risk ventures with high prospective growth and consequent high returns. Its
origination was informal (Batterson, 1986; Bygrave and Timmons 1992; Qark, 1987) and it was
primarily dependent on wealthy individuals called “ angels” as suppliers of funds, as equity
investors without intermediaries (Seymour and Wetzel, 1981). The initial effort to recognise and
institutionalise venture capital as a formal alternative source o f financing began in the United
Sates in the mid 1940s with the establishment of the American Research and Development
Corporation (ARD), a firm dedicated to raising funds from different sources and using these as
an equity investor in new ventures. The success of the Digital Equipment Corporation, one of
A RD ’s portfolio companies, catapulted ARD into the limelight. The venture capital industry has
since revolutionised the United Sates economy by backing start-up companies like M icrosoft,
N etscape, Yahoo, Federal Express, Intel etc.
Although a venture capital firm fills a much needed funding gap by financing growing
companies, a review of the detailed operations of venture capital reveals that venture capital firms
provide more than finance to their portfolio companies. As experienced professionals, venture
capitalists pass on their knowledge and experience to the entrepreneurs through active
involvement with their portfolio companies. The importance o f this aspect of a venture capital
firm’s work has prompted researchers to call a venture capitalist a relationship investor, builder,
innovator and partner, sounding board member and business consultant, coach/m entor,
financier and friend/confidant (Fried and Hisrish, 1994; Sapeinza and Timmons, 1989;
1
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Landstorm , 1990; Lorenz, 1989). Research shows that the m ost important contributions of
venture capital firms relate to the area o f financial advice, strategy formulation, crisis management
and access to business networks (MacMillan et a l; 1988, Gorm an and Sahlman, 1989; Rosenstien
et al., 1989; Ehrlich et a l, 1994; Elango et al., 1995). Although the venture capital firm s’ m ajor
involvement in the portfolio companies is by virtue of a seat on the board of directors, they may
also keep in regular contact through telephone and form al or informal meetings (Fiet, 1995) or
through reports submitted by the portfolio companies (Sweeting, 1991).

1.2

N eed for this research

O ver the years, researchers have tried to measure the results of venture capital firm s’ involvement
in their portfolio companies. This research activity gained particular momentum from the late
1980s. The attempt at measuring venture capital firm s’ involvement contribution, termed value
added, in the portfolio company has been tried with multiple approaches. The criteria of value
added is taken to be the time spent by a venture capital firm with a portfolio com pany (Gorman
and Sahlman, 1989), the number o f activities in which the venture capital firm is involved
(Rosenstein et al., 1989; Pandey and Jang, 1996; MacMillan et al., 1988) or the frequency of
venture capital firm /portfolio com pany interaction (Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Sapienza, 1992).
M oreover, the value added findings are alternatively based on the survey of venture capital firm s’
perceptions (MacMillan et a l, 1988) or portfolio companies’ perceptions (Fried and Hisrish,
1994; Rosenstein et aL, 1993; Rosenstein et al., 1989, Rosenstein et al., 1990) or both (Sapienza
and Tim m ons, 1989; Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al., 1996). Very few researchers have relied on
the case study method (Stier and Greenwood, 1995). Finally, research has also been carried out in
terms o f performance evaluation o f the portfolio company after initial public offerings.

The research, so far, has largely remained inconclusive about the value-added contribution of
venture capital firms. The problem has been further complicated by the findings that venture
2
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capital firm s, who are more involved in their portfolio companies, do not necessarily perform
better them selves nor do their portfolio companies (MacMillan et aL, 1989). M ost of the research
on value added has confined itself to an application of agency theory, which although useful, has
been deficient in respect to its appropriateness to venture capital firm s/portfolio companies’
relations because it does not explain the possibility of opportunistic behaviour by the principal
(venture capital firm). This thesis, thus digresses from the often trodden path of the application
of “ agency theory” (Amit et aL, 1990, Gom pers, 1995; Sahlman, 1990) and provides a new
perspective to this question.

A number of research studies have been conducted which have tried to measure the value-added
relationship and determine factors, which can possibly effect the value added. During this
process, the influence of many factors has been confirmed. However, there has been little effort
to classify these factors and set up a relationship between them in an over-all model, which
explains the value-added process.

Apart from value added, this thesis also fulfils the need for research in markets other than the
United Sates and Europe (Frear and Wetzel, 1990). Some of the Asian markets have recorded
remarkable growth in venture capital during the 1990s. However, not much research seems to
have been conducted in Asian countries in the area of venture capital
1.3

O b jectiv es o f the stu d y

This study supports the view that the venture capital firm s/portfolio company’s relations could
be seen from the resource-based perspective. It also argues that the value added by venture
capital firm s, in portfolio companies, is a function of resource exchange.

A critical component of the success of a venture is the accumulation of resources from the
environment, which helps the business to exploit available opportunities. The fate of venture
3
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capital firms is inextricably linked with the performance of their portfolio companies. While
venture capital firms add a vital resource of finance to the resource pool o f a portfolio company,
their contribution towards portfolio companies extends beyond finance. Because of the nature of
their work, venture capital firms acquire skills in developing strategies, forming management
team s, timing the development of the companies and building up a network of relationships.
These skills o r resources are vital for a growing company. Thus, venture capital firms will add to
the probability o f success o f the portfolio companies by contributing to their resource pool.
However, as explained in this thesis, this resource transfer/exchange depends on many factors
such as relationship characteristics, resource characteristics and more importantly on the
willingness o f the parties to enter into a resource exchange relation. This thesis, however, is not
an exercise in reinventing the wheel and therefore, the past research conducted in the area of
venture capital has been accepted as relevant and a useful starting point. During the process of
explaining the relationship between venture capital firms and portfolio companies, a holistic
model has been constructed and past research conducted in this area has been shown to
contribute logically toward the framework of resource exchange theory. Lasdy, part o f this
model has been tested in Singapore and H ong Kong, and during the process, valuable insight
gained into peculiarities of venture capital in these countries.

This dissertation basically addresses the following three-part research question: D oes resource
exchange theory offer a useful perspective for studying inter-firm relations? D oes the value
addition as perceived by venture capital firms depend on the resource exchange relations
between venture capital firm and portfolio companies? D oes the Asian interpretation of venture
capital allow a wider applicability for the findings of this thesis?

4
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1.4

Contribution to venture capital literature

This study is expected to contribute to the existing literature on venture capital in several ways. It
provides an insight into how the involvement o f venture capital firms in their portfolio
companies can be seen and analysed through a resource exchange perspective. Moreover, while
past research studies have identified isolated factors as they effect the value-added relationship
between venture capital firms and their portfolio companies, this study attempts to construct a
holistic model of this relationship. A three dimensional model has been pur forward which
include the characteristics o f venture capital firm s/portfolio companies, the characteristics of
relationships and the characteristics of resources. Furthermore, since this study is conducted in
A sia it also adds to a very limited literature on involvement of venture capital firms in their
portfolio companies in Asia.

1.5

Lim itation of this study

It was felt that the survey method was the m ost appropriate for this research. Similar studies have
been conducted in other countries, m ostly using an empirical approach, and have provided a
valid standard for comparisons of the findings. Because the measures in this study rely on the
perception o f the venture capital firms, caution must be exercised in their application and
interpretation. Bias and inaccuracy are potential threats wherever perceptual measures are used
Apart from the language difficulties, this study acknowledges the differences in definitions and
concepts that are used in different cultural settings. Such problems exist whether investigators are
using primary or secondary data sources.

1.6

Defining Venture Capital

A s discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, there is no generally accepted definition of venture
capital. The term venture capital has been used widely and its definition varies between countries
and even regions within countries (Venture Capital Journal, 1989). Generally speaking, venture
5
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capital is third party equity financing provided with management support to potentially high
growth companies where the main objective is capital gain. In Asia, this term is used rather
loosely and there is little attempt to draw a difference between private equity and venture capital
Thus all third party equity investment in unlisted companies is considered venture capital Since
this study is being conducted in Asia the same concept will be followed unless otherwise
indicated

1.7

Structure of the D issertation

The remainder o f this dissertation consists of eight chapters. Chapter 2, is used to present
background information on the venture capital industry in A sia and the little dragon economies,
traces industry history and delineates differences and similarities across countries. In chapter 3,
research that has, so far, been conducted in the area o f involvement of venture capital firms with
portfolio companies is reviewed The relationship of the venture capital firms with their portfolio
com panies, drawing upon the resource-based theory, is explained in chapter 4. The research
model is also presented in this chapter. The development o f propositions, which primarily rely on
the research model, is explained in chapter 5. Chapter 6 contains the research m ethodology
including a description of the sample and data collection m ethod Chapter 7 and 8 contain the
result o f analysis and a discussion on the findings. The dissertation concludes with chapter 9. It
also contains a discussion of the practical implications of the research findings, has an outline of
the limitations of this research and delineates directions for future research in this area.

6
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2.1

Chapter 2: Industry Review

Introduction

Because o f the diversity o f the venture capital industry, it is debatable whether existing research
studies on venture capital, predominantly undertaken in Europe and the United States, are
applicable to Asian countries. As this study is based on Asian venture capital markets and as there
is sufficient evidence that the local venture capital culture has a profound effect on the venture
capital strategies used in each market (Jeng and Wells, 2000), a relevant industry review is
appropriate. In this chapter, the history of venture capital in Asia and the progress and structure
of the venture capital industry in the “ little dragons1” countries is traced.

It needs to be mentioned that existing research cannot be termed irrelevant because the concept
o f form al venture capital sprang from the United States and m ost Asian countries have tried to
emulate this m odel There also exists an extensive relationship between different venture capital
funds at an international level, which can produce similarities, to some extent, in their
operations2.

2.2

Defining Venture Capital

The term venture capital is used far more frequently than it is understood (Cornelius, 2000). The
indiscriminate use of this word is almost threatening to relegate it to the status o f evocative
metaphor, applied so loosely that it ceases to hold any meaning. The generally held concept of
venture capital is based on the United States model, largely because the institutionalisation of
venture capital started in the United States. It is still the largest venture capital market and many

1 Singapore, H on g K on g, Taiwan and S. K orea together are also referred to as “Little D ragons” (Vogel, 1993) and “ Asian Tigers”
(K im , 1998).
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international venture capital markets have developed based on the United Sates model. Venture
capital has been defined as broadly as “the investment by professional investors of long term, risk
equity finance where the primary reward is eventual capital gain rather than interest incom e”
(Wright and Robbie, 1997) or as precisely as “long term financing (equity or potential equity)
leveraged with management support and provided to unlisted, potentially high growth
businesses” (Cornelius, 1992). Between these two standpoints, there is an array of definitions
(EV CA , 1998: A V Q , 1999: Pratt, 1998: O EC D , 1999).

The problem , that there is no generally accepted definition of venture capital, has been
com pounded by the internationalisation o f this term and hence multiple perceptions o f venture
capital, which are sometimes, downright erroneous. It is, however, quite difficult to define
precisely what venture capital means. According to the Venture Capital Journal (1989), there is
no accepted definition of venture capital even within a single country, let alone worldwide. The
m ajority o f the literature on regional comparisons of venture capital, perhaps recognising the
futility o f the exercise, takes the situation as it is and does not make a clear attempt to delineate
differences or distinguish between different interpretations (O ECD , 1996; Wright et al., 1999;
M llhaupt, 1997).

Available definitions of venture capital primarily derive their inspiration from the classical
structure that originated in the United States, based on the pioneering experiment of General
G eorges D oriot. The idea caught on and venture capital became a buzzw ord B y the late 1980s,
venture capital firms within the United States were stretching the term to include financial
practices which were not venture capital in the classical sense. Some called this practice
“ opportunism ” by investment bankers (Bavaria, 1992). These new practices collided with2

2 A result o f institutions is that organisations often develop in a sim ilar isom orphic manner (Slack & H irelings, 1994).
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substantially altered market factors including the poor performance o f venture capital firms
during the period. Venture capital, even within the United States, started losing its classical
characteristics. It was not patient and brave m oney any more (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992).

The institutionalised venture capital idea, primarily borrowed from the United States, became
really popular in Asia in the early 1990s when the venture capital industry in the United States
itself was undergoing a change in strategic focus. Thus, the picture of venture capital in Asia,
which emerges from the available literature, is much broader in concept than would be
encom passed b y definitions of venture capital (Goutarelli, 1977; Brophy, 1986). Bygrave and
Timmons (1992) have even argued that countries, except the United States, never really
developed classical venture capital at any stage. In Asian countries, even in cases where a venture
capital market has a significantly different structure3 from the traditional model, the term signifies
a broader concept (Borton, 1992). Although exact definitions might vary, broadly speaking,
venture capital in Asia primarily refers to “equity investments in growing unlisted companies”
(AVCJ, 1999). The investment scope covers all industries o f all sizes at virtually all investment
stages. Since, like Asia, Europe constitutes many diverse economies, the European notion of
venture capital is closer to the broader Asian viewpoint (EVCA, 1998: A V Q , 1999). Although
venture capital is usually referred to as a subset of private equity, it seems that in Asia and Europe
these terms are used interchangeably.

3 A com parison o f Japanese venture capital with the U nited States model provides a classic exam ple o f different venture capital
industry structures. The m ost com m on form o f venture capital in the United States is liability lim ited partnership accounting fo r
about tw o third o f venture capital invested in 1988 (Barry, 1994). Alm ost all Japanese venture capital firms are subsidiaries o r
affiliates o f large banks o r insurance com panies. This arrangem ent is sim ilar to what is term ed corporate venture capital in the
U nited States (Cornelius, 2000). "While United States venture capital firm s act as conduits fo r channelling funds raised from
other sources, Japan ese venture capital firm s mainly invest their own funds (K ato et aL, 1995). Unlike U nited States venture
capital, Japan ese venture capital is not associated with active monitoring. In fact, until 1995, Japanese law prohibited em ployees
o f venture capital firm s from being on the board o f their portfolio com panies (H am ao et aL, 2000).The Japanese venture capital
market is also unusual fo r the tim e it takes fo r young com panies to be listed. This period, which is around 30 years in Japan, is
about 4-5 years in the U nited States (Hulme, 1994).
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Although m ost o f Asia and the United States have followed almost similar paths toward the
transform ation o f venture capital from its initial position as technology-based investment in new
ventures to a broader range of investments which include mature companies (Cornelius, 2000),
the usage o f this term within the two regions carries a different emphasis. The National Venture
Capital A ssociation o f the United States (NVCA, 2000)4 defines venture capital as “ money
provided by professionals who invest alongside management in young, rapidly growing
companies that have the potential to develop into significant economic contributors” . While
making a clear reference to early stage companies and technology, it goes on to explain that a
“venture capitalist may invest in a company throughout the company's life cycle and therefore
som e funds focus on later stage investing.... At the other end of the spectrum, some venture
funds specialise in the acquisition, turnaround or re-capitalisation o f public and private
companies that represent favourable investment opportunities.”

Venture capital markets continue to develop and readjust across regions and countries. There has
been an increasing trend in the networking of global venture capital, sometimes referred to as
“ strategic alliances” . These networks create pools of capital by raising funds from traditional
venture capital resources and investing them in ventures throughout the world. The result is a
global inform ation exchange and joint venture relationships among European, American,
Australian and Asian companies. Thus, internationally, the perception o f what constitutes venture
capital is undergoing a change as venture capital firms reach a compromise on their different
viewpoints. W ith the concept of venture capital being continually adjusted in different countries
(Lau, 2000), any comparison between markets needs to be viewed in the light o f how venture
capital is currently perceived structured and is being transformed.

4 D efinition available on official w ebsite, h ttp:// www.nvca.com, accessed on January 17,2000.
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2.3

Growth of Venture Capital in the Asian Region

Like any other part of the world, equity financing is not new to the Asian region and has been
around for, possibly, hundreds of years. In E ast Asia the “ huay” , an informal system o f banking
involves a group of people who each subscribe to one or more shares in a comm on fund through
a fixed subscription. These funds are invested in different businesses (Choy, 1990). In South Asia,
this kind o f capital is supplied informally by friends, relatives and fam ily members. The idea of
equity investment, although rarely practiced in the Muslim culture o f the Middle E ast on a wider
scale, has always been present in the shape of “M odaraba” , third party equity investment (Harper,
1997). Traditionally, most businesses in Asia have been family owned over generations (Chen,
1995; Brown, 1995). Third-party proposals to invest in a company's future are not considered
acceptable by the family owning that business. In m ost of Asia, family members usually
contribute to a business. Smaller and newer ventures are earmarked fo r young family members
so, when venture capital was introduced into this region, many questioned the need for the
venture capital market and doubted whether it had a future (Montagu, 1988 b). From the
perspective o f the Asian businessman, moving beyond the known circle o f investors was a
relatively new experience.

'When venture capital, primarily backed by businessmen from the United States, came to Asia
during the early 1970s, few entrepreneurs, even when strapped for cash, considered approaching
a venture capital firm. The alien concept bred suspicion and tapping equity from family and
friends remained the driving forces behind company growth and security. The initial United
States venture capital investment in Asia faltered. Cultural differences were considered part of the
reason (Morrow, 1991). The investors, seemingly, could not develop the necessary long-term
relationships with clients in Asia that would ensure successful investments (Mantagu-Pollok,
1988). W estern style due diligence did not seem to work and foreign investors also had a hard
11
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time coping with local accounting practices (Pohndorf, 1997). After this initial setback, any real
prospect o f venture capital development in Asia depended on overcoming cultural barriers and
involving local participation on the supply side of this market.

In the m id-1970s, the role of development banks, which were widely seen by respective
governments as a tool fo r national economic development in developing countries, increased.
Asian development banks, backed by the government o f the country, started looking for more
creative financing arrangements and opportunities. Venture capital was identified as one possible
mode o f operation. B y the early eighties there were close to 100 venture capital firms operating in
the Asian region (Kravits, 1985). Soon a formal institutionalisation of the market was underway.
There were, however, no assurances that traditional venture capital was likely to succeed without
problem s in the unique Asian environment.

During the 1980s H ong K ong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea experienced tremendous
econom ic growth. Combined, the exports of these four nations were about 80 percent those of
Japan (Schilit, 1992), the highest exporting nation in Asia. As these countries m oved from a
labour-intensive manufacturing environment to technology-oriented undertaking, the need for
venture capital became more obvious and growth in the technology sector form ed the basis for
such activity (Hou, 1988). Continued development, especially in East Asia, produced cash rich
companies eager to invest in start-up technologies at home or abroad in order to diversify their
technologies and further their technological development. There was an increasing awareness,
am ong respective governments, that venture capital played a very real role in the economic
developm ent process. There were some warnings that the American style system could not be
copied by any other infrastructure, as evidenced by numerous failed attempts to mirror the
United States model in Europe and Japan (Pratt, 1990). Asian countries, including the litde
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dragons, continued to move forward toward what they considered to be hi-tech venture capital
projects. There is today, a large amount of private m oney going into venture capital in these
countries. In 1997 these countries had a combined investment portfolio of more than U SD 10
billion.

2.1

Little Dragons-Venture Capital Investment Portfolio ( 1997)5

Hong Kong
South Korea
Singapore
Taiwan
Total
Modified from AVQ, 1999

USD millions %age of Total Venture Capital
Investment in Asia
4,691
22.86%
2,490
12.14%
1,574
7.67%
622%
1,277
10,032
48.89%

Venture capital investment in the little dragon countries accounts for almost half o f the venture
capital market in Asia. Venture capital is not only well entrenched in these countries but has a
comparatively successful history in terms of growth. Com pared to the rest of Asia, the larger size
of venture capital in these markets is far beyond their comparative size in terms of area and
population. Together the little dragon countries provide a very fertile ground fo r further research
in the area o f venture capital

2.3.1

Developm ent of Venture Capital Industry

Governments in little dragon economies, joined by countries like Hong K ong, which do not
usually intervene in the capital markets (Lassene and Schiitte, 1995), have taken an active stand
and a variety of approaches to foster and monitor venture capital development. Respective
governments have not only targeted and promoted specific industries through grants and tax
incentives but also, in some cases, taken up the role o f venture capital firms. Venture capital in
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m ost o f these countries has been used as a development tool and in most cases governments
have played a key role in deciding what qualifies as venture capital. In Taiwan, fo r example, the
M inistry o f Finance defines venture capital primarily as equity investment in growing unlisted
companies. It goes on to limit venture capital by specifying the investment focus as domestic
technological firm s, domestic or foreign venture capital firms and domestic general
manufacturing industries (Pandey and Jang, 1996).

The first example o f active government support was provided in 1983 by the Taiwanese
government, when it enacted venture capital regulations. It provided investors with generous tax
breaks, handing local investors tax credits that effectively gave them back 20% o f any m oney
invested in hi-tech. This was followed by investment by the state-run Bank o f Communication in
eight funds. The government regulated the investment through tax credits, which are only
available to companies that invest in 'strategic' hi-tech areas like personal computing
technologies, precision machines, or biotechnology. Government institutions such as the Bank of
Communications

(B O Q , the Development Fund of the Executive Yuan and the China

Developm ent Corporation (C D Q are themselves large investors in hi-tech firms and venture
funds (Montagu-Pollock, 1990-91).

Sensing high investment returns, many venture capital firms in Taiwan forfeited tax concessions
and diversified investments into the service and manufacturing sectors. The Taiwanese
government in the early 1990’s eased restriction on investors wishing to reach outside o f the
high-tech area. The Government also moved away from seed-stage investment in favour o f more
mature companies. During 1990-91 the Taiwanese venture capital industry consisted o f 12
venture capital firms with a total capital under management of U SD 250 million (Asian Finance5

5 A V Q (1999) distinguishes and provides separate data about venture capital pool (Capital under management o r com m itted
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b, 1990-91). Annual fund raising in the Taiwanese venture capital industry took off in the mid
1990s, and grew more than 15 times between 1994 and 1997. The number of venture capital
funds increased to 74 and the total venture capital pool or venture capital under management
touched U SD 2 billion by 1997 (Guide to Venture Capital in Asia, A V Q , 1999).

The story of venture capital is similar in Singapore. The Econom ic Development Board (ED B)
has been supporting venture capital since 1984 giving generous grants, making investments and
approving Pioneer Service Status, which gives venture capital funds corporate tax holidays fo r up
to 10 years. Getting the E D B ’s backing involves transferring technology to Singapore. If a
portion o f a fund's capital, as approved by the E D B on a case-to-case basis, was used fo r seed
finance, the E D B also allowed investors to write-off up to 100% of capital losses against other
income. The E D B itself, a particularly large investor in venture capital, intended to exploit
opportunities in strategic industries. Venture Capital in Singapore though privy to Government
support, differs from the Taiwanese example in one important way. Its venture capital strategy is
outward looking. Investing in other countries in the region is acceptable as long as the E D B
identifies a link between the investment and the future development of the home economy. The
Government, showing its bias for high-tech start-ups, has geared its tax and legislative
concessions to this sector. Any investment in a venture capital project, therefore, is limited by
financial necessity, to the Government's approved list. Singapore's venture capital industry tends
to move cautiously within Government guidelines and consequently its growth is less spectacular
than that o f Taiwan, however, it has grown at a continuous pace. During 1990-91 Singapore had
10 venture capital firms with a total venture capital pool of U SD 300 Million (Asian Finance,
1990-91). During 1997 the total venture capital pool in Singapore exceeded U SD 4 Billion with
around 60 venture capital funds (Guide to Venture Capital in Asia, A V Q , 1999).

capital), venture capital investm ent, annual venture capital investm ent and new funds raised annually.

15

2: Industry Renew

The South K orean example is similar to the scenarios in Taiwan and Singapore. Venture capital
financing found expression in K orea as early as 1973, with the creation of the K orea Technology
Advancement Corporation (KTACj to commercialise the research and development (R&D)
results o f the K orea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), a public R & D Institute. N ot
until the early 1980s did a booming interest in high-tech start-up industries set the funding wheels
firmly in motion. The Government set up three firms to further technological research and
development. Although these firms ended up lending rather than investing in equity, venture
capital had begun. In 1986, the South Korean Government passed the Small and Medium
Enterprise Start-up Support Act (SM ESS), which gave tax benefits on the capital gains o f start-up
investment companies. In the same year its sister act, the N ew Technology Financial Support Act
(N TFSA ), enabled firms to make investment funds that could absorb idle private capital. Initially,
South K orea created a venture capital industry highly focused on eariy-stage, hi-tech financing,
because the Government's strict incentive conditions ensured that 92% of funds went into eariystage companies. Although the Government remains the chief sponsor o f venture capital
projects, the focus on early stage business has drifted away. The Government increased the
allowable age o f companies in which venture capital could be invested from three years to five
years in 1989, and permitted partial investment in mature companies (aged more than five years)
in 1992. Rules were relaxed further after local funds found themselves in trouble. N ew laws
granting tax breaks to venture investors and lifting the usual ceiling on foreign investment came
into effect in 1997. Foreigners were allowed to purchase stocks of more than 55% in a company
listed on the K orean Stock Exchange. This ceiling was completely abolished the next year
resulting in a 160% increase in foreign ownership (A V Q , 1999). In 1998, the South Korean
Government also allowed pension funds, which at that time managed more than U SD 40 billion,
to invest in start-ups alongside a venture capital firm. An important feature of the K orean
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venture capital market is that local players, thanks to regulatory barriers and resistance to
outsiders, have long dominated this market. During 1990-91 about 33 venture capital firms were
operating in South K orea with funds under management of U SD 900 Million. The total venture
capital pool has since grown to U SD 1.9 billion being managed by 128 funds at the end o f 1997.

Am ong the little dragons, H ong K ong was the last to provide incentives to hi-tech industry
development and the Government clung to its laissez-faire traditions fo r a long time. A s a result
H ong K on g saw its industries increasingly overtaken by hi-tech developments elsewhere.
Requests from Hong K ong entrepreneurs triggered the Government into action in 1992 and the
Industrial Department announced a large allocation fo r applied research and corporate
development projects on a dollar-for-dollar 'matching' basis with private investment. The
Industrial Technology Centre provides funds for start-up hi-tech ventures, and provides support
facilities and low-rent space fo r hi-tech firms. H ong K ong assumed new importance, after being
taken over by China, as a springboard into China. Because large amounts o f venture capital
invested in China are routed through Hong Kong, the growth o f venture capital in H ong K ong
looks spectacular. After Japan, H ong Kong is the largest single venture capital base in Asia. Its
venture capital pool was more than U SD 9 billion with 91 venture capital funds in 1997.

2.3.2

Structure and Organisation

Gompared to the United States, where venture capital took off in the late 1970s, the
institutionalisation and increased importance o f venture capital is largely a phenomenon o f the
1980s and 1990s in most European countries. Little dragon economies recorded a comparatively
visible venture capital market only during the 1990s. Some venture capitalists believe that,
com pared to other regions, venture capital in these countries is still in its infancy (Wong, 2001).

17

2: Industry Redew

Thus one o f the common features of the venture capital industry in little dragon economies is
that each country is in similar phase o f growth6.

Venture capital in little dragon economies, as a whole, m aybe classified into several general areas.
First, there are start-up and hi-tech funds, which m ay be privately owned, or government
sponsored. Privately owned funds are primarily based on the United States model and driven
m ostly by foreign investors, though managed by local professionals. The government-sponsored
investment funds offer tax and regulatory concessions to investors who agree to back projects
deemed worthwhile by government planning authorities. Secondly there are funds that are
involved in corporate restructuring. These funds seek out more established enterprises with
proven track records. Instead o f providing seed money, they tend to offer capital for a firm's
expansion. In contrast with the 5-10 year commitments pledged by traditional venture capital
firms, they prefer 2-3 year turnovers with an eye on acquisition o r consolidation o f a group of like
enterprises. Third, there are infrastructure funds. These funds mostly invest in infrastructure
projects like bridges, docks and highways. Another category gaining importance can be termed
“privatisation

funds” . Privatisation

funds

exploit

opportunities

created by respective

governments’ increasing attention to privatisation, making available enterprises, which are
undercapitalised, an d/or desperately need modernisation. A more recent trend visible in the
global venture capital area, including this region, has been that o f "networks," sometimes referred
to as "strategic alliances." These networks are linkages between venture capital companies around
the world. These networks create pools by raising m oney from pension funds, insurance

6 The venture capital industry is viewed as cyclical in nature (Fried and H isrish, 1992) . The experience o f die U nited States exhibits
an association between the venture capital industry and the stock m arket, whereby, the venture capital industry recorded
accelerated grow th in a bull m arket (O E C D , 1997). The U nited States venture capital market perform ed poorly between 1987
1991 w ith grow th returning in 1992. The venture capital market in m ost o f the European countries is com paratively new and so
far has seen only one downturn between 1991-1993.
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com panies, banks, corporations, and wealthy individuals in much the same way that traditional
American venture capital firms do, and then invest these funds in ventures throughout the w orld

In addition to established venture capital funds, other venture capital players include;

(a) private equity/fam ily wealth where corporate empires are essentially family controlled
vehicles;

(b) private equity and wealth channelled through private bankers, off-shore trusts and tax
efficient vehicles;

(c) and private investment clubs consisting of friends or co-investors. F or example, overseas
Chinese networks.

The actual availability of venture capital is difficult to measure precisely because o f the peculiar
features o f individual countries exacerbated by issues comm on to all venture capital markets.
Since venture capital frrms in little dragon countries tend to invest overseas, the number o f firms
is not a true reflection of the available capital in a specific market. M ost of the data is supplied by
respective governments and expressed in terms of their own currency. Since the rate of exchange
applied depends on the type o f rate e.g. spot, inter-bank etc, the source of exchange rate
information and the chosen point in time, there might be som e differences in reported amounts
in different articles and research studies (A V Q , 1999; Asian Finance 1990-91; Phalon and
Katiyam a, 1988; Pandey, 1996; Rah et al., 1994). M oreover, som e venture capital firms are
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engaged in venture capital intermittently. Venture capital estim ates thus, m ay differ depending on
the source7.*

2.2 Little Dragons- Total Venture Capital Pool (USD Millions)
Hong Kong
NA
1991
NA
1992
NA
1993
NA
1994
N.A
1995
8,019
1996
9,632
1997
Modified from AVQ, 1999

Singapore
868
896
1,013
1,833
3,164
3,981
4,468

S. Korea
1,547
1,629
1,687
1,902
2,567
3,224
1,857

Taiwan
412
470
508
562
696
1,336
1,913

2.3 Little Dragons -Annual Venture Capital Investment (USD Millions)
Hong Kong
N.A
1992
N.A
1993
1994
N.A
N.A
1995
1183
1996
778
1997
Modified from AVQ, 1999

Singapore
120
186
236
240
461
388

Korea
111
111
443
745
1,139
920

Taiwan
61
148
132
216
429
643

It appears that in these countries, the total venture capital pool has increased at an average annual
growth rate o f more than 10% between 1991-96. 1997 has proven to be an eventful year in the
history of venture capital in Asia. The growth o f venture capital slowed down considerably.
South K orea was the hardest hit in terms o f total venture capital pool. Except for Taiwan,
venture capital investment declined in all countries.

7 The prim ary source fo r data on A sian venture capital in this thesis is “The G uide to Venture Capital In Asia-1999” published by
A sian V enture Capital Jou rn al Further calculations have been marie to make data com parable across countries. Som e m istakes in
A V C J data w ere pointed out and the data has been rectified through later correspondence. M inor differences between A V Q
and this thesis rem ain because o f rounding o ff figures and differences in applicable exchange rates. The details are recorded in
Annex 1.
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A t the end o f 1997 there were about 350 venture capital funds operating in little dragon
countries. These funds had an average capital under management of around U SD 50 million.
There are significant differences in fund sizes between these countries. In H ong K ong the
average fund manages more than U SD 100 million whereas in South K orea it is less than U SD 15
million. The venture capital funds were managing around TJSD28 million o f average investment
portfolios com prising 13 projects each. More than 1500 professionals were working in the
venture capital industry in the little dragon countries with each fund being managed by
approxim ately 4 professionals on average. This means that each professional is handling an
average investment portfolio o f a little more than U SD6.6 million and about 3 projects. As a
percentage o f G D P 8 the size of the venture capital market in Singapore or H ong K ong is bigger
than that in South K orea or Taiwan.

Although no specific data is available for the little dragon countries, research indicates that
mezzanine and turnaround funds in Asia are larger in comparison to funds focussing on early
stage investments as are funds with a regional investment focus (Aylward, 1998). Moreover,
funds that have parent company involvement, or are comparatively older, tend to be smaller as
m easured by the proportion of equity to funds raised.

2.4

Little Dragons-Venture Capital Investment by Financing Stage (1997-USD Millions)

Country
Seed
Start-up Expansion Mezzanine Turnaround
Hong Kong
206
1,618
2,186
113
23
South Korea
239
493
154
1,148
374
57
699
381
33
379
Singapore 9
Taiwan
97
208
14
642
309
Total
599
2,700
4,675
1,174
225
5.97%
Percentage Share
26.92%
46.60%
11.71%
2.24%
Modified from data provided by AVQ, 1999

Buyout
469
82
25
6
583
5.81%

Others
75
0
0
0
75
0.75%

8 V enture capital p ool in Singapore and H ong K ong is more than 1% o f their G D P .
9 A ccording to the A V Q D irectory the seed and Mezzanine (Pre-IPO) investm ent in Singapore is 3.6% and 24% recpectively
whereas according to a Singapore governm ent survey (1999) available on the Internet, it is 34% and 12% respectively. A V Q
stands b y its data. See Annex. 1 fo r details.
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Within the little dragon countries, venture capital is primarily directed toward expansion projects
instead of start-ups and seed stage projects. Venture capitalists in these countries “ ... do not
invest in start-up or young stage [sic]. We see some American style in South K orea, Taiwan and
Singapore, but m ost cases are large sized private equity funds’ investments in stabilised and
proven companies for their growth or expansion purpose” 10. The reason usually forwarded for
this difference is the small amount of money that goes into R& D spending in these countries.
F o r example, H ong K ong spends only 0.1% of G D P on research and development (Slater,
1998). Individual countries exhibit diverse trends in the distribution o f venture capital according
to the stage o f matunty o f portfolio companies. About 40% of venture capital is invested in seed
and start-up financing in H ong K ong whereas in Taiwan it is 24%.

2.5

Little Dragons-Venture Capital Investment by Source of Finance ( 1997-USD Millions)

Corporations

Private
Pension Government Insurance Banks Reinvestment Others
Individuals Funds
Agencies Companies
(C Gains)
164
605
47
957
216
0
267
77
32
249
57
199
90
864
93
55
138
101
346
0
150
212
38
50
61
38
0
26
546
731
484
1,176
800
90
1307
5.44%
7.29%
4.83%
11.24% 7.97%
0.89%
13.02%

Hong Kong
2,435
Korea
921
Singapore
691
Taiwan
852
Total
4,899
Percentage
48.83%
Share
Modified from data provided byAVCf

A s fo r source o f funding, little similarity appears between countries except fo r the fact that
coporation s provide a large part o f venture capital funds. In H ong K ong and Taiwan
corporations account fo r more than 50% o f venture capital. In Singapore and South Korea the
government’s share is comparatively larger with close to 10% of venture capital coming from
government agencies. This fact seems to suggest that governments, in general, have relied more

10 Personal correspondence: Jung-K yoo Yang, Chief International B usiness D eptt, K orea Technology Corporation, South Korea,
M arch 18,1999.
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on m easures to promote venture capital rather than actual supply of funds. In Singapore, banks
are the second largest source o f venture capital (22%) whereas in Hong K ong insurance
companies are the second m ost important source of venture capital. Taiwan is conspicuous for a
very large proportion (16.6%) o f venture capital coming from private individuals. Except for
H ong K ong, pension funds do not account for more than 10% o f venture capital in any country.
South K orea is likely to see an increased contribution from pension funds following permission
by the South Korean Government to allow pension funds to invest in venture capital
(Thom pson, 1999).

2.6

Little Dragons-Venture Capital Investment by Industry- ( 1997-USD Millions)

Consumer Related
Computer Related
Electronics Related
Industrial Products
Medical/Biotechnology
Communications
Energy
Transportation
Construction
Financial Services
Other Services
Other Manufacturing

Hong Kong
1,004
145
99
938
145
615
202
432
647
103
127
230

Korea
167
261
391
628
50
252
37
79
86
40
127
374

Singapore
165
201
249
178
133
182
39
26
131
73
78
119

Taiwan
20
365
495
94
13
97
8
31
8
41
20
84

Total
1,356
972
1,234
1,838
341
1,146
286
568
872
257
352
807

%age
13.52%
9.69%
12.30%
18.33%
3.40%
11.43%
2.85%
5.66%
8.69%
2.56%
3.51%
8.05%

Overall, over one half o f the venture capital is distributed between industries relating to
electronics, consumer products, communications and industrial products. Sophisticated
technology areas like biotechnology and computers account fo r only a little more than 13% of
venture capital investments. There is a broad spectrum o f investment strategies in individual
countries. In Hong K on g and South K orea a larger portion (more than 20%) goes to industrial
products. H ong K ong stands out fo r its comparatively larger investments in consumer related
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products. O nly Taiwan exhibits industry concentration with 65% of venture capital invested in
computer related and electronics industry.

Com pared to Taiwan, venture capital in other countries is more international in nature. An
investment portfolio of a typical venture capital firm m ay include an array of projects of a similar
bent from more than one country. R isk diversification, is usually put forward as a reason for this
strategy o f regional rather than local investment (Stine, 1990; Meyer & Shao, 1995). Previous
research shows that venture capital firms do not normally seek risk diversification by industry,
stage of maturity o f portfolio companies or complexity o f technology (Gorman and Sahlman,
1986; Cornelius, 1992)). Thus, geographical diversification can be a valid reason fo r this strategy
(Stine, 1990).

The venture capital market is only a decade old in litde dragon countries and has been affected by
a recent crisis with most Asian stock markets producing negative returns (Periitz, 2000). Given
the impact o f a venture capital downturn, venture capital performance vis-à-vis public equity
cannot be examined fairly (Scheela et aL, 2000; Pohndorf, 1997). However, som e authors claim
that despite the industry’s shorter record, and the inherent risks that accom pany any investment,
the internal rate of return (IRR) makes venture capital in Asia a worthwhile endeavour fo r an
investor (Lasserre and Probert, 1994; Tanaka, 1994: Payne, 2000). F or example, although no
research data is presented, it has been claimed that between 20-40% o f venture capital investors
earned a 30-40% internal rate of return in H ong K ong during 1990 (Asian Finance, 1990-91) and
after the Asian crisis investment returns in South K orea were reputed to be around 20-40%
(Seoul Venture Investment Co. Ltd., 1999).

There has been very litde research in the area of venture capital processes in the litde dragon
econom ies.

A s for venture capital firm ’s evaluation criteria within these countries, previous
24

2: Industry Review

research suggests marked differences. In Singapore, the entrepreneur's personality and experience
was found to be m ost important evaluation criteria used by venture capital firms while financial
considerations were least important (Ray, 1991). Rah et al. (1994) have examined investment
evaluation criteria of venture capital firm s in South K orea who rank managerial capability, market
attractiveness, superior product and technology, financial ability, availability of raw material and
superiority o f product and technology as m ost important. The rate o f return on investment and
market considerations are more important to Taiwanese venture capital firms while product
characteristics are considered least important (Pandey and Kim , 1997).

In Taiwan venture capital firms are believed to be proactive and m ost o f the deals are generated
by the venture capital firms themselves (Pandey, 1996). In South K orea most of the significant
venture capital firms are subsidiaries of financial institutions or larger companies with deal-flow
primarily derived from the parent com pany (Rah et al., 1994). Except for Taiwan, it is unlikely
that a venture capital firm will resort to the use o f preferred stock as an investment option11.
There is more variety in venture capital deals in Taiwan, ranging from preferred stock to more
complicated convertible debts and hybrid debt/equity instruments (Chen and Lee, 2000).
However, venture capital firms are structured as corporations (A V Q , 1999) in all little dragon
econom ies, rather than limited partnerships as in the classical venture capital structure12. Venture
capital management firms sometimes themselves have a divisional or multinational structure or
they m aybe a subsidiary o f an investment bank or commercial banking firm.

11 In A sia, different classes o f stocks with different voting rights are not usually perm itted. A survey o f 52 venture capital firm s in
developing countries, 40 o f which belonged to A sia, has found that preferred stock constitute only 5% o f long term investm ents
in portfolio com panies and convertible stock averaged less than 2% (Aylwand, 1998). A sian venture capital firm s, thus, m ostly
rely on com m on stocks and other means o f m anaging risks o f the portfolio company.
12 Although it is acknowledged as an im portant difference, the term venture capital firm has been used in later discussion to indicate
a venture capital firm o r a com pany, fo r consistency o f expression.
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Initial public offering is not considered a popular exit in little dragon countries. Venture backed
firms typically have to struggle for a long time to be listed on a stock market because of stria pre
conditions. To list a stock on the H ong K ong exchange in reality takes years of profitability, with
the expectation that the company will soon be generating USD10-15 million in profits annually
(Schilit, 1992). Purchase by a third party or buyback by the company are the m ost popular modes
of exit in Taiwan (Pandey, 1996). With a movement in most o f these countries toward a viable
alternative stock market (Sender, 2000), there is a possibility that the exit route priorities may
undergo som e adjustment. The experiment with an O T C (over-the-counter) stock market13 has
produced mixed results and small market turnover has been a m ajor problem in most markets.
However, Taiwanese’ R .O .G O T C (Republic o f China Over The Counter Securities Exchange)
and South K orea’s K O SD A Q (Korea Securities Dealers Automated Quotations), has been
relatively successful in terms of trading volume (Gilley, 1999; Business K orea, 2000,a).

The Asian venture capital market was expeaed to slow down, after the Asian financial crisis in
1997 as it adversely affected equity markets and hopes of initial public offerings (IPOs) of new
share issues (Asian Business b, 1998). However, contrary to expectations, the Asian venture
capital market registered increasing importance both at the funding and advisory level. In the past
venture capital firms functioned m osdy as passive investors, however, during the crisis they
contributed more o f the advice and contacts that companies needed to survive (Asian Business b,
1998). “ There is a trend toward greater management involvement and control largely a symptom
of the Asia crisis and need for V C s to maximize their returns” 14. M any o f the struggling firms
were saved by venture capital. As corporate valuations lowered and currencies depreciated,

13 K O SQ A Q in South K orea, SE SD A Q (Stock Exchange o f Singapore D ealing and A utom ated Q uotation system) in Singapore,
R .O .C . O T C in Taiwan and G E M (Growth Enterprise M arket) in H ong K on g.
14 Personal Correspondence: N icholas Ashby, M anaging D irector, G lobal Alliance Capital (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. Malaysia. A pril 5,
1999
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venture capital investors took minority stakes in unlisted firms in the expectation that they could
cash out via initial public offerings within a few years. Companies also welcomed venture capital
because, in crises, this capital came cheap compared to loans at prevailing high interest rates.
Even listed companies were courting venture capital via private placements (Asian Business b,
1998). Governments seemed to be undeterred by the crisis and the South K orean Government
announced on February 11,1998 that it would set aside U SD620 million in 1998 to help finance
2000 venture firms (TheEconcm st, 1998).

Some venture capitalists feel that the crisis has left a positive and indelible impression on the
Asian market. "... the crisis was the once in a life time opportunitiesfsic] fo r venture capital
investment as it nosed down deal price and many good ventures were in need o f working capital
and growth capital which were financed in debt form. In addition, the crises made them change
their attitude on debt financing. They became to listen carefully to equity financing [sic]” 15.
Others are sceptical. “ There is a short term need fo r capital, but whether the structural and
latitudinal changes have taken place to make the market more attractive, is unproven” 16.

Venture capital in tiger economies is more international in nature and is similar to
Europe(O EC D , 1997). It is one o f the reasons why venture capital as a term is interpreted so
loosely in these countries. The current structure and process of venture capital in little dragon
countries is the result of m any other factors, including individual culture and geography, and the
nature o f the evolutionary process of the venture capital industry17. The m ost noticeable aspect
o f venture capital in little dragon countries is its comparable infancy. Thus the venture capital

15 Personal Correspondence: Jung-K yoo Yang, Chief International B usiness D eptt, K orea Technology Corporation, South K orea.
M arch 18,1999.
16 Personal Correspondence: Jane Craw ford, M anaging D irector, 31 pic South E ast A sia, Singapore . M arch 23,1999
17 Ivan Zim onyi, m anager o f the D evelopm ent Finance D ivision at the A sian D evelopm ent Bank quoted in A sian Finance, Six
Problem s That N eed to be O vercom e, Anonymous 14(5)56,63., 1988

27

2: Industry Review

market in these countries also reflects the initial stages o f a fast developing venture capital
market. A comparison o f stages o f financing of venture capital investment over a period in these
countries shows that, as is common to new markets, initially venture capital was more focused on
seed and start-up financing and has gradually moved away from the initial stages. M ost of these
markets, probably because o f lack of experience (McCurry, 2000), are shy o f sophisticated
financing (eg LBO) and financing techniques. Akin to the novelty are also the sources of
financing. At this stage, corporations and banks are the largest source o f venture capital but as
the market develops pension funds’ share, which are a more common source of venture capital in
a developed market like the United States, is increasing. Venture capital investment by industry
in little dragon countries is skewed toward industrial goods, energy and the construction business
as is expected from growing economies.

Because o f the historical ownership structure, the use o f venture capital in these countries is not
as w idespread as in the United States. The closed ownership structure has resulted in the limited
use o f equity participation incentives to new employees18. Since this particular aspect of venture
capital is particularly important in high technology industries, where human resource is more
expensive, it m aybe the reason why venture capital in these countries is not as high tech as in the
United States. Another reason, for limited high-tech emphasis, is the lack o f protection available
to intellectual property which form s the core o f many technology start-ups. Since intellectual
property protection is weak in these countries, venture capitalists award lesser status to intangible
assets such as patents or copyrights. Thus, portfolio company valuation is based on tangible
assets resulting in bank-like financing driven by collaterals. The element o f risk however remains
unaffected even in case o f tangible assets because o f less developed accounting practices in these

18 Fam ily control is not restricted to private com panies. F o r exam ple, in Singapore ethnic Chinese fam ily businesses control 81% o f
Singapore’s listed companies b y capitalisation (Chen and Soh, 2000)
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countries. A s company regulations in these countries are still developing, the environment in
these countries is not very accommodating to the use of a wider variety of investment
instruments19. Thus venture capital financing is not structured flexibly enough to suit investors
and thus investors have very limited instruments to choose fro m In most o f the little dragon
countries, venture capital firms follow a corporate structure compared to limited partnerships as
in the United States. While this structure is more form al and system driven, it takes away the
right o f the investors to dissolve the fund at the end o f stated period. Thus the venture capitalists
have less incentive to perform as well to claim back the investment. This factor is likely to make
venture capitalists less adventurous in these countries. Although little dragon countries are only
now m oving toward a secondary stock market, which is viable fo r disinvestment by venture
capitalists, the stock market is not widely used as an exit route. There is, however, very limited
information and research as to which alternative mode o f exit is more popular.

There is very little research on the value added aspect of venture capitalists in little dragon
countries. However, based on factors that have influenced the structure and process of venture
capital in little dragon countries, an educated guess can be made. This aspect o f venture capital
has been discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.

2.4

Conclusion

Venture capital and its interpretation is not limited to technology, stage of business, value
addition, capital gains etc. All over Asia, the term venture capital is construed broadly and the
difference between venture capital and private equity, in general, is non-existent. Form al venture
capital has a short history in little dragon countries. Venture capital has evolved with respective

19 Since venture capital financing usually entails successive rounds o f financing, involving different investors with different interests,
it is often desirable to use a diversity o f investm ent vehicles, whether equity (e.g. various form s o f preferred shares), or debt (e.g.
notes), o r a hybrid nature (.e.g. convertible notes), to accom m odate the particular requirement o f each class o f investors.
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governments playing a large role in directing and defining the industry. The current industry
structure is now a result of a blend o f cultures, regulatory environments and developmental
needs.

D espite the fact that little dragon countries have different economic structures, their venture
capital industries have several common and unique features. The common areas include industry
maturity, the corporate structure o f venture capital firms, attitude toward entrepreneurial culture,
use o f stock options and significant involvement o f governments in venture capital. The value
addition question, taken up in greater detail in this thesis cannot be studied in isolation and
should be seen in the light of all the factors that have shaped the current venture capital industry.

In line with the review of venture capital industry in the little dragon countries, the next chapter
reviews the existing research which covers the relationship between venture capital firms and
portfolio companies.
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3.1

Chapter 3: Literature Review

Introduction

The question o f value added by venture capital firms through their participation in the portfolio
companies is explored in this chapter. First, existing research that has been carried out that
directly or indirectly relates to the involvement o f venture capital firms in their portfolio
companies is reviewed. The different research findings, which are specific to the value added
debate, are then discussed. The perspective o f the value added debate is also explored. The
chapter concludes with a summary of the directions o f the findings to date.

3.2

Venture Capital Research in the P ast

Venture Capital has become common as an innovative means to finance new ventures in the
United States (Bygrave et al., 1989) and in other part o f the world (Manigart, 1994). Despite this
fact, overall research in venture capital has lagged behind the development o f the industry
(Wright and Robbie, 1997). Barry (1994) enumerates the reasons and argues that the theoretical
problems (relating to venture capital) are complex, multi-faceted and difficult to solve. Moreover,
its very nature creates difficulties for the empiricist because data on private investment by private
investors is difficult to obtain. In general, research on venture capital gained prominence in the
late 1960s and early 1970s, as indicated by many publications during this period. This interest,
however, subsided to a considerable extent in the following decade. From the late 1980s there
has been a renewed research interest in venture capital. An examination of 122 research studies
related specifically to venture capital and published after 1984 and before 1998 was carried out.
O f these, 40 were published between 1985-1989 and 61 between 1990-1994 suggesting a
noticeable rise in research interest. 1995-1997 included 21 studies which, although fewer, indicate
a continued interest. The research list, however, is not exhaustive and the results point toward a
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general trend. Tybjee and Bruno (1984) have classified the previous research in venture capital
beginning with interest in procurement of investment opportunities (deal origination), fund
policies (deal screening), evaluation procedures (deal evaluation) and the structuring o f the
investment agreement (deal structuring). The examination of environments in which venture
capital firms operate, can also be added to this list (Cornelius, 1992). Brophy (1986) notes that the
role o f finance in entrepreneurial-driven-emeiging-growth-companies was the main area of
research in the 1960s. Attention during the 1970s shifted to the processes o f venture capital and
its link to m odem finance theories (Bancroft and Burgin 1977; Driscoll, 1974). Research in the
eighties has focused mainly on the characteristics o f the venture capital portfolio, the investment
decision process and flows o f venture capital (Davis et a l, 1984; McMillan et al., 1985; Robinson,
1987; G atson and Bell, 1988; Wetzel, 1985). Dunng the late eighties there was a gradual increase
of interest in the venture capital firm / portfolio company relationship (Sapienza and Timmons,
1989; Rosenstein et al., 1989; Perry 1988; McMillan et aL, 1988) and a growing recognition of
venture capital markets outside the United Sates (Alan, 1989). The first half of the 1990s not only
saw several studies focusing attention on various other markets but also testing the applicability
o f previous research findings in these markets (Ray, 1994; Rah et al., 1994; Ray, 1991). These
studies, however, were m ostly limited to western countries (Sweeting, 1997; Knight, 1994;
Landstrom , 1993; Sapienza et al., 1994; Sapienza et aL, 1995).

3.2.1

R esearch in Venture Capital Involvement

The institutionalisation and recognition of venture capital, as a viable financing alternative, began
in the United States. It is, therefore, understandable why most o f the research in this area is
confined to United States an d/or Europe. So far, the research, as regards venture capital
firm /portfolio com pany relations, has covered both the financial and non-financial assistance
provided by the venture capital firm to portfolio companies. The subject of involvement of
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venture capital firms with their portfolio companies has received more attention during the
1990s. The interest was largely sparked by a suggestion from Timmons and Sapienza (1992) that
only those venture capital firms are likely to survive an industry shake out which distinguish
themselves through value adding involvement in their portfolio companies. However, the
literature discussing the non-financial aspects o f the venture capital firm ’s involvement in the
portfolio com pany has attended more to the extent and focus of the venture capital firm’s
involvement rather than answering the question o f whether the venture capital firms’
involvement in their portfolio companies add value to their portfolio companies (MacMillan et
a l, 1988; Flynn, 1992). The research interest in the field o f the venture capital firm ’s involvement
has coincided with the movement of venture capital research beyond the exploratory stage
(Bruno, 1986). Consequently, m ost of the research is based on questionnaires and personal
interviews. Another characteristic o f research in this area is a comparatively larger focus on high
technology companies (Wright and Robbie, 1997). Countries besides the United States have,
however, not necessarily shared the technology focus in venture capital research (Murray, 1992;
Rizzoni, 1991; M ason and Harrison, 1992).

3.2.2

Is Previous Research in Venture Capital Relevant in an International Context?

Considerable diversity exists between venture capital markets in different countries (Hurry et al.,
1992). This difference forces us, at times, to redefine venture capital in m any individual situations.
Questions about the inclusion o f very large management buyouts/buyins and later stage
investments within the sphere o f venture capital, as in the United Kingdom (Murray, 1995), are
still being debated (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; N V CA , 2000). Thus, fo r researchers
contemplating investigation o f less explored markets, grappling with the definition of venture
capital is one o f the more searching questions that must be answered satisfactorily. Designing a
research question is made more difficult by the fact that respective environments influence
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elementary research parameters. Thus, the term value added may be interpreted differently.
While, it is expected that the difference in interpretation m ay result in a new perspective that is
not comparable with the existing body of literature, the existing literature cannot be termed
irrelevant. Internationalisation of venture capital and past efforts toward replication o f the United
Sates m odel in many Asian countries point towards a possible broad convergence on many
features o f venture capital. M any inferences, thus, m ay turn out to be transportable across
countries. The existing literature, in any case, serves as a useful starting point for venture capital
research.

3.3

Venture Capital Fiim /Poitfolio Company Relationship Dynamics

In the classical20 sense venture capital firms are organised as limited liability partnerships and seek
to finance new or developing high growth firms which do not have access to the public securities
market o r institutional lenders (Morris, 1991). A venture capital firm acts as a financial
intermediary receiving funds from subscribers and investing on their behalf in portfolio
companies, invariably, in the shape o f equity or long-term debt which m ay be convertible into
equity at a later stage (Robbie & Wright, 1996). Venture capital firms, consequendy, can be
theorised as a professional service not dissimilar to commercial banking, investment banking or
even insurance (Swartz, 1991). Venture capital firms usually invest in groups, commonly termed
‘syndicates’, with one of the firms acting as ‘lead’. The syndicate structure of a venture capital
market holds several advantages for venture capital firms (Lem er, 1994)21. The post investment
relationship between a venture capital firm and a portfolio company typically lasts from 3 to 10
years (Sapienza and Am ason, 1993). A venture capital firm offers more than finance (Roberts a,

20 The venture capital market m odel as developed in the United States.
21 Syndication m ay lead to a superior selection o f investments. Syndication also gives venture capitalists a a chance to check out
their ow n thinking against other knowledgeable sources Syndicating first-round venture investments m ay lead to better decisions
about w hether to invest in firm s. Syndication is also a mechanism through which venture capitalists exploit informational
asym m etries.

34

3: L itm rture Review

1991; Fried and Hisrich, 1995) by actively monitoring the project and participating, within
limitations, in decision-making processes. They may, sometimes, assume a managerial role within
the portfolio company. To some researchers, this appears to be one o f the m ost significant
distinguishing features that sets the Venture capital firm apart from other capital providers (Rock,
1991; Perry, 1988). Venture capital has been characterised as the combination o f capital and
consulting (W ame, 1988).

The post investment involvement o f a venture capital firm and its portfolio company is unlikely
to follow a set pattern. Basically, the complexity grows out o f the three dimensions o f the venture
capital firm /portfolio company relationship. First, portfolio companies do differ according to
size, industry, technology etc. Secondly, relationship parameters, like the relative amount and
share o f equity and the lead status role of venture capital firms, m ay influence relationship
patterns. Thirdly, venture capital firms also differ. F or a while, a misconception about the
homogeneity o f the venture capital business clouded this third dimension of the relationship.
However, it was later found that even within the United States the venture capital industry is not
hom ogenous, as believed in the past (Fried and Hisrich, 1988). In fact researchers started
examining the differences (Robinson, 1987; Florida and Kenny, 1988; Sapienza and Timmons,
1989) am ong venture capital firms long before venture capital became recognised as a
heterogeneous industry (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). Because of the networking of co
investors the relationship between a venture capital firm and a portfolio com pany was not
believed to be dyadic (Stier and Greenwood, 1995). However, the concentration o f research
studies focusing exclusively on the relationship between the lead investor and the portfolio
company (Rosenstein et aL, 1989; Pandey and Jang, 1996; Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Sapienza,
1992) is indicative o f a one to one relationship.
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The relationship between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur is governed by several
structural governance mechanisms (Fried and Hisrich, 1995; Rosenstien, 1988; Reid et al., 1997;
Barney et aL, 1989; Gladstone, 1989; Barney et aL, 1994). One of the monitoring mechanisms is
to adjust contact frequency. G om pers (1995) has shown that a decrease in industry ratios o f
tangible assets to total assets, higher market to book ratios and greater R & D concentration results
in more active monitoring o f the portfolio company. Compensation schemes are put in place to
offer the entrepreneur appropriate incentives. Convertible securities are used which give Venture
capital firms an option to sell their stake back to the entrepreneur. Covenants are also used to
manage risk (Cornelius, 1992) and to limit entrepreneurial behaviour detrimental to value
maximisation efforts of venture capital firms (Gompers and Lem er, 1996). Although Gom pers
(1995) has downplayed the role o f accounting information and reports submitted by the portfolio
companies to their Venture capital firms fo r facilitating governance, som e researchers (Robbie et
aL, 1992; Sweeting, 1991) have specifically addressed the subject as very important.

3.3.1

The Extent of Influence and Governance

Whether and how venture capital firms can influence a portfolio company’s decisions,
considering their “ arm’s length” (MacMillan et al., 1988) position, has attracted very little
attention. The argument to explain influence (Gomez-Meija et aL, 1990) is based on resourcedependence theory (Yutchman and Seashore, 1967) as Stiglitz and W eiss (1982) have applied it to
the banking industry. As influence is the process of exercising power, the amount o f power that
A exercises on B depends on the degree to which B depends on A fo r things B needs. Portfolio
companies are primarily dependent on venture capital firms for capital (Frederiksen et aL, 1990).
The uncertainty in portfolio companies’ circumstances also increases the dependence o f portfolio
companies on the venture capital firm s. The dependency, and hence potential for influence, is
also increased in that there are not many alternative sources of financing for high tech firms
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(Rosenstien et al., 1993). The primary reason for the lack o f alternative financing is because the
value of portfolio companies lies in their potential growth rather than their tangible assets (Jeng
and Wells, 2000). A venture capital firm’s influence is multiplied further if it is able to add
important resources to the resource pool o f a portfolio company. This argument stems from the
findings of Salancik and P feffer (1974) who have indicated that the power of a department in an
organisation is a function o f the number and extent o f important resources contributed by the
department. Thus venture capital firms are in a position to exercise, whether they choose to or
not, enormous real and potential power over the portfolio company. Although, venture capital
firms are not the only equity investors to be involved in investees (Adamati et a l, 1994; Gatson
and Bell, 1988), the fact that venture capital firms do exercise a greater control over portfolio
• companies is supported by the studies which have found that venture capital firms have been
known to perform som e key corporate functions (Sahlman, 1990) and even take complete
control o f the portfolio company dismissing the original entrepreneur (Q ian et al., 1990).
Although it cannot be said with certainty whether the influence of venture capital firms on
portfolio companies has undergone a change, evidence shows that the power that financial
institutions exercised over corporations has declined (Herman, 1981).

Before going through past research, which focuses on the extent o f involvement of the venture
capital firm in its portfolio company, it needs to be mentioned that there are differences among
researchers regarding the use of a common scale to measure involvement. The criteria most
researchers have used is the amount o f time spent by the venture capital firm with their portfolio
companies (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989), the number o f activities that a venture capital firm is
involved in (Rosenstein et al., 1989; Pandey and Jang, 1996; MacMillan et al., 1988) or the
frequency o f venture capital firm /portfolio company interaction (Sapienza and Gupta, 1994;
Sapienza, 1992).
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A venture capital firm ’s involvement with a portfolio company is usually at a senior level
(Macmillan et al., 1988) and the senior partners may spend as much as 60% o f their time in post
investment activity (Gorman and Sahlman, 1986). Venture capital firms differ in the amount of
time they spend with their portfolio companies (Robinson, 1987; Gorman and Sahlman, 1986).
Lead venture capital firms are generally more involved with their portfolio companies than the
non-lead firms (Gorman and Sahlman, 1986; Elango et a l, 1995). A comparison of research
conducted by Gorm an and Sahlman (1986) and Elango et al. (1995) indicates the different
amounts o f time venture capitalists spend with their portfolio companies. The earlier study shows
markedly less time allocation compared to the later study. This may suggest that venture capital
firm s’ involvement in their portfolio companies is increasing. The difference is probably
understated as the first study concentrates on early stage ventures where the involvement is
thought to be higher (Sapienza, 1992). MacMillan et aL (1988) have classified the involvement of
venture capital firms in their portfolio companies as low (laissez-faire), moderate and high (close
tracker). This classification is generally accepted and often quoted in research studies relating to
the involvement of venture capital firms.

Macmillan et al. (1988) have also concluded that venture capital firms are more involved with
their portfolio companies sim ply because they chose to be involved. Barry (1994) has refined this
conclusion by citing evidence that the choice o f involvement is in turn dependent on the need to
be involved as perceived by the venture capital firm. Sadder (1993), however, has argued that
although involvement m ay be a matter o f choice, in som e comparable cases, the difference in
involvement is dependent on contingent factors (Sweeting, 1991), some o f which, may not be
under the control o f the venture capital firm There have been a number of research studies that
have found adequate evidence that these “ contingent factors’ do influence the involvement of a
venture capital firm (Sapienza et al., 1996; Sapienza and Timmons, 1989; Barney et al., 1996).
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3.3.1.1

Contributing Factors Determining the Extent o f Venture Capital Firm ’s
Involvement

Based on the above two point o f views, the research on factors influencing involvement can
broadly be divided into two parts. Firstly, a venture capital firm’s involvement is dependent on
their perceived role, which is, primarily, managing the risks of the proposed venture (Macmillan
et a l, 1985; Ruhunka and Young, 1991; Driscoll, 1974). Secondly, it is also dependent on a
number o f other factors over which venture capital firms have little control

3.3.1.1.1

M anaging R isk

The argument that venture capital firms may exercise greater influence on a portfolio company
when there is a perception of higher risks is based on Galbraith’s (1973) information processing
theory. The theory concludes that the complexity o f a decision making process is dependent on
“task uncertainty” . Task uncertainty, in this case, is the gap between the information necessary to
make effective decisions and the information already possessed by the decision-makers. This
suggests that the venture capital firm will seek greater control, and hence more information from
the portfolio company in the case o f higher risk, as perceived by the venture capital firm,
resulting in greater interaction. Sapienza et al. (1994) have found general evidence in support of
the argument and state that there is less involvement of venture capital firms in monitoring
activities in the portfolio companies with comparatively lesser risk. It needs to be mentioned that,
though a venture capital firm s’ involvement may be an attempt to reduce risk, greater
involvement is not always cost effective and needs to be balanced against the benefits
obtained(Bam ey et a l, 1989; MacMillan et al., 1988). The existing literature on venture capital, in
regard to risks faced by a venture capital firm vis-à-vis a portfolio company, has looked at this
problem from two basic viewpoints. One group o f researchers simply considers these as parts of
business risks while others see these risks as essentially emanating from agency relations, believed
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to exist, between a venture capital firm and a portfolio company. There is, however, considerable
overlap, from both points of view, in regard to factors that are understood to affect a venture
capital firm ’s involvement with its portfolio company.

3.3.1.1.2

B usiness R isk

Business risk, faced by venture capital firms, has been defined as the uncertainty associated with
obtaining a return on investment in a new firm due to that firm ’s competitive environment
(Barney et al., 1989). The business risks, in regard to venture capital, have been broadly
conceptualised in terms o f venture performance, the technology being pursued by the venture
and venture stage (Sapienza et al., 1995). There is sufficient consensus that venture
perform ance and technology has a direct relation with the venture capital firm ’s involvement
(Sadder, 1993). Research conducted in the United K ingdom has gone as far as to confirm that,
irrespective o f the initial strategy preference, heightened intrusion by a venture capital firm
resulted when the investee com pany was in particularly difficult circumstances (Murray, 1991).
The relations between venture stage and involvement has remained a subject o f debate. The
research findings in this case can simply be classified into studies which did not find any
correlation between the stage of the portfolio company and the heightened venture capital firm s’
involvement (MacMillan et a l, 1988; Elango et aL, 1995), and studies which found otherwise
(Gorman and Sahlman, 1986).

3.3.1.1.3

Agency R isk

The literature on agency risk in venture capital considers the relationship between a venture
capital firm and a portfolio company from a principal/agent viewpoint (Reid, 1996; Fiet, 1995;
G ian et aL, 1990). An agency relation is one where a “principal” i.e. a venture capital firm
delegates its authority to an "agent", a portfolio company, to perform some service for the
principal. This point of view has its basis in the division that exists between management and
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ownership, as in the case of corporations (Goase, 1937; Hoffm an. 1982; Howe and Patterson,
1985). Agency theory is acknowledged “by its emphasis on the risk attitudes of principals and
agents" (Barney & Hesteiiy, 1996:124).

Agency risks, as faced by a venture capital firm, are primarily classified into moral hazard risk and
adverse selection risk. Moral hazard is a risk where the entrepreneur m ay not put forth the efforts
originally agreed upon. The risk of adverse selection pertains to the possibility o f an entrepreneur
misrepresenting h is/h er abilities. The basic premise holds that the frequency of a venture capital
firm /portfolio com pany interaction will be greater when high agency risks necessitate greater
monitoring by the venture capital firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Barney et al., 1989; Reid, 1987).
As applied to venture capital firm /portfolio company relations, there exist multiple sources of
agency risks (Callahan and Sharp, 1985). So far, the variables that effect governance, derived from
agency theory and found positively related to involvement, include venture capitalist/chief
executive officer goal congruence, stage o f the business, degree of technical innovation and
physical distance between the venture capital firm and the portfolio company (Sapienza and
Gupta, 1994). The involvement has been found to be negatively related to the experience o f the
chief executive o f the portfolio company and the extent o f the venture capitalists’/entrepreneurs
personal relationship (Barney et al., 1989; Gomez-Meija et al., 1990, Sapienza and Gupta, 1994).
The agency risk factors of the venture capital firm /portfolio company experience and the length
of the venture capital firm’s association with the portfolio company has produced mixed results
at an international level (Sapeinza et aL, 1995; Sapienza et a l, 1996). There is disagreement on the
application o f agency theory to venture capital firm / portfolio company relations (Cable and
Shane, 1997). The empirical research on venture capital suggests that there may not always exist a
hierarchical relationship between a venture capital firm and a portfolio company. Moreover, there
is room fo r opportunistic behaviour on the part of a principal (venture capital firm) making
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desertion a possibility (Sahlman, 1990), which challenges one o f the basic premises of agency
theory. Furthermore, the portfolio company's performance, to som e extent, also depends on the
competence o f the venture capitalist.

3.3.1.1.4

Contingent Factors

The venture capital firm s’ own circumstances, which are beyond their control, are also likely to
effect the extent of involvement. The venture capital industry has become increasingly specialised
(Robinson, 1987; Swartz, 1991; Gorm an and Sahlman, 1986). Research studies have identified
technology being pursued (Tybjee and Bruno, 1984; Sadder, 1993) and the investment stage of
the portfolio com pany (Gorman and Sahlman, 1986; Robinson, 1987) as possible areas in which
venture capital firms m ay specialise. Thus, venture capital firms specialising in particular stages or
technologies, may be forced to get more involved in their portfolio companies because of high
risk factors. Similarly, the size of the venture capital firm in terms o f capital under management
(Elango et aL, 1995) and the experience o f the venture capitalists (Sapienza et a l, 1996) may
reflect on the venture capital firm’s decision to be more involved with the portfolio company.
M oreover, geographic proximity of the venture capital firm with the portfolio company may also
effect the extent o f involvement as venture capital firms located close to their portfolio
companies tend to be more involved in their portfolio companies (Gomez-Meija et al., 1990).
The research conducted by Wright et al. (1994), though restricted to management buyouts, found
that larger deals attracted repeated and active monitoring by venture capital firms in the United
Kingdom . Cultures differ across countries and so does the concept o f venture capital. These
differences ultimately influence methods o f doing venture capital business (Clark, 1987). These
differences are also reflected in the extent and frequency of a venture capital firm’s/portfolio
company’s interaction (Sapienza et al., 1994; Jo g et a l, 1991).
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3.3.2

The Choice O f Platforms

The m ost com m on (Robert, 1983) and influential (Landstrom , 1990) method o f venture capital
firm s’ involvement in their portfolio companies is through participation on the Board of
Directors. Although any contribution or initiative to contribute by the venture capital firm may
not be the result of, or by virtue of, their seat on the Board, there is a direct relationship between
the increased role of the venture capital firm on the Board and management’s favourable
assessm ent o f the resources (finance, experience, expertise, technical assistance etc) provided by
the venture capital firm (Landstrom, 1990). The existing literature, while discussing a venture
capital firm’s contribution, rarely distinguishes the involvement o f the venture capital firm
through different platforms. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that the greatest involvement o f a
venture capital firm in its portfolio company is through representation on the Board (MacMillan
et aL, 1989). Even in those cases where venture capital firms dp have membership on the board,
they m ay also be involved through form al/inform al meetings (Gomez-Meija, 1990). The venture
capital firm m ay also take advantage of making unexpected telephone calls to C E O ’s in an effort
to update themselves as to the status of the business and provide an opportunity fo r the C E O to
discuss important issues (Fiet, 1995).

Research studies on board representation o f venture capital firms in portfolio companies have
analysed the actual representation decision, its size and the influence board members cany within
the board o f directors. A venture capitalists’ desire to be represented on the board o f a portfolio
com pany m ay depend on its choice (A V Q , 1999) or the presence of various other factors. Local
regulations m ay prevent a venture capital firm from claiming a seat on the board. In Japan, for
example, it is unusual for a venture capital firm ’s representative to be on the board of a portfolio
com pany due to antitrust laws (Spencer, 1995). Furthermore, in cases o f syndicate financing,
representation o f non-lead managers on the board o f a portfolio company is also uncommon
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(Rosenstein, 1990). The size o f a venture capital firm ’s investment may have som e bearing on
their representation (Elango et aL, 1995). The number of board members that will represent a
venture capital firm will also depend on circumstances. It has been determined that a portfolio
com pany with proximity to a venture capital firm is likely to have more venture capital board
member involvem ent/representation than others (Lemer, 1995). Lem er (1995) has also
concluded that there is heightened involvement of venture capital firms on the board in times of
crises, and the number of board members representing a venture capital firm increases between
financing rounds when the firm ’s C E O is replaced in the interval Venture capitalists’ number
and influence on the Board also tends to be determined by the diversity o f ownership in a
portfolio company. The com pany with a comparatively wider ownership (mainly public limited
companies), tend to be influenced more by the C E O in regard to the selection o f the board of
directors (Rosenstien, 1990). It has also been established that, generally, the Board o f a high-tech
portfolio com pany is dominated by venture capital firms (Rosenstein et aL, 1993).

In regard to the direct interaction between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur, one of the
limiting factors for a venture capitalist is the paucity o f time. The decision to interact is also
influenced by the apprehension that excessive intrusion in the portfolio com pany may cause
resentment on the part of the portfolio company an d/or encourage complacency where the chief
executive o f the portfolio com pany will not take risks thereby jeopardising the entrepreneurial
spirit o f the project. It has also been argued that as a result o f greater contact, the chief executive
of the portfolio company m ay cease feeling inhibited about taking a decision contrary to the
wishes and interest of the venture capital firm. The risk is greater when he/she has a greater
predilection to serve self-satisfying goals (Barney et aL, 1989). The last argument appears tenable
because the chief executive o f the portfolio company has also much at stake in the shape of
h is/h er equity investment, which ranks him /her almost equal to the venture capital firm in terms
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of expectations from the venture. Thus, the chances of adverse selection or bad judgement may
be greater than those of moral hazard or self-satisfying motives. It needs to be emphasised,
however, that the incentive for the venture capital firm to be in contact with the chief executive
of the portfolio com pany will always remain (Sapienza and Gupta (1994), because expecting
‘perfection’ from the management team of the portfolio company, in all circumstances, is
im possible. M oreover, managerial competence in the portfolio company is usually the greatest
concern o f the venture capital firm (Ruhunka and Young, 1987).

An alternative way of looking at the issue of venture capital governance is suggested here in
Table 3.1. In order to understand the value-added role o f investors, like venture capital firms,
there is a need to make a distinction between value-added investors and others. Governance is a
broad term and covers the activities of all types of investors. It should be separated into elements
which will draw attention to the role of an investor vis-a-vis his/her investment. The division of
governance into three modes each, with their own unique features, is useful. The basic objective
o f “ monitoring” is to seek information from an investee company and to analyse this information
in order to determine the extent o f risk. Monitoring indicates to the venture capital firm when to
make adjustments in other governance modes. Information about an investee company is
gathered from multiple platform s ranging from telephone conversations with the management of
the investee company to on-site physical inspection. Moreover, there are several external sources,
which help determine the extent o f risk in a broader industry scenario. The scope and amount of
inform ation flow can be adjusted by increasing/decreasing the number, frequency and time
allocation o f the relevant platform.
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3.1 C la ssifica tk m o f G overnance M odes

O bjective

R isk
M an agem en t
Platform s

M onitoring
Seek Information

#

1 l .
Add value

Analyse and A ssess

Control

Minimise

Internal

• Compensation
schemes

•
•

• Convertible
securities
• Covenants

•

Telephone
Form al/ informal
Meetings
• Board Participation
• Reports
• Physical Inspection
External
• Competitors
• Industry data
• Journals/
Newspapers etc
•
•
•

Frequency
Number
Time spent

•
•
•

Extent
Size/num ber
Scope

•
•
•

Stage
A pproach

.......—

Establish
standards
and provide incentives

•
•

A djustm en t
M ech an ism

^

M ostly post-investment
' Hands-off

M ostly pre-investment
Passive

Telephone
Form al/Inform al
Meetings
Board Participation

Frequency of
Interaction
Participation in
Num ber o f Activities
Time spent

Post-Investment
Pro-active

Controlling indicates a different governance mode. One of the objectives of controlling is to set
standards o f performance and behaviour for the management of the portfolio company. Another
objective is to develop adequate and appropriate incentives for the portfolio company
management in order to achieve the desired level of performance. This exercise ensures that the
risks already identified are prevented from increasing any further. This goal is primarily achieved
through the use o f convertible debts and ratchet (staged) financing (Gompers, 1997). Potential
moral hazards are also controlled though various covenants contained in the financing agreement
(Barney et al., 1994; Chan et aL, 1990). Control is also established through innovative
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compensation schemes employed to offer appropriate incentives (Sahlman, 1994). M ajor changes
in these variables are less likely to occur after the investment has been made. Thus, these controls
are passive by nature.

The purpose o f what is classified as “ involvement” is to add value by increasing the chances of
survival o f the portfolio company and hence minimising risk. This is primarily achieved through
actual participation in the portfolio company's business activities. This classification underscores
the point that while other suppliers of funds, like banks, only monitor and control their
investments from relevant platform s, what makes a venture capitalist special is his involvement
with the investee, where the value-added objective assumes more prominence. It is argued
further that the involvement issue is akin to the value-added question. It, however, needs to be
emphasised that while some governance platforms are easily identified with a governance mode,
it is difficult to draw a line between others. F or example, a telephone conversation may start with
the venture capitalist seeking information from the entrepreneur Le. monitoring, and may end
with the venture capitalist conveying useful information/advice Le. involvement.

3.3.3

Areas And Focus O f The Venture Capital Finn’s Involvement In The Portfolio
Com pany

The last half o f the 1980s saw efforts on the part o f researchers to identify (Timmons and
Bygrave, 1986; MacMillan et aL, 1989; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989) and rank (Perry, 1988;
Sapienza and Timmons, 1989; Landstrom, 1990) the activities (in order of importance and the
extent o f involvement) in which venture capital firms were involved with their portfolio
companies. MacMillan et aL (1989) identified as many as 20 activities in their study, including;

1) assistance in finding and selecting key management team personnel;

2) solicitation o f essential suppliers and customers;
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3) strategic planning;

4) assistance in obtaining additional financing;

5) operational planning ; and

6) replacement of management personnel when appropriate.

Gorm an and Sahlman (1989) added the provision of network of contacts to this list. This activity
is now identified as one of the more important areas o f contribution (Litder and Sweeting, 1989;
Jarillo, 1989).

Although researchers differ slightly (Rosenstein, 1988; Rosenstein et al., 1990; MacMillan et al.,
1989; Ehrlich et al., 1994), an indicative study by Rosenstein et al. (1989) regarding the focus o f a
venture capital firm ’s involvement found that the chief executive of the portfolio company
regarded the five m ost important areas of the venture capital firms’ involvement according to
ranking as;

1) a sounding board to the management team;

2) interfacing with the investor group;

3) monitoring the operations;

4) monitoring financial performance; and

5) recruitment/replacement of the chief executive of the portfolio company.
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The evidence that captive22 venture capital firms tend to have more financial expertise whereas
independent venture capital firms have more industrial expertise and hence greater involvement
(Beecroft, 1994) suggests that the focus of the venture capital firm’s involvement depends on the
skills and expertise available to the venture capital firm. Moreover, the emphasis or importance of
any activity has been found to be dependent on the stage at which the venture capital firm
discovers its investment (Sapienza and Timmons, 1989; Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Rosenstein,
1993). Venture capitalists have been “ characterised” as coach, mentor and adviser based on their
particular activities (Sapienza and Timmons, 1989; Landstrom, 1990) but this approach tends to
generalise the relationship, which depends on multiple factors. The factor dependent
characterisation (Lorenz, 1989; O lofsson, 1985) approach is comparatively recent and appears to
be more useful than simple characterisation o f the venture capitalist’s role.

3.4

The Value Added Question

Managerial support activities on the part o f equity investors can help to add value to the firm
(Thurow, 1992; Klien, 1987). Even discounting the actual contribution, one o f the objectives of
the venture capital firm through involvement with the portfolio company is an attempt to add
value (Bhide, 1994). Amit et a l (1998) have argued that venture capital firms will generally
operate in an environment where their relative efficiency in selecting, monitoring and adding
value to the investment gives them a comparative advantage. The attempt to add value, in fact, is
difficult to segregate from the venture capital firm’s efforts to protea the investment and is
considered part of the venture capital process (Silver, 1985; Sadder, 1993). The question of value
added, however, has been a tricky one for research scholars. The basic problem emerges from the
f a a that it is very difficult to assess the im p aa o f particular decisions on the value of the
company. Any attempt at determination of value-added would lean toward subjectivity and

22 A venture capital firm fully o r partially owned b y another business.
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generalisation. It is, thus, not surprising that most of the studies are built around the perception
o f the venture capitalist an d /or the entrepreneur as regards addition o f value. M oreover, while
venture capital firms, are involved in a number of activities, their actual value added contribution
m ay not be in all areas of activity. Furthermore, the venture capital firm and its portfolio
company differ in composition, expertise, culture and a host o f other factors. These differences
reflect on the capacity of venture capital firms to add value and the appetite o f a portfolio
company to absorb added value. Technology oriented firms, for example, are considered
particularly receptive to value addition by equity investors because of their capability to absorb
inputs (Forest, 1990; Landstrom, 1990). In some cases the value added question may not arise
altogether because venture capital firms, for whatever reasons, may not be involved in their
portfolio companies. Research has shown that international differences do influence involvement
and may also prevent generalisation of findings (Sapienza et al., 1996). The argument over
addition o f value by venture capital firms in their portfolio companies has been debated for a
number o f years. The researchers, in regard to the value addition question, have taken two
general approaches. One set of studies considers the perception of venture capitalists/ chief
executives o f the portfolio company and the other looks at the perception of venture capital
firms in regard to value added.

3.4.1

The Rationale

Researchers have put forward several arguments to substantiate the existence of circumstances in
a venture capital/portfolio company relationship, which should result in value addition. One of
the arguments stems from the basic premise that organisations use information to reduce
uncertainty and curtail ambiguities (Daft and Lengel, 1986). This approach requires subjective
judgement and intuition (Daft and Lengel; Simon, 1987). Proper understanding of the problems,
therefore, is more important than information to better control ambiguities. When a venture
50

3: Literature Renew

capital firm and a portfolio company interact with each other value is added when better
understanding develops and creative solutions to problem s are found (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt,
1988). A nother argument in this context is based on the organisational learning model, which
assum es that learning improves performance (Argyris, 1994; M ezias and Glynn, 1993). Besides
any financial or non-financial assistance, portfolio companies get added value through learning
from venture capital firms (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Rock, 1991; Sapienza, 1992). “A s venture
capitalists have observed various cases o f business matters in other portfolio companies, they are
in a good position to give advice”23. The very process o f asking questions and engaging in due
diligence operations sharpens the thinking of the com pany management and inspires them to
think through their growth plans and potential problem areas in a more targeted manner (Sadder,
1993).

Since there is a need for sm all firms to focus on their strategic objectives (Roberts, 1991), a
venture capital firm can add value through regular checks forcing, CEO s to follow dominant
logic, focus on it, and limit the number of objectives (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). The contractual
arrangements said to be designed to control opportunism (Barney et a l, 1994) by the C E O ,
prevents management from non value maximising activities, links compensation with
perform ance, offers incentives to keep good managers (Wright and Robbie, 1997) and is really
geared tow ard value maximisation (Sahlman, 1990). Staged investments also enable a venture
capital firm to terminate involvement and cut back losses (Gom pers, 1995) hence maximising
value. A further rationale of possible value added has been forwarded by Caravalho (1996), which
is based on his finding that more than 3A o f venture capital firms operate in an informal network
and a m ajority o f venture capital firms reported acting on the suggestions of other venture capital

23 Personal correspondence record; Com m ents byJung-K yoo Yang, Chief, International Business Departm ent, K orea Technology
C orporation, South K orea
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firm s in as im portant a m atter as hiring a new manager. Based on this, Caravalho (1996) argued,
that through the m echanism of networking, a venture capital firm adds value by transferring
organisational capital to firms. He includes organisation culture, experience and knowledge in
organisation capital.

Reputed venture capital firm s, by backing a start-up, add a seal o f approval to a portfolio
com pany (Fried and Hisrish, 1994). This can translate into an increased availability o f a whole
gamut o f resources fo r the portfolio com pany at com paratively better terms com pared to those
businesses, not backed by venture capital firms. Supporting institutions like lawyers, accounting
firm s, auditors and lessors are known to gather around an “ approved” portfolio com pany in the
hope o f reaping benefits at a later stage (M agginson and W eiss, 1991; The Econom ist, 1997 (a);
Jarillo, 1989).

3.4.2

Venture Capital Firm /Entrepreneuris Perception

Venture capital firm s e x p e a that their involvement in the portfolio com pany will increase the
likelihood o f the success o f the venture (Rock, 1991; Perry, 1988) and m ay even be welcomed by
the portfolio com pany (Fried and H isrish, 1994; Bygrave and Tim m ons, 1992; Silver, 1985). The
previous research studies as far as the m ethodology is concerned, have been predominantly based
on survey instrum ents, case studies or interview data from venture capital firms about specific
com panies (G orm an and Sahlman, 1986; MacMillan et al., 1988; Rosenstein, 1988). Using similar
m ethodology, researchers have also co lleaed data from entrepreneurs about the involvement o f
respective venture capital firms in different aaivities (Fried and H isrish, 1994; Rosenstein et a l,
1993; R osenstein et al., 1989, Rosenstein et al., 1990). Lastly, by pairing the venture capital
firm /portfolio com pany as unit o f analysis, data has been colleaed from both participants to
evaluate the relationship (Sapienza and Tim m ons, 1989; Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al., 1996).
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Som e o f the studies have restricted themselves to high technology portfolio companies (Barney
et aL, 1996; Ehrlich et aL, 1994; Sapienza and Am ason, 1993; Stier and Greenwood, 1995).

The research results, overall, are conflicting (Cherin and H ergert, 1988; Sapienza, 1992). N o
relation has been found between intensity o f involvement, perception o f value addition and
venture perform ance (Rosenstien et aL, 1989; MacMillan et aL, 1988). The C E O s o f the portfolio
com panies do not see venture capitalists on the board as adding more value than any other board
m em ber (Rosenstein et aL, 1989) unless the venture capital firm is highly reputed (Rosenstien et
aL, 1993). Rosenstien et a l (1993) also found that the perception o f value added is greater where
higher activity is reported. According to them, monitoring o f operating and financial
perform ance and form ulation o f marketing plans have been identified by C E O ’s as areas in
which venture capital firm s apply great effort but do not produce as much value added as
expected. B ased on these findings they concluded that the value added depended on the type o f
activity undertaken.

Studies in the United K ingdom (Harrison and M ason, 1992) and the Netherlands (VanWakeren
et al., 1989) have found that entrepreneurs in the United K ingdom rate acting as a sounding
board and advising on strategic matters as the m ost important value adding activity of venture
capitalists. They depend more on the assistance o f venture capital firms than they do on other
types o f investors. G om ez et al.(1990) found through personal interviews that

C E O ’s of

portfolio com panies recognise the financial and networking contribution o f venture capital firms
as a positive value adding activity. They also found that managerial involvement by the venture
capital firm was perceived negatively by the C E O s’. These results m ay explain Flyn’s (1992)
findings that venture capital firms have a low involvement in the administrative aspects of the
new ventures. M urray (1994) has narrowed down finance as the only area where the portfolio
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com pany considers the skills of the venture capital firm better than that provided by other
investors. In contrast a British Venture Capital Association Survey (1992) has found that
portfolio com panies’ perception toward welcoming post investment involvement undergo a
change, and they start preferring active non-financial assistance.

The value added contribution was initially found, b y Sapienza and Timmons (1989), to vary
according to the stage o f m atunty o f the portfolio company, experience o f the C E O and the
am ount o f equity stake o f the venture capital firm in the portfolio company. Sapienza, however,
in his later study (1992) o f 51 matched pairs of venture capital firm s/C E O ’s discounted stage as a
factor. Instead, he found that a higher level o f innovation being pursued, com pared to a
com petitor, was positively related to value added. This means that a portfolio com pany pursuing
more intricate technology is more likely to experience a greater involvement o f the venture
capital firm24. A second finding from the Sapienza (1992) study was that greater an d/or open
interaction between venture capitalists/C EO resulted in a higher perception o f value-added. This
is basically a personal com patibility between C E O of the portfolio com pany and the venture
capitalist. H e also found the perception of value added to be related to venture performance.

3.4.3

Portfolio Com pany Performance

The research studies relating to the performance o f the portfolio com pany can be divided into
pre-IPO and p ost IP O analysis o f the performance. Although pre-IPO value added perception
has been found to be both direcdy correlated (Sapienza, 1992) and unrelated (Rosenstein et al.,
1989) to venture perform ance, the post-IPO success rate o f venture capital-backed ventures was
found to be significantly higher than the success rate of new ventures generally (Nash, 1988;
D avis and Stetson, 1984; M aier and Walker, 1987). These findings are debatable because a better

24 Perry (1988) and Tim m ons and Bygrave (1986) have pointed out the technology aspect o f the relationship in earlier studies.
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success rate o f venture backed firms m ay largely be the result o f other factors including the all
im portant fact that the selection o f the venture is a very rigorous exercise with discreet success
criteria (Bruno and Tybjee, 1985; Tybjee and Bruno, 1984; M arrifield, 1987; H all and H ofer,
1993; R ah et al., 1994; Knight, 1994). Thus, only those ventures are cleared fo r funding which
stand a better chance o f survival (Q ian, 1983). However, balancing this advantage is the fact that
venture capital firms end up financing ventures that cannot tap conventional sources o f financing
because o f the risks involved25. Thus, the performance o f venture-capital-backed ventures, even
when it is at par with non-venture-capital backed ventures, means added value. O ther possible
factors believed to result in value added, by effecting post-IPO perform ance, include the
incentive to exit (Berglof, 1994), the proper syndication o f investment (Adamati and Pfleiderer,
1994) and the staging o f investment (Bergmann and H ege, 1997). Barney et a l (1996) have
concluded that venture capital backing does improve the performance o f the portfolio companies
but only marginally.

The increased presence o f a venture capitalist on the board, as evidenced by their numbers, has
not been found to have any association with the perform ance o f the venture (Rosenstien, 1993).
It is generally acknowledged that there is a need fo r more research to investigate the relation
between venture capital finance and the success o f a venture (Brophy, 1986; Bygrave, 1987;
Tim m ons, F ast and Bygrave, 1983; Tybjee and Bruno, 1984).

Based on post-IP O perform ance analysis, the notion o f value added was earlier rejected by
Cherin and Hergert (1988) when they did not find any statistical difference between the riskadjusted returns o f venture backed and non-venture backed companies, after the initial public
offering, over a period o f two years. Sapienza and Tim m ons (1989) have expressed reservations

25 W inners curse.
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about the m ethodology used in this study through an analogy with two students studying at
H arvard who com e from different schools. They aigue that, in this case, differences in grades at
H arvard m ay not be a reflection of the quality of training provided by the respective schools.
Cherin and H ergert (1988) have them selves admitted that any value added m ay have already been
discounted through the initial price. Sapienza and Tim m ons (1989) have also questioned the
adequacy o f a two-year period to allow fo r the surfacing o f differences between venture-capitalbacked and non-venture-capital-backed ventures. Following on the premise that value added is
discounted through price at IP O stage, Brophy and V eiga (1988) postulated that the companies
backed b y venture capital should be less under-priced from the beginning and early returns
should vary less than firm s which are not in receipt o f venture capital. They found that venture
capital backed companies outperform ed others over 20 days after the initial public offering. They
also found that unlike non-venture backed companies, venture capital backed ventures do not
gain substantially from having a prestigious underwnter. However, G om pers and Lem er (1999)
have pointed out that underwnters m ay play a role in reducing asymmetric information thereby
reducing chances of a negative price reaction fo r an IPO .

Stein and Bygrave (1990) hypothesised that venture capital firms with more seats on the Board o f
a com pany add more value and thus the related portfolio companies should perform better post
IPO . They did find higher returns fo r these companies over a period o f four years after IPO .
Apparently, Cherin and H ergert (1988) have not only conducted their study over a shorter period
but also ignored the extent o f the post-IP O association between the venture capital firm and the
portfolio com pany. Bharat & O m esh (1995) in a relatively recent study with more parameters of
operating perform ance have found that the market appears to recognise the value o f venture
capital firm monitoring which is reflected in the higher levels o f market to book ratios and P /E
ratios at the tim e o f an initial public offering. Going further, they have also found that venture
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capital backed IP O firm s have superior operating perform ance com pared to non-venture backed
IPO firm s over a three-year post issue period. Besides this, there is considerable evidence that
companies who go private through L B O /M B O experience considerable improvement in
performance (Kaplan, 1989; M uscarella and Vetsuypens, 1990; Smith, 1990).

3.5

Conclusion

The surge in interest in venture capital throughout the world owes more to form al
institutionalisation o f this market rather than the novelty o f this concept. Since the United States
has always been on the forefront o f this institutionalisation, it is not surprising that m ost o f the
development and research relating to this market has originated from the United States. As the
formal recognition o f this concept has crossed international boundaries so has the research
interest. How ever, academics have had a hard time keeping pace with the speed at which the
world has form ally em braced this idea. Researchers have covered different aspects o f this market
as it has progressed and the 1990s has seen a growing interest in the value added role o f the
venture capital firm. The 1990s also saw a number o f in-depth research studies o f the venture
capital m arket in countries other than the United States. A sia remains, largely, an unexplored
territory. H ow ever, because o f their fast developing venture capital market, Asian markets are an
ideal ground (Scheela, 1994) fo r research in venture capital.

The recent surge in venture capital has sparked interest in venture capital by investors and policy
makers creating more room fo r research (Gom pers, 1998). F o r policy makers, attempting to
promote venture capital, it is critically important to find out the different aspects o f the venture
capital m arket which are important fo r making more venture capital available and insuring the
success o f enterprising new ventures (Poterba, 1989; G om pers and Lem er, 1997; Jen g and Wells,
1997). F o r investors, better understanding o f the market will improve their chances o f focused
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investment strategies. Venture capital firm s and companies financed by venture capital operate in
an environment where the size is relatively sm all but the risks are high. F o r researchers, this harsh
environment presents extreme and borderline cases fo r the testing o f not only business theories
but also other em erging theories from a number of disciplines (Kierulff, 1986: Brophy, 1986),
providing new opportunities fo r research.

While researchers have taken a keen interest in value added by venture capital firms in their
portfolio com panies in the last twenty years, this area of research is still relatively new. M any
venture capital firm s pride them selves on and advertise their value-added potential; however,
their contribution to the portfolio companies has never been proven categorically by research.
While previous research has confirm ed that firms backed by venture capital perform better, the
actual value added analysis by researchers has sometimes produced conflicting results. Thus there
is room fo r further research on the value added question (Barney, 1994; G om pers, 1998).

The research conducted, so far, in value addition by venture capital firm s has discovered m any
factors, which affect this relationship. Although value-added has been m easured differently, there
seems to be strong indications that the presence o f certain factors does affect value-added
without regard to how it is measured. There has been, however, little attempt to classify these
factors in a logical relationship to each other and the value-added phenomena. G assification o f
these factors will help future research in three different ways. Firstly, it will be clearer to the
researchers exactly what is being m easured and how it relates to other factors being considered.
Secondly, the classification o f these factors will help in a more focused research. Lastly,
identifying broad classifications m ay also explain the reason for conflicting research results.

Another noticeable feature o f previous research in value added by venture capital firms is the lack
o f a theoretical base. Sapienza et aL (1996) has noted that studies o f venture capital firm ’s
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activities and value added have tended to be descriptive and somewhat atheoretical. There is thus,
a need to put together a theory, which explains the basic model relating to value addition that is
also in line with the research conducted in this area.

A large m ajority o f value added research has been conducted in the United States which is a
mature venture capital market. Although some research has been conducted at international level
(Sapienza et aL, 1995, Sapienza et al., 1996), it is limited to Europe which shares a comparatively
sim ilar culture with United States. A research study conducted in a different cultural setting will
provide more information about how the value added question responds to cultural differences
and how value added is seen in a developing venture capital market

M ost o f the previous research studies have analysed the different activities that venture capitalists
are involved in with their portfolio companies as an indication o f value added without going into
the potential of venture capital firms to add value o r the potential of portfolio companies to
absorb value. Sapienza et al (1995), however, have explored the value added question on the basis
o f dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salanchik, 1978). He argues that value m ay be the result o f
resource dependence o f the portfolio company. Thus, value added can be seen as a resource
question.

This study is an attempt to build on all the above ideas. As discussed in the next chapter, the
resource exchange perspective, in view o f the network-dyad relationship between a venture
capital firm and a portfolio company, has been identified as a more appropriate theoretical base
as an explanation o f value-added. An effort has also been made to put together a comprehensive
m odel o f value added which is also in line with the research conducted in this area.
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4.1

Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework

Introduction

The resource-based theory, around which the construction o f propositions revolves, is explained
in this chapter. The nature o f the relationship (network dyad) between the venture capital firm
and the portfolio com pany is also described. The later explanation of the resource exchange
paradigm and theoretical m odel logically follow s from both o f these. This chapter also includes a
discussion o f the resource exchange m odel as applied to the relationship between venture capital
firm s and their portfolio companies.

4.2

Resource26 B ased View o f the firm

Within the strategy field, scholars have been concerned prim arily with explaining the differences
in firm perform ance (Rumelt et aL, 1991). O ut o f m any possible explanations, two prominent
theories that, arguably, have made m ajor contributions to understanding these differences are
transaction costs theory and resource based theory o f the firm.

Although the term resource-based was originally attributed to Wemerfelt (1984), the resourcebased paradigm is primarily based on the sem inal work o f Edith Penrose (1959) and Joseph
Schum peter (1934). The theory argues that the differences in firms’ perform ances are primarily
because o f the heterogeneity o f their businesses (Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1991). The unique assets
and capabilities o f each firm are important factors, which give rise to imperfect competition and
provide opportunities fo r firm s to reap super-norm al profits. Early strategic decision models,
based on the theory, propose setting rational objectives followed by an internal appraisal of
capabilities and an external appraisal o f outside opportunities. The resultant fit between

26 T h e term resources has been used in this thesis to indicate resources, capabilities o r resource-based rapahilirips
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capabilities and opportunities shape a firm’s feasible expansion path, diversification and growth
strategies (M ahoney & Pandian, 1992; Thomas et al.,1999; A nsoff, 1965). N ovel combinations of
resources resulting from accumulation and exchange also generate new sources of value fo r firms
(Schum peter, 1934; Moran and G hoshal, 1996). This process also encourages innovation as it
feeds on diverse resource inputs (Kanter, 1988) and combinative capacities (Kogut and Zander,
1992).

Since the list o f resources possessed by firms is likely to be long and all resources m ay not create
com petitive advantage, researchers have tried to sim plify the identification process by
characterising and categorising these resources. Barney (1991) proposed that advantage-creating
resources m ust possess the attributes o f value, rareness, inimitability and non-substitutability.
G rant (1991) has argued that the level of durability, transparency, transferability and replicability
are im portant factors. Amit and Shoem aker (1993) have produced a list of eight characteristics of
advantage creating resources27 while Gollis and M otgom ery (1995) have limited these to five28.

The efforts to classify resources have been plagued by nomenclature problem s. The terms more
com m only used in the literature are skills, com petencies, resources, capabilities and even
resource-based capabilities. M ajoor and W itteloostuijn (1996) define resources as tangible and
intangible assets, which are tied semi-permanently to the firm. Som e writers used the term
resources to refer to anything, which could be thought o f as a strength o r weakness o f a given
firm (Learned et a l, 1969; W em erfelt, 1984). M ore recent writers have used the term to mean
positive assets and attributes enabling conception and implementation o f strategies that improve
effectiveness (D raft, 1983; Barney, 1991). There have been numerous attempts to categorise

27 N am ely, com plem entarity, scarcity, low tradability, inimitability, lim ited substitutability, appropriability, durability and overlap
w ith strategic industry focus.
28 Inimitability, durability, appropriability, siiisritutabiiityand competitive superiority.
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resources starting with the basic classification b y A n soff (1964) o f physical (inventory, plant),
m onetaiy (m oney, credit) and human (labor, management). Andrews (1971) later added
corporate com petencies to this classification. The concept o f com petencies further evolved into a
more detailed description o f organizational resources (H ofer & Schendel, 1978) and reputational
resources (Dollinger, 1995). Table 4.1 presents a com prehensive view o f resource classification
in view o f p ast research. It is based on ideas derived from Brush et al. (1997) and Fahy (2000).

While the resource-based theory is considered relevant to all firm s, it is generally believed to be
particularly suitable fo r new and sm all businesses (C ooper et al., 1991; Handjimanolis, 2000).
Dierickx and G ool (1989) have drawn a distinction between stock and flows o f resources. They
argue that the flow o f resources not only increases stock o f resources but also ensures that critical
stocks are n ot dissipated o r rendered useless. A s sm all and new ventures have fewer stocks of
resources, the m ost critical role o f the entrepreneurs o f sm all and new ventures is the acquisition,
developm ent and application o f resources that can lead to competitive advantage and superior
perform ance.

The union o f the resource based view with strategic management started in early 80’s
(Rumelt,1984; W em felt,1984; Barney, 1986b; Teece,1982). Resource-based theory, in recent
years, has contributed significantly to the literature on strategic management (Peteraf, 1993;
G rant, 1991; M ahoney and Pandian, 1992). While Porter’s (1980) book shifted the attention
toward external, industry-based competitive issues, resource-based theory has directed scholars
back tow ard the internal strengths and weaknesses o f the firm (Priem and B u tler, 2001 a).
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4.1 Classification of Resources

Basic Classification
Tangible Assets (Hofer &
Sehende! 1978)

Sub Classification

Fixed Assets (Wemerfelt,
1989)
Property Based (Miller and
Shamsie (1996)
Capabilities (Half 1992),

Technology (Dollinger, 1995)
Financial Resources (Ansoff, 1964) (Bygrave, 1992)
Organizational
(Brush et aL, 1997;
Brush and
Greene, 1996;
Fahy, 2000).

Organizational relationships, structures
(Tomer, 1987)
Routines, culture (Hofer &Schende! 1978; Wemerfelt,
1989)
Knowledge (Dollinger, 1995)
Achieved Attributes (Becker, 1964)
Education and Experience (Cooper, 1981; Glade, 1967)
Track Record and Reputation (Dollinger, 1995; Brophy,
1992)
Training (Barney, 1991)
Relationship and networks (Bondieu, 1983)
Family (Liebenstein, 1968)
Race and ethnicity
Political connections (Glade, 1967)
Reputation of groups (Barney, 1991)

Individual (Fahy, 2000)

Achieved Attributes (Becker, 1964)
Education and Experience (Cooper, 1981; Glade, 1967)
Track Record and Reputation (Dollinger, 1995; Brophy,
1992)
Training (Barney, 1991)

Invisible Assets (Itaim, 1987)

Intermediate goods (Amit and
Shoemaker, 1993)

Core Skills
(Irvin and Michaels, 1989)

Human
(Brush and Greene,
1996; Brush et aL,
1997)
Group (Fahy, 2000)
Social (Brush and
Greene, 1996;
Brush et aL, 1997)

Knowledge-based
Müler and Shamsie (1996)

Definition
Facilities and Equipment (Hofer &Schende! 1978),
(Wemerfelt, 1989)

Relationship and networks (Bordieu, 1983)
Family (Liebenstein, 1968)
Race and ethnicity
Political connections (Glade, 1967)
Reputation of groups (Barney, 1991)
Trademarks, patents and databases (Half 1992, Williams,
1992)

Blueprints (Wemerfelt, 1989)

D espite the fact that, in recent years, there has been a renewed interest displayed in the role of
resources as the m eans o f creating competitive advantage (Coyne, 1986; Ghemawat, 1986; Hall,
1989; G rant, 1991; M ahoney and Pandian, 1992; Williams, 1992), the resource based view does
suffer from a num ber o f weaknesses. It is often difficult to pinpoint the resource separately o r in
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com bination, which accounts fo r a firm ’s competitive advantage. Som e researchers have gone to
the extent o f saying that the ultimate resource responsible fo r a firm ’s competitive advantage can
never be identified (Collis, 1994). M oreover, resources cannot be evaluated in isolation because
their value is determined in the interplay with market forces. A resource that is valuable in a
particular industry or at a particular time might fail to have the sam e value in a different industry
or chronological context (Collis and M ontgomery, 1995). The fact that som e resources may
become specialised, in essence, producing a bundle (or bundles) o f co- specialised assets (Teece,
1986; Conner, 1991;Bamey, 1991) further com plicates the issue. The attempt at developing a
resource based predictive m odel o f new venture success, failure and growth (Cooper et aL, 1991)
has been m et with scepticism . The identification process also seem s to be retrospective rather
than predictive since once the factors, which have contributed to the firm ’s success, are
recognised, they are labelled as a source o f competitive advantage. This particular aspect of
resource-based theory has led som e scholars to term it as tautological (Priem and Butler, 2001
b)29.

4.3

Venture Capital Firm /Portfolio Com pany Network D yad

The relationship between the venture capital firm and the portfolio com pany does not fit
precisely into well-known relationships o f either market or hierarchy. In the market relationship
governance relies largely on price for control. It is basically competitive rather than symbiotic.
Hierarchical relationships are governed by authority as between an employer and an employee.
Researchers, who follow the m arket/hierarchy approach, believe that an agency relationship,
which is a form o f hierarchical relationship, exists between the venture capital firm and the
portfolio com pany (Ried, 1996; Fiet, 1995; Chan et al., 1990). Since there is room for

29 F o r an interesting expose on the status o f resource-based view as a theory see Priem and B uder (2001 a), Priem and Butler (2001
b) an dR yall (1998)
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opportunistic behaviour by the principal and the perform ance of the portfolio com pany depends,
to som e extent, on com petency of the venture capital firm, the existence o f an agency
relationship betw een the venture capital firm and the portfolio company is not always accepted.
Cornelius and Su (2000) assert that several covenants in the contractual arrangement, between a
venture capital firm and a portfolio company, are not identifiable with a classic principal/agent
relationship. M any venture capitalists believe this relationship to be partnership oriented rather
than a principal/agent relationship (Cornelius, 2000). Some venture capitalists see the
principal/agent relationship as a downgrading of relations. “It is important that both parties share
the sam e interest and act in the same direction to avoid the principal/agent relationship” 30. Smith
(1988) suggests that the relationship between the two can be more appropriately viewed as
reciprocal agency obligations. Thus, there is doubt whether traditional agency theory can be
applied to the venture capital firm /portfolio com pany relations. It is worth noticing that the
venture capital firm /portfolio company relationship is not the only one, which does not
correspond adequately to the two popular notions o f agency and hierarchy31. There is, thus, a
need to examine alternative relational arrangements. These alternatives have been variously called
quasifirm (Eccles, 1981) relational contracting (Macauly, 1963) hybrids (Powell, 1987) and
networks (Powell, 1990).

Powell (1990) first offered network form as a distinct organisational arrangement compared to
hierarchical o r market relationships. Networks can be defined as a set o f nodes and relationships
that connect the nodes (Formbrum, 1982). A more recent definition o f networks by Dubini and
Aldrich (1991) term s them as patterned relationships between individuals, groups and

30 P ersonal correspondence: Frédéric D e Lam inne, General M anager, E-G apital, Belgium , M ay2,20 01.
31 These relationships have been show n to exist in a variety o f settings including international business (C ontractor and Lorange,
1988), Japan ese textile p o r e , 1983) Sw edish large m anufacturing com panies (H akasson, 1987) and entrepreneurial firm s (Jarillo,
1988).
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organisations. From the resource-based perspective, network ties are considered as links to
clusters o f resources (Burt, 1992; Tichy, 1981). N etw ork relationships between firms are believed
to be lateral rather than vertical (Baker, 1992).

The literature on networks has been taken in two broad directions. Researchers adopting the first
direction are concerned with networks o f organizations and their patterns o f interaction. The unit
o f analysis is the broad network itself (Borch and Arthur, 1995; Grandori and Soda, 1995; G ray
1985; H akansson and Johanson, 1993). Researchers adopting the second direction focus on the
firm as the unit of analysis and are concerned with understanding how the firm creates and
manages a netw ork (Aldrich and Zim m er 1986; Dubini and Aldrich 1991; Venkataraman 1989).

Generally speaking, firms more likely to engage in network arrangements will be those that need
to exchange difficult to codify knowledge intensive skills, best transferred through processes of
collaborative inform ation sharing. Powell (1990) has particularly mentioned firms engaged in fast
moving industries with short product cycles as m ost likely to engage in network partnerships in
order to reposition products rapidly and respond quickly to changing market conditions and
technological developments. Dubini and Aldrich (1991) have added new ventures to this list. In
a network exchange relationship, the value o f the resource is one o f the central factors explaining
relationship behaviours and outcom es (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer and Now ak, 1976;
Thorelli, 1986; Harrigan, 1986). Bradach and Eccles(1989) have ascribed the control elements of
price, authority and

trust

to

market, hierarchical and network arrangements respectively.

Com plex netw ork relationships m aybe combinations o f all or any two arrangements with control
m echanisms existing in different proportions. In a network form of arrangement, additional
control elem ents like personal relationships, reciprocity, co-ordination, concern fo r reputation
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etc. also p lay an important role (Larson, 1992). While econom ic control is present, social control
plays a crucial role in network arrangements.

Portfolio com panies use a prim ary resource (finance) supplied by the venture capital firm. The
venture capital firm is not usually actively involved in the d ay to-day utilisation of this resource.
U nder these circum stances, a predominant control m echanism fo r the venture capital firm
remains trust. In the case o f venture capital firm /portfolio com pany relations trust has two
dimensions. Trust in the managerial abilities of the portfolio com pany for effective utilisation of
the resource and moral trust in the management. However, venture capital firm /portfolio
com pany relations are not a m atter o f trust only and other control elements also come into play.
F or exam ple, personal relationships between venture capitalists and the C E O of the portfolio
company, exchange history, risk level o f the portfolio com pany etc. have been known to affect
relational arrangements between the parties (Barney et al., 1989).

The netw ork m odel is believed to offer several advantages over other models (Larson and Starr,
1993). It is considered dynamic because it focuses on a com plex relationship between the units. It
em phasises exchange processes between entities and identifies the economic and social aspects of
these exchange linkages. It also highlights the fickle nature o f exchange relationships (Gabarro,
1987), which allows fo r further understanding of the stability and flexibility o f collective activities.
It also has the potential to account fo r the forces involved in organisational growth (Jarillo, 1988).

Inter-organizational relations can be studied in a multitude of ways, ranging from the
investigation o f overall netw ork properties, to dyad properties and to relational properties o f the
network's m em ber firms (Keister, 1999). One of the fundamental premises in this thesis is that
portfolio com panies and venture capital firms operate in a network environment and also use
network nodes to obtain resources. The relationship between the venture capital firm and the
67

4: TheoreticalFramework

portfolio com pany is one such relation. While we cannot ignore the network nature of the
relationship, it is viable to study this relation in a dyadic framework32 in what Larson (1992) terms
as a network dyad.

4.4

Resource Exchange and Inter-Finn Relations

Since it is posited that a com plex network arrangement exists between the venture capital firm
and the portfolio company, it then follows that social aspects o f the relationship should play a
vital role tow ard mutual satisfaction and the success o f the alliance. Larson (1992) has shown that
the social aspects o f alliances, as they exist between the venture capital firm and the portfolio
company, are critical to their co-ordination and maintenance. She specifically showed that when
the econom ic interest o f entrepreneurs and outsiders are governed through positive social
interaction, such partnerships endure. With these considerations in mind, it would be worthwhile
to look fo r the explanation o f a fruitful relationship, between the two, from a social point o f
view. Thus a m odel, which relies on social principles effecting relationship dim ensions, will be
put to an appropriate use if applied to the relationship between the venture capital firm and the
portfolio com pany. Thus there seem s to be a sufficiently strong case to explain the relationship
between the venture capital firm and the portfolio com pany from social exchange perspectives
under the banner o f resource-based theory.

The resource exchange paradigm, which can be termed as a hybrid o f resource-based and social
exchange theory (C ook and Em erson 1984; Em erson 1976), is not new. The social exchange, a
sociological theory, is based on the exchange o f rewards and costs to quantify the values o f
outcom es, from different situations, fo r an individual The social exchange theory is com prised o f
three main concepts, relational outcom es, relational satisfaction, and relational stability. Resource

32 Som e researchers have treated the relationship betw een venture capital firm s and the portfolio com pany as essentially dyadic
(Route and M aidique, 1986; M acM illan et aL, 1987; Sapienza, 1992).
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exchange theory focuses on the exchange o f resources between units applying the social
exchange principles.

Resource exchange theory can be divided into two closely related approaches. The first deals
with micro processes in an organisation. Im portant work in this regard includes Thibault and
K elley (1959) H om ans (1961) and Em erson (1962), who have relied on ideas from operant
psychology (Blau, 1964; Coleman, 1966). These works were primarily based on an individual
oriented theory, which studied individuals and very small groups. The second strand o f the
resource exchange m odel has been developed in the work o f Yutchman and Seashore (1967) and
White (1974) and a num ber of other writers, who have focused primarily on the macro
organisational process. The works o f Yutchman and Seashore (1967) and White (1974) are also
important because they brought into consideration the constraints and the contingencies that are
im posed on the organisation by outside factors. Since this development, the resource exchange
paradigm has been a basis fo r a num ber o f studies on agency theory and the relationship between
management and the owners of com panies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glasberg & Schwartz, 1983).
Similarities between individual oriented and firm oriented resource exchange theory has
remained. G eorgiou (1973) has explained this by arguing that a focus on the organisation as a
unit o f analysis is arbitrary and the basic strategic factor in the organisation remains the
individual.

4.5

Application o f the resource-exchange paradigm to the value added question

In addition to industry experience, the operational skills o f new ventures' management are also
important to the developm ent of the venture (e.g., Roure & K eeley, 1990; Rock, 1991). As the
management o f new ventures differ in industry experience (MacMillan et aL, 1989; Sapienza
1992), they are also likely to differ in the level o f operational skills and the resources available
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within the organisation. E fforts b y new venture management to acquire skills, technological or
otherwise, are facilitated by their relationship with venture capitalists. F o r a new venture
m anagement, venture capitalists provide an initial channel fo r acquiring critical information and
resources (Barney et al., 1996; Fiet, 1995a). The tim ely acquisition o f resources from venture
capital firm s is a com paratively low-cost method o f adding to the resource pool and reducing the
risk o f failure (Anderson & N aru s, 1990; Fiet,1995 a; Sapienza & Am ason, 1993). It is argued that
since the success o f a firm primarily depends on the availability o f resources and the capability to
use them efficiently, the perception o f value addition, from whatever sources, will depend on the
receipt o f these resources by the portfolio company. It is further argued that the perception o f
value addition by a venture capital firm will depend on the existence o f a relationship in which
both sides perceive an exchange o f resources. Thus, value added is a function o f resource
excharge. The question o f determination o f resources has been left open at this point, because
there are limitless ways to conceive of a firm ’s resources (Shrader and Sim on, 1997).

The kind o f resources that a firm needs to gather from its environment depends on its objectives.
Entrepreneurs, and hence portfolio companies, tend to specialise in two types o f resources. The
first resource needed is the ability to identify un-exploited opportunities and the skill to combine
intangible and tangible resources to exploit these opportunities in a novel fashion. The second
resource is the capacity to specialise in the day-to-day development o f new businesses activities
(MacMillan et a l, 1989). Venture capital firm s, on the other hand, specialise in creating networks
o f individuals and institutions to reduce the costs o f acquiring capital, to find customers and
suppliers and to establish the credibility o f portfolio companies (Lam , 1991; MacMillan et al.,
1989; Sahlman, 1990). Consequently, the resource com position o f venture capital firms and
portfolio com panies m ay vary. There can also be considerable overlap between the resources,
their quality, magnitude and concentration within venture capital firm s and their portfolio
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com panies. A portfolio com pany m ay find resources possessed by a venture capital firm
attractive and beneficial, since according to resource-based theory, an increase in the pool of
resources im proves perform ance o f a firm.

The perception o f higher value added should depend, to a large extent, on convergence of
perspective (Sapienza and Tim m ons, 1989) and a m eeting o f minds o f the C E O o f the portfolio
com pany and the m anagement o f the venture capital firm. This is, however, only one factor
am ong m any variables in the value-added m odel that effect the value-added perception. This
factor, however, m ay not be the basis o f a value-added relationship. F or exam ple, an important
relationship characteristic o f prior affiliation has been found to be linked with initial satisfactory
relations but not to the longer-term benefits of the partners (Saxton, 1997). O ther variables in the
category o f relational characteristics are geographical proxim ity (Gomez-M ejia et al., 1990),
com patibility o f objectives, clear expectations and obligations, trust and personal compatibility
(Larson, 1992). Sim ilar variables have been categorised as relational dimensions and accounted
for as factors, which, though not the basis fo r exchange relation, do affect the breadth of
resource exchange. H ow ever, the link between shared vision and relational dim ensions suggests
that som e relational factors m aybe influenced b y the shared vision o f the partners. F o r example,
com m on values and beliefs provide the harm ony o f interest that minimise the possibility o f
opportunistic behavior (Ouchi, 1980; Tsai and G hoshal, 1998) and prom ote trust. Thus, it is
argued that the value-added phenom enon is a logical consequence o f the venture capital
firm /portfolio com pany netw ork dyad, created b y the situation in which they find themselves.
Thus, even in cases where convergence of perspective is limited, the entrepreneur will see a
venture capital firm as adding value if useful resources are being shared.
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4.5.1

The Venture Capital Firm /P ortfolio Com pany Resource Exchange M odel

In order to develop the resource exchange m odel presented as figure 4.1, a m odel o f venture
perform ance with environmental interaction conceived by Chandler et al. (1994) and the process
m odel o f entrepreneurial dyads as developed by Larson (1992) and Larson and Starr (1993) have
been relied on. Basic ideas from both these models have been incorporated and extended to the
relationship between venture capital firm s and their portfolio companies.

According to Larson (1992) netw ork dyads develop in three phases. The coming together of
dyads requires som e preconditions o f exchange, which enhances the chances o f early co
operation between them Larson and Starr (1993) argue that personal reputation; histories and
personal friendships are important factors in explaining why firms form dyads. Know ing people
personally and by reputation increases the chances o f better assessm ent o f their capabilities,
which can result in better econom ic relationships later. The relationship based on reputation also
puts a burden on dyads to succeed because failure could have a serious im pact on the reputation
o f both the parties and subsequently, on business.

Resources are obtained using “ relational contracts” or a social exchange relationship based on
custom s, practices and mutual expectations. Later only those dyadic relationships are retained and
developed which supply sufficient resources. Larson and Starr(1993) argue that network relations
start only as one dimensional i.e. econom ic or social but later take on a two dimensional
appearance involving both social and economic exchanges or “ socio-econom ic exchanges” . The
second phase o f the association establishes conditions necessary to build the relationship. These
necessary conditions include m utual economic advantage and a trial period. The participants,
how ever, m ay not enjoy the benefits proportionately. In the next phase, rules and procedures are
established and clear expectations are outlined A relationship o f mutual trust is established based
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on reciprocity. The last phase results in further integration and the association is primarily
governed b y social controls. The focus o f Larson’s (1992) argument, explaining the formation
and w orkability o f a network dyad is based on relationship characteristics rather than the network
participant’s characteristics.

A s perceived b y Chandler et aL (1994) at the initial level, founders interact with the environment
to conceive o r discover business opportunities. O f the available opportunities, some get selected.
Opportunities are created by changing circumstances, chaos, confusion, inconsistencies, lags or
leads, knowledge and information gaps and a variety o f other vacuum s in an industry o r market
(Tim m ons, 1990). The competitive advantage o f the firm depends on how effectively it can take
advantage o f the opportunities, which ultimately depend on an entrepreneur’s perception of both
the environm ent and the internal abilities o f the firm to exploit these (Andrews, 1971; Thom pson
and Strickland, 1990). Resources can conversely, limit the choices a firm may have and ultimately,
the level o f profit it m ay e x p e a (W emfelt, 1989).

73

Figure 4.1. Resources, Venture Strategy and Performance

Based on Chandler & Hanks, Market Attractiveness, Resource-Based Capabilities, Venture Strategies
And Venture Performance, Journal of Business Venturing, 9:331-349,1994

C h apter 4- T h eoreticalFram e work

One o f the basic assum ptions o f resource-based theory is that resources and capabilities can vary
significandy across firm s33 (Barney and Hetterly, 1996). It is the heterogeneity o f these productive
resources that gives each firm its unique character and effectiveness (Penrose 1959).
O rganisations, through transactions with the elements in their environment, acquire resources.
This is true about all organisations whether we are talking about public organizations, private
organisations, sm all o r large organisations o r organisations that are bureaucratic or organic (Bums
and Stalker, 1961). O pportunities, however, are not fixed and m ay change with a change in
conditions an d / o r change in a firm ’s knowledge and consequently with a change in the internal
supply o f resources. The availability of resources within a start-up firm depends, among other
factors, on the founders’ ability to gather these from the environment and develop strategies for
effective use (Grant, 1991). If a firm has, or has access to, adequate resources it can survive easily,
grow more rapidly, is more profitable and has more “ organisational slack” (Singh et al., 1986).
Thus a firm in possession o f a wide variety o f resources is likely to have more opportunities
available to it and will be able to exploit more o f the available opportunities. A positive relation
has already been established between perceived resource-based capabilities and the performance
of start-up m anufacturing firm s (Chandler et a l, 1994).

This m odel has been m odified and the venture capital firm has been introduced as an entity that
supplies resources and supplem ents the efforts o f the portfolio com pany to gather resources
from its environment. lik e any other business, the venture capital firm gathers resources and
capabilities from its environment, which enables it to exploit the available opportunities. As part
o f its business, the venture capitals firm transfers its m ost important resource i.e. finance to new
ventures and entrusts them with its competent use. In order to ensure that this resource is used

33 H eterogeneity.
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effectively, the venture capital firm may provide other resources as well or supplement the efforts
o f the portfolio com panies to gather more resource based capabilities from the environment.

A venture capital firm ’s resource contributions span all three broad categories o f resources34.
From a venture capitalist’s perspective, making its own resources available to the portfolio
com pany will increase the portfolio company’s pool o f resources and enhance its chances of not
only having w ider choice o f opportunities but also their effective exploitation. “[The] More talent
and expertise in different areas that V C brings to the table, complement the company
founders.” 35 This increases the likelihood o f successful outcom es and subsequent returns to the
venture capital firm. Both the venture capital firm and its portfolio com pany possess a unique
pool of resources. The portfolio company needs all those resources that will expand the
opportunities and enable it to exploit them m ost effectively. M oreover, fo r growth-oriented
com panies especially, additional resources are needed to search fo r opportunities. A venture
capital firm s has a further need fo r resources because it needs to provide resources fo r its own
survival as well as to provide fo r the portfolio com pany if necessary.

34 T angibles, invisibles an d know ledge-based.
35 P ersonal correspondence: Com m ents b y a venture capitalist from Singapore (identity kept confidential on request), A ugust 15,

2000.
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Figure 4.2: V C /P C Value Added Relationship- A Resource Exchange Perspective
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M ere p o ssessio n o f resources is not enough and any possible resource exchange requires a
thorough aw areness o f the venture capital firm ’s, and the portfolio company’s, resources.
Venture capitalists should “ understand what competencies we have as V C s [venture capitalists].
Ensure that the V C [venture capitalist] is organized in a w ay that these com petencies are
transferred to the portfolio com pany... .” 36. On the other hand “the more knowledge they
[venture capitalists] have about the com pany [portfolio company] the more they can help them re
biz [business], re networking etc” 37.

G ear assessm ent o f an organization’s resources is also im portant fo r the determination o f the
resource gap, the need to fill this gap from the environment and the extent o f the resultant
sacrifice/cost. Know ing the resources and capabilities o f each other helps both the parties avoid
any uncertainty and misunderstanding in the subsequent relationship and develops an econom ic
trust in each other’s capabilities. Thus, how both the venture capital firm and the portfolio
com pany assess each other in the initial stages has an influence on subsequent relations and
involvem ent and thus value added. F o r venture capital firm s, part of the reason fo r the due
diligence process is the exploration o f the resources possessed by the portfolio com pany and
their suitability and usefulness in survival efforts. Being part o f the venture capital firm ’s
functions, this inform ation is even gathered by venture capital firm s who have no intention o f
being significantly involved with the portfolio com pany later on. A s far as portfolio com panies
are concerned, past research reviewed does not reveal any factor that has a significant bearing on
the choice o f the venture capital firm by the portfolio company. However, it has been suggested

36 P erson al correspondence: C om m ents b y a venture capitalist from Singapore (identity kept confidential on request), A ugust 19,

2000.

37 P ersonal corresponden ce: H arjeev K andhari, N ew M edia Spark, U nited K in gdom , A pril 18,2000
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that the portfolio companies should be careful in choosing financial partners as the venture
capital firm s vary in the resources that they possess (Ehrlich et al., 1994; Sapienza, 1992).

As far as the resource assessm ent o f the portfolio com pany is concerned, it an be argued that the
business operating in a riskier environment, will have a lower assessm ent of its own resources
and thus a higher dem and fo r resources than a business operating in a less risky environment.
The factors that affect the riskiness o f the business will also affect the rating o f available
resources and the need to welcome input. This argument is based on a previous research finding
which suggests that assistance is more highly valued when the task involves greater com plexity
and uncertainty (Ehrlich et al., 1994; Sapienza, 1992; Barney et al., 1996). The growth stage, the
technology being pursued and the perform ance o f the portfolio com pany are some o f the factors,
which have been found to finally lead to a greater involvement of the venture capital firm
(Sapienza, 1992; Sadder, 1993). Since this thesis argues that a portfolio company's self-resource
assessm ent and a venture capitalist’s resource assessm ent o f the portfolio com pany m ay finally
impact on the involvement and thus value added, the same risk factors38 have been taken into
consideration fo r measuring resource perception.

It is argued that several factors m ay affect how venture capital firm s perceive, or are perceived to
be in possession of, adequate resources. According to resource exchange theory, possession of
resources is translated into better perform ance fo r a business. Since performance comprises
multiple criteria apart from R O I, well perform ing venture capital firms are distinguished by
certain characteristics derived from a successful track record. As reputations travel, investors are
more likely to seek out and invest with successful venture capital firm s resulting in an increase in
capital under management and arguably the hiring of more professionals. Thus, the amount of

38 Le. grow th stage, technology and perform ance.
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venture capital under management and the number o f professionals working fo r a venture capital
firm m ay be an indicator o f perform ance. Successful venture capital firm s are also expected to
last longer in term s o f the number o f years in operation. The type o f venture capital firm m ay
also have som e bearing on how it perceives its own resource pool.

The dependence o f any organisation on another, and the consequent resource exchange, will
arise in proportion to a need fo r the resources which the supplying organisation can provide to
the dependent one (Thom son, 1967). Thus, fo r a possible exchange relationship, the need of the
portfolio com pany m ust be matched b y the availability o f resources within the venture capital
firm. The term matching is used to indicate the availability and the need fo r a resource that will
contribute tow ard the realisation o f the portfolio company's objectives immediately or in the
future (White, 1974). The absence o f a reasonable match can lead to adverse consequences. F or
exam ple, if the portfolio com pany already possesses sufficient industry experience and teams up
with a venture capital firm accustom ed to providing extensive industry advice, their overlapping
expertise m ay increase conflict (Barney et al. 1996). The need for resources primarily depends on
perception. Sapienza et aL (1986) have indicated that even if the portfolio com pany is actually
short o f a resource, it m ay not seek that particular resource regardless o f how the venture capital
firm perceives the situation.

The possession o f inform ation and the awareness o f the demand and supply o f resources may
not trigger a resource transfer unless it is backed b y a willingness o f the parties to affect the
transfer. This is called “ intentionality’’ . Intentionality depends on m any factors such as company
policy, lead role, tim e, etc. These factors will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter.

The portfolio com pany, per se, has an incentive to utilise the resources o f the venture capital firm
because they are free o f incidental costs. M oreover, new entrants into a business m ay have to pay
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higher prices to acquire these resources com pared to prices paid by existing firms (Wemfelt,
1984). There are, however, other factors, which m ay effect the portfolio company's decision to
resort to venture capital firm s. According to the resource dependence theory, organisations tend
to avoid dependencies and being controlled by others (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Portfolio
com panies, fo r fear o f loss o f control and avoidance o f unnecessary interference by the venture
capital firm s, m ay not be willing to be dependent and be involved in an exchange relation.
Conversely, the portfolio com pany m ay not resist the venture capital firm s, interference for two
reasons. Firstly, an affiliation with a venture capital firm enhances the portfolio company's
reputation b y earning it legitimacy and credibility. Secondly, the failure o f a relationship could
have a serious impact on its reputation and business prospects. H ow important a particular
resource is to the portfolio com pany will affect its readiness to sacrifice other considerations and
its choice to avoid interaction will be considerably weakened (H anigan; 1984). Furthermore, just
as venture capital firms have their own policies regarding the extent of their involvement, the
portfolio management team may have its own resource strategy likely to influence resource
exchange relations.

The possibility o f resource excharge also considerably weakens in the

presence o f a negative attitude toward it. The question o f resource excharge is also affected by
the particular venture capital culture. There is sufficient evidence that the local venture capital
culture has a profound effect on venture capital strategies, including involvement issues ([eng and
Wells, 2000).

It is theorised that an exchange relationship between the venture capital firm and the portfolio
com pany will exist if the matching o f resources are backed by a willingness to exchange. Both the
parties should share a com m on perception about specific opportunities and the resources needed
to exploit the opportunities effectively.

The resource exchange relationship, as described, is

dynamic and there is a constant shift between the opportunities and consequent requirements fo r
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resources, as perceived by both parries. This argument has been derived from the belief that
organisational emergence happens in spurts, where a trigger creates a revolution or
reconfiguration o f resources (Gartner, 1985). These triggers, fo r a new venture, m aybe internal
or external. F o r a portfolio company, an internal trigger m ay be reaching a milestone fo r further
funding by venture capital firms (Lichtenstein, 1997). External triggers m ay be associated with
industry based sources o f support (Brush and G reene, 1996).

Resource characteristic will have little bearing on the initial exchange process. However,
particular characteristics, m ay add to the usefulness o f a resource thereby reducing uncertainty
and leading to an enhancement o f a value added relationship. Although the terminology used has
been different (Peteraf, 1993), there appears to be general agreement in the related literature
about the resource characteristics that contribute to a firm 's sustained competitive advantage. At
the m ost basic level, such resources must be valuable (i.e., rent producing) and nonsubstitutable
(Barney, 1991: Dierickx & Gool, 1989). In other w ords, fo r a resource to have enduring value it
must contribute to the portfolio com panys capability and the portfolio com pany should not be
able to acquire this resource easily through alternative means. N ext, resources must be rare
an d /o r specific to a portfolio com pany (Barney, 1991; Reed & DeFillippi, 1990). That is, they
must not be widely spread in an industry and easily identified as associated with a particular
company, thus making them difficult to transfer o r trade. Finally, such resources m ust be difficult
to replicate because they are either tacit (causally am biguous, that is, scarce because o f the unique
train o f events that led to their accumulation) o r socially com plex (Teece, 1987; Winter, 1987).
Tacit resources are skill based and people intensive. Such resources are "invisible" and based
upon leaming-by-doing. These resources are accumulated through experience and refined by
practice (Itam i, 1987; Polanyi, 1962). Socially com plex resources depend upon large numbers of
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people or team s engaged in coordinated action such that few individuals, if any, have sufficient
breadth o f knowledge to grasp the overall phenomenon (Barney, 1991; Reed & D eFillippi, 1990).

The explanation so far, of a value added relationship m aybe interpreted as an attempt to “ under
socialise” (Granovetter, 1985) this com plex alliance resulting in a model in which the importance
o f personal relationships is dow nplayed A balanced approach would suggest that this
relationship should be considered a combined function o f resource exchange and formation o f a
satisfactory social relationship (Saxton, 1997). However, it is argued that the social side of the
issue only explains why this alliance is form ed or relationship enhanced (Gulati, 1999) and it is
not an essential element for the existence of a value added relationship.

O nce the resources have been passed on to the portfolio com pany they must be used effectively.
Effective usage results in a visible reduction in uncertainties, which can lead to a value added
relationship (Bygave and Tim m ons, 1992). H ickson et al. (1971) argue that pow er accrues to
those in the organisation able to reduce uncertainties fo r the organization. Thus in a dyadic
relationship if both parties believe that uncertainties have been reduced because of the exchange,
it will result in a greater influence of the venture capital firm on the portfolio com pany and spur
higher levels o f interaction and generate relational satisfaction. Unlike previous research that only
considers m ore frequent interaction by the venture capitalist and the C E O o f the portfolio
com pany as an outcome o f a reduction in uncertainties, it is argued here that frequency of
interaction m ay also result in a higher level of satisfaction fo r both the parties. Thus a valueadded relationship does not only depend on the frequency o f interaction but also on the higher
level o f satisfaction resulting from the interactioa

There have been a number o f studies which have taken up the value added question without
really defining value added (Sapienza et al., 1996; Sapienza et al., 1995; Cherin and Hergert, 1988;
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Landstrom , 1991). The resource-exchange perspective helps define value added. Since a firm is
considered a bundle o f resources, any addition in its resource pool is likely to increase its chances
o f survival. Thus an addition in the resource pool can be interpreted as the creation o f value. The
resource exchange perspective provides an opportunity to recognise the complexity of the value
added question. It cannot be assum ed, under this perspective, that value addition gets translated
into visible measurable performance. Taking on the resource-exchange paradigm allows
participants to recognise that value addition has occurred prior to visible results being obvious. It
recognises that the extent o f value addition depends also on the nature of the interaction
(characteristics o f resource). It also takes into account the importance o f social aspects o f the
relationships, which govern value addition. Under this paradigm , the translation of added value is
governed b y multiple factors, which m ay not always result in better performance. F or example,
the resources added will not make such an impact on a com pany if they do not pass the test of
rarity, value and inimitability. Based on the resource exchange theory a strong case can be put
forward fo r value addition from the moment a venture capital firm and a portfolio com pany
decide to establish a relationship. The resource exchange m odel also makes a distinction between
value addition and the maximisation o f value ad ditioa U sing the resource exchange perspective
allows the researchers to make a distinction between stock and flows o f resources. A s described,
considering value addition as a resource flow makes the concept o f “ value-added” more dynamic
than it has previously been considered.

From the theoretical position outlined in this chapter several hypotheses have been extracted
relating to the venture capital firm /portfolio com pany relationship. The next chapter includes the
research hypotheses and, after a detailed discussion on their validity, considers both sides o f the
question before adopting a position.
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Chapter 5: Propositions

Introduction

The basis fo r the research propositions outlined in this chapter have been primarily derived from
the theoretical position adopted on the relationship between a venture capital firm and a
portfolio com pany, as described in the previous chapter. In addition, previous research studies
have also been used to support the formulation of the research hypotheses.

5.2

Propositions

Very few research studies have examined venture capital in the Asian environment. Those which
have, did not focus exclusively on the relationship between a venture capital firm and a portfolio
company. Little attem pt has been made to explain the dynamics of this relationship in Asia.

Past research in value addition by venture capital firms has covered American and European
markets m ore extensively than Asian markets. The research findings in previous research studies
may not be applicable to Asian markets in general because o f inherent differences in culture and
work values39. A s explained in chapter 2, there are cultural, geographical and developmental
differences between Asian and other countries in which previous research studies have been
conducted. A s can be gathered from that chapter, there is very little available information in the
way o f research studies on the nature o f venture capital markets in Asia, including the little
dragon countries. Thus, enough arguments seem to exist to warrant a possible difference in the
way in which venture capital firms operate in A sia and other countries.

Therefore, som e basic assum ptions have been derived from the study o f the Asian venture
capital m arket as a unit and applied to the H ong K ong and Singaporean venture capital markets

39 M anagem ent styles o f the venture capital firm s have been reported to differ across countries (H urry et aL, 1992).
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as a useful starting point fo r this research. Previous research studies, conducted outside Asia,
have also been used to support the propositions derived in this chapter. Following due process,
these assum ptions will be tested and the findings will add to our knowledge o f the impact that
culture and w ork values create in the Singapore and H ong K on g venture capital markets. They
will also assist in determining the extent to which the conclusions drawn in this thesis are
amenable to broader application.

5.2.1

The Extent o f Involvement

An Equity Investors position is different from other investors. Creditors, fo r example, are
involved in the investee business on a less regular basis than equity investors. While lack of
involvement m ay not show any less concern fo r the investment, equity investors’ greater
involvement with the investee stems from the high level of risk in their investments. They rank
below all creditors in regard to final setdement, which puts them in the unique position where
they will always be the first to record a loss. The higher risk that the equity investors take is
com pensated b y the greater influence that they can exercise over the investee and, consequendy,
their investment. Thus, the options to exercise this influence, in m ost cases, impart greater
control over the investment to the equity investors than to the creditors. Since equity investors, in
better tim es, gain disproportionately more than other investors, it also gives them an opportunity
and incentive to use their existing resources and add value to their investment. Venture capital
firms share similanties and differences with other equity investors on m any counts, which make
their involvement with the investees even more significant. Private investors and venture capital
firms prefer funding businesses with a potential fo r high capital growth (Sullivan, 1991). These
investors usually intend to liquidate their investment after a fixed term ranging 5 to 10 years
(Wetzel, 1985). However, there are certain m arked differences between private investors and
venture capital firm s. Venture capitalists are professional investors who invest on behalf of others
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and have different incentives o r disincentives to be involved with the investee than have private
investors. Their involvement m ay be due to their fiduciary duty, as an agent o f the suppliers of
venture capital funds. F or a venture capital firm, acceptable performance allows them to raise
follow -on funds and hence is a m atter o f survival. Because limited liability partnerships are time
constrained, suppliers o f venture capital funds will not contribute to new partnerships structured
by under perform ing venture capital firms. Thus, there is always a risk o f non-renewal if a venture
capital firm fails to perform . F o r a venture capital firm , the disincentive to be involved in its
portfolio com pany m ay be due to the number o f investments being managed, the lack of
resources within a venture capital frrm useful to a portfolio com pany and so on. Private investors
do not have sim ilar disincentives and they m ay well seek to help a friend or a fam ily member
(Sullivan, 1991) o r derive non-financial rewards from assisting other entrepreneurs in the growth
o f their ventures (Wetzel, 1985). The differences, between a venture capital firm and a private
investor, translate into distinct investment and involvement strategies (Florida and Kenney, 1988;
Frear and W etzel, 1990; Ehrlich et al., 1994).

Being an experienced professional involved in a specialist business, the venture capitalist’s
involvem ent and contribution is expected to be more than that of other investors (Thurow,
1992). Earlier research in the United States pointed to both active (Fried and H srish , 1994) and
passive (Gorm an and Sahlman, 1986) involvement by venture capital firms in their portfolio
com panies. Rosenstein (1988)40 found that venture capital firms employed two different
approaches to their portfolio companies. Immediately, after making an investment, one group
replaced the founders’ team with more experienced professional managers. The other group of
venture capital firm s nurtured and worked with the existing management. In all cases, venture
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capital firm s put pressures on the management team to achieve objectives that were consistent
with the business plan. Rosenstein (1988) concluded that venture capital firm s take a highly active
role in the m anagem ent o f their portfolio com panies, especially through participation on the
board o f directors. In analysing responses from 62 venture capital firm s, M acM illan et aL (1989)
perform ed cluster analyses on the data relating to the involvem ent o f venture capital firm s and
found a clear emergence o f three clusters which they classified as low (laissez-faire), moderate
and high (close tracker) involvem ent venture capital firm s. The involvement criteria were taken as
the num ber o f activities that the venture capital firm s undertook with their portfolio companies.
G orm an and Sahlm an (1986) found that a lead venture capitalist visited each portfolio company
an average o f 19 tim es per year and spent 100 hours (8.3 H ours/M onth) in direct contact (on site
o r by phone) with the com pany. The non-lead venture capitalist visited half as often and stayed
2 / 3rd as long. Elango et al. (1995) confirm ed the existence o f three clear groups of investors and
found that the high assistance group spent an av erag e o f 35.65 hours p er month, the middle
assistance group spent 12.75 hours and the low assistance group spent an average o f 6.76 hours
per m onth with the portfolio com pany. The non-lead venture capital firm averaged 4 hours per
month. A com parison o f these tw o research studies, considering the time gap, could lead to the
conclusion that, generally speaking, the venture capital firm involvement in its portfolio has
increased o ver tim e. The involvem ent o f a venture capital firm in its portfolio com pany follows a
different pattern at the international level. Research has shown that venture capital firm s in the
N etherlands are less involved with the C E O s o f their portfolio com panies than in the United
K ingdom (Sapienza et al., 1994) and despite a relatively hom ogenous group o f investments, a
venture capital firm 's involvem ent does not follow a consistent pattern in France. In Canada up 04

40 R osenstein ’s (1988) stu dy was b ased o n interview s with six D allas (U nited States) based venture capital partnerships and two
venture capital com panies (S B IG ). H e w as investigating investor involvem ent in the m anagem ent o f portfolio com panies
through b oard participation.
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to 85% o f venture capital firm s were found to be active o r very active in their level o f
involvem ent (fog et a l, 1991). N o research studies relating to the time that venture capital firms
spend m anaging their portfolio com panies in Asia were fo u n d

There are, theoretically strong argum ents for and against a proposition fo r greater involvement of
venture capital firm s in their portfolio companies in Asia. H all and H ofer (1990) have broadly
classified culture as either m onochronic o r polychronic in nature. Polychronic people are
com m itted to maintaining close long-term interpersonal relationships whereas monochrome
people are accustom ed to maintaining short-term interpersonal w ork relationships. They
conclude that a cultural characteristic o f Asians, in general, is to behave in a polychronic
fashion41. Thus fo r an Asian portfolio company, once a personal relationship with the venture
capitalist is established, frequent meetings and regular dialogue between parries m ay result in a
greater involvem ent of the venture capital firm with the portfolio company. The portfolio
company, in this case, m ay seek greater involvement since Asian managers, unlike the American
m anagers, tend to increase dependence with time (Michael, 1997). Signals coming out o f Asia
also suggest that some o f the venture capital firms are actively involved with their portfolio
com panies (A V Q , 1999).

There are equally cogent reasons in A sia to suggest a possibility that venture capital firms m aybe
less involved in their portfolio com panies. An important feature o f the Asian market is that
families play a more prominent role in the econom y (Gidoom al, 1997; Tahilia, 1997). Since m ost
o f the portfolio com panies are fam ily owned, issues concerning control and dilution are
important. Fam ilies value their control over their businesses and the dilution of control over the
business is m ore important than the dilution in equity (Stine, 1990; Chen, 1995). A venture
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capitalist from H ong K on g has term ed it as “M anagement obsession with an imperialistic sense
o f "control"4
42.
1 Furtherm ore, fam ily businesses are free o f pressures fo r short-term profits (Bork
et al., 1996) whereas venture capital firm s have been known to press fo r short-term results
(Gom ez-M eija et al., 1990; Stier and Greenw ood, 1995). The human resource, in a family
business, also com es preferably from the fam ily rather than from the best qualified potential
contributors. Venture capital firms m ay not always agree to this arrangement and thus may be
kept at arm ’s length by the portfolio company. Asian entrepreneurs m ay not be accepting of an
investors’ involvem ent since, traditionally, friends and acquaintances make equity investments but
do not get actively involved in the business. Lastly, “ Venture capitalists require a rate o f return on
their m oney that m ay not allow the investee to continue to operate and develop the business in
the way, that, historically they have operated” 43. U nder these scenarios the venture capital firm
may be eyed with suspicion and the venture capital firm itself is likely to be careful in the matter
of involvement. Som e venture capitalists from A sia also believe that venture capital firm s should
restrict them selves to board meetings and inspection o f monthly management accounts only.44
Yet another argum ent against greater participation o f venture capital firm s in portfolio companies
in H ong K o n g and Singapore is the fact, that since venture capital is comparatively new in these
countries, the venture capitalists have not accumulated the experience necessary fo r high levels o f
involvement in their portfolio com panies. Since the accumulation o f resources by a business
depends a great deal on experience, there is a greater likelihood that venture capital firm s will be
less equipped to add to the resource pool o f the portfolio company.

The average size o f

41 It needs to be pointed ou t that this classification is very broad and not entirely tenable since A sia com prises m any diverse
cultures.
42 Personal correspondence: Com m ents b y a venture capitalist from H on g K on g (Identity kept confidential on request) A pril 2,

2000
43 Personal C orrespondence: Com m ents b y a
confidential on request), A pril 7 ,1 9 9 9

Senior Solicitor specialising in venture capital from Singapore (Identity kept
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investment in both these countries is also sm aller com pared to the average size o f the venture
capital investm ent in the United States4
45.
4 Thus, venture capital firms in the United States m ay
find more allocation o f time financially viable. A fter considering both sides o f the argument it is
proposed that venture capital firm s in H ong K on g and Singapore will be less involved in the
affairs of the portfolio com pany com pared to their Am erican counterparts.

P reposition 1 : V enture cap italfirm s allo cate less tam e to rm m gn gportfolio com panies in H ong
K ong an d Sin gtpore th an in the U n tied S tates.

5.2.2 The nature o f Involvem ent
G orm an and Sahlm an (1986), in a pioneering research w ork relating to the kind o f activities in
which venture capital firm s are involved, found that venture capital firm s contribute to the
portfolio com panies in the area o f financing, strategic and operational planning, management
recruiting and providing a network o f contacts. M acM illan et al. (1988) built on Gorm an and
Sahlman’s w ork and identified 20 activities in their study. The top six activities were;

1) serving as sounding board to entrepreneur team ;

2) obtaining alternative sources o f equity financing;

3) interfacing with the Investor group;

4) m onitoring financial perform ance;

5) m onitoring operational perform ance; and

44 P ersonal C orrespondence: N icholas A shby, M anaging D irector, G lob al Alliance Capital (M alaysia) Sdn. Bhd. M alaysia, April 5,
1999.
45 A V Q (1999), E lan go et aL (1995).
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6) obtaining alternative sources o f equity financing.

An im portant area o f strategic and functional m anagement was found m issing among the top
areas o f involvement. M acM illan et al. (1988) argued that either the venture capitalist did not feel
that involvement in strategic and functional areas was important o r that due to the continual
nature o f involvem ent in these activities, the venture capitalist m ay not have been able to devote
substantial tim e to them. They also suggested that the low involvement in these activities was the
result o f the am ount o f hands on participation entailed. They also speculated that the role o f a
sounding board member, which was rated highest, might include acting as confidant or mentor.
Follow ing G orm an and Sahlm an (1986), they did not ask venture capital firm s to rate such roles.
Rosenstein et a l (1989) adapted the survey instrument o f MacMillan et al. (1988) and gathered
data, from 162 C E O s o f portfolio com panies, about the areas o f the venture capital firm s’
involvement. They found that C E O s ranked the five m ost important areas o f the venture capital
firm s’ involvement as being a sounding board to the management team , interfacing with the
investor group, monitoring the operating perform ance, monitoring the financial performance and
recruitm ent/replacem ent o f the C E O . A com parison o f the studies conducted by MacMillan
(1988) and Rosenstien (1989) indicates that venture capital firm s and portfolio companies tend to
generally agree on the areas where venture capital firm s become involved with their portfolio
com panies. Sapienza and Tim m ons (1989) had sim ilar results with the m atched responses o f
C E O s o f venture capital backed ventures and lead venture capital firm s. A survey in Sweden
observed different styles o f venture involvement and classified these as consultancy oriented,
m entor oriented, operation oriented and structure oriented (Landstrom, 1991). In the United
K ingdom , venture capital firm s are valued by their portfolio companies on the basis of being a
sounding board fo r ideas, challenging the status quo, financial advice, guidance on strategic
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m atters and their contacts and market inform ation (BV CA , 1998). Thus the European and
Am erican studies found sim ilar results.

A survey conducted by Pandey and Jung (1996), in Taiwan, found that ranked by importance,
venture capital firms are involved in managerial assistance, in financing policy and strategy,
developing the product o r service, internal management o f the firm, launching the product or
service in the market and technology induction. A case study conducted by Pandey (1998),
undertaken in India, found that a Governm ent owned venture capital firm was involved in
providing managerial assistance and support, monitoring and follow-up of assisted ventures and
arrangement o f IPO . Thus, research studies in Asia, although few, generally point toward
activities that are similar to the involvement activities o f venture capital firms in the United States
o r E urope, but with a different em phasis. However, since these two studies are limited to only
two countries, they m ay not truly reflect an overall picture o f the Asian market. M oreover, both
these m arkets are markedly different in terms o f venture capital market size and stage of
developm ent. The first study conducted by Pandey and Jun g (1996) in Taiwan was focused on
the difference in perception o f both venture capital firms and portfolio companies and did not
attem pt to com pare the results with previous research findings elsewhere. The research case
study in India, by Pandey (1998), pertained to only one venture capital firm owned by the
G overnm ent o f India. A s governm ent owned venture capital firms constitute a very small part of
the A sian venture capital market (A V Q , 1999) the result cannot be assum ed to mirror the
behaviours o f the entire unit. Consequently, P an d e/s findings cannot be generalised.

While there is a possibility that venture capital firm s in A sia m ay be involved in sim ilar activities
throughout A sia, the sam e cannot be said about the importance that is attached to these activities
by either the venture capital firm s o r the portfolio com panies. There is som e evidence that
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cultural factors do affect the kind o f activities that venture capital firm s are involved in (Pandey
and Jung, 1996). H ow ever, m ost o f the previous research tends to agree on the areas o f venture
capital firm s, involvement and there is, so far, litde evidence o f a m ajor deviation in these
activities in other countries. Therefore, it is proposed that there will be no deviation in
involvem ent activities undertaken by venture capital firm s in Singapore and H ong K ong as
com pared to those in the U nited States.

P roposition 2 : V enture cap ital firm

in Singapore an d H ong K ong are inudw d in sim ilar

aetm ties m th th eirp o rtfo lio com panies a s w ntw e cap italfirm in the U nited States.

As far as the ranking o f activities according to their importance is concerned, it has been found
that the portfolio com panies and the venture capital firm s assign different ratings to different
value added activities. In Finland, the activities of financing and active oversight are rated m ost
important (Ahdekivi, 1990). In Sweden one survey observed that entrepreneurs rate access to
capital, the venture capitalist’s com petence, moral support and networks o f prime importance
(Frederikson, 1990). A s already stated, in Taiwan portfolio companies rated establishing
management system s, providing management recruitment/training, assistance to explore new
technologies, providing m arket channels, market planning and establishing accounting systems as
am ong the m ore im portant activities undertaken by venture capitalists (Pandey and Jung, 1996).
In the U nited States, M acM illan et al. (1988) found that the importance o f activities varies with
perform ance and high levels o f som e activities (e.g. negotiation o f employment terms) were
associated with high perform ance, whereas high levels o f other activities, such as recruiting top
m anagem ent, were associated with p o o r performance. Although, seemingly, there is some
difference in the im portance that is attached to any activity, there has been little attempt in the
past to com pare these activities across countries and to find out whether these differences are
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significant. O n the basis o f the second proposition suggesting similarities in activities, it is further
proposed that rankings o f the importance o f the activities in which venture capital firms are
involved with their portfolio com panies in H ong K on g, Singapore and the United States, will be
similar.

P ropositkn 3 : The im portance c f w ine added activ ities attrib u ted to w tu re cap ital firm
d isp lay sim ilarpattern s in Singapore, H ong K ong an d the U nited S tates.

5.2.3

V alue-added and the venture capital firm

MacMillan et al. (1988) found that venture capital firms included in their study were generally
quite satisfied with their involvement with portfolio companies. However, their observation, that
both positive and negative correlations existed between involvement measures and venture
perform ance made the com m only accepted link between value addition and venture performance
rather controversial

One o f the earliest studies taking up the value added question was by Rosenstein et al. (1989)46.
They found that although entrepreneurs ranked the venture capital firm ’s contribution
particularly useful in the early stages o f the portfolio company’s life cycle, overall, entrepreneurs
did not perceive that venture capitalists on their boards added more value than did other board
members. T hey concluded by surm ising that the value added depends on the type o f activity
undertaken. In a follow-up study, Rosenstein et a l (1993) interviewed C E O s about the
involvement o f venture capital firm s on their board o f directors. They found that C E O s rated the
contribution o f venture capitalists more highly than the contribution o f outside investors if one
o f the top 20 venture capital firm s was represented on the Board o f Directors. Sapienza and
Tim m ons (1989) found that the portfolio company’s assessm ent o f the venture capital firm’s
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involvem ent depended on various factors like the stage o f developm ent attained by the business,
experience o f the entrepreneur and the stake o f the venture capital firm in the portfolio company.
The follow -up study (Sapeinza, 1992), based on a survey of 51 pairs o f venture capital firms and
portfolio com panies and using personal interviews, confirm ed that the value attributed to venture
capital firm 's involvem ent varied with circum stances. The study concluded that since venture
capital firm s do add value, choosing the right venture capital firm fo r the portfolio company at
the outset w as im portant. G om ez-M ejia et al. (1990) used a qualitative research approach and
conducted interviews o f 20 venture capitalists and entrepreneurs in the United States. They
expressed m ixed views regarding the value o f the managerial involvement o f venture capital
firms.

A few studies o f European venture capital firms parallel the studies undertaken in the United
States and provide insights into the roles that venture capital firms play. Using the MacMillan et
aL (1988) fram ework, H arrison and M ason (1992) found that entrepreneurs in the United
K ingdom rated acting as a sounding board and strategic activities as the two m ost important
contributions o f venture capital firm s. They also admitted that they depended more on the
assistance o f the venture capital firm than they did on other types o f investors. A British Venture
Capital A ssociation Survey (1992) concluded that, prior to investment, entrepreneurs expressed a
preference fo r passive financial assistance only, but, post investment they rated active non
financial assistance as providing the highest value added. According to Van Wakeren et a l (1989),
who have done their research in the Netherlands, about 60% o f entrepreneurs admitted receiving
im portant strategic assistance from venture capital firms and about 20% received useful
networking assistance. Exploring six successfully exited portfolio companies in the United 64

46 R osenstein h im self had been studying the venture capital board (R osenstein, 1988) and he, along with others, specifically applied
value added questions to board m em bers representing venture capital firm s.
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K ingdom , M urray (1996) found that, with one exception, all the portfolio com panies questioned
perceived appropriate and tim ely intervention by the venture capital investor as a critical element
o f success. Frederiksen et al. (1997) found a significant positive correlation between the level o f
influence held by the venture capital firm and the non-econom ic developm ent47 o f the portfolio
com pany. In a survey o f entrepreneurs who have used venture capital finance in the United
K ingdom , Colville (1991) found a high degree o f satisfaction, with 95% o f respondents prepared
to recom m end venture capital to a friend and alm ost two thirds subscribed to the belief that
venture capital fund directors did add value to the company. However, there were concerns
about the value o f the post investment relationship. O nly half the respondents considered fees to
be good value and less than one third believed that venture capital fund directors contributed
more than non-executive directors did. The prom ise o f advice and ongoing support was ranked
fifth b y users as a choice criterion fo r the selection o f venture capital firms. However, venture
capitalists generally believe that they do add value. “ A venture capitalist m ust be able to provide
more than just financing. We tell our clients and encourage them to see other VCs [venture
capitalists]... to see what they have to offer. All V C s [venture capitalists] offer $ [money]... But
what else sets them apart from others?”48. H ow ever, so far, there is m ixed evidence in the United
States and Europe that entrepreneurs see venture capitalist as adding value. Research results also
seem to vary across different countries.

little research, explaining the value added question, has been conducted in Asia. In Asia, because
o f the fam ily oriented nature o f the businesses, entrepreneurs m ay be averse to the interference
o f the venture capitalist and m ay even see the absence o f value added where it does exist. The
Am erican style o f institutionalised venture capital industry and consequent value added incentives

47 In the area o f m otivation, jo b satisfaction and networking as op p o sed to turnover, profitability, liquidity etc.
48 P erson al correspondence: G odw in P on, Investm ent M an ager, A gri-F ood E quity Fund, Canada, A pril 4,20 01.
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fo r venture capital firms m ay not sit well, fo r now, with A sian entrepreneurs sim ply because they
are not used to this level o f institutionalisation o r m ay not appreciate the goals of venture capital
firms as such. Another reason why venture capital firm s m ay not be able to add value to their
portfolio com panies is the com parative lack o f experience in venture capital and the consequent
com parative deficiency of resources that it can pass on to its portfolio company.

D espite their recent developm ent m any o f the venture capitalists operating in Asian venture
capital firm s either have experience o f the A m erican/European market or learned the ropes in
these m arkets. Asian businesses can learn from these venture capital firms and are likely to see
them as adding more value to the business. Correspondence with venture capitalists revealed that
venture capitalists, at least, do believe in value added involvement. “If the V C [venture capitalists]
does not add value, why does it e x p e a itself to make m oney?” 49

P roposition 4 : V enture cap italfirm s in Singapore an d H ong K ong see them selves a s adding
vakte to the business thrm çfi th eir involvem ent.

5.2.4

A ddition o f value in the context o f resource exchange

A s already argued, it is difficult to identify any resource singly or in combination, which accounts
fo r a firm ’s success. Hindsight o r ex-post examination o f fa a o rs contributing to success biases
the conclusions (Foss et a l, 1995). In order to avoid ex-post explanations, those resources
(activities) in which venture capital firms have been known to participate are the only faao rs
exam ined in this thesis.

The next proposition is derived from the research m odel (Figure 4.3) presented in Chapter 4. As
argued, the prim ary requirement o f a value-added relationship is the willingness (intentionalit)) of

49 P ersonal correspondence: Com m ents b y a venture capitalist from H on g K o n g (Identity kept confidential on request) A ugust 23,

2000
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both the parties to interact and agree to a resource exchange relationship. In order to test the
im portance o f willingness o f both the parties in a value-added m odel it is important to analyse
factors which can affect willingness o f both the parties to interact.

As noted in chapter 4, MacMillan et al. (1988) found that the degree o f involvement o f a venture
capital firm in the affairs o f a portfolio com pany w as a m atter o f choice, which in turn is
governed prim arily b y the firm ’s policy. Conversely, L em er (1995) found that a venture capital
firm is m ore likely to be involved where it perceives a need fo r oversight. Thus, beside choice,
there are other factors that can influence levels o f involvement that are governed by
circum stances other than choice.

A venture capital firm has to manage m any projects and the venture capitalist has to learn to
divide time between investments. M oreover, time needs to be allocated to the search fo r new
projects and to evaluate investment proposals. A ny involvement in portfolio companies,
therefore, is also dependent on the dem and that other activities put on the time available. The
degree o f involvem ent m ay also depend on the venture capital culture o f the subject
country/region (H ofstede, 1984; Jen g and Wells, 2000). It has also been found that venture
capital firm s are more involved in portfolio com panies in which they have a relatively higher
equity stake (Gom ez-M ejia et a l, 1990); whether in term s o f their ownership proportion, the size
o f their investm ent or the proportion o f their capital under management invested in that
portfolio com pany. Finally, the investm ent role is a factor in venture capital involvement since it
has been determ ined that lead venture capital firm s are more involved with their portfolio
com panies (G orm an and Sahlman, 1986).

It is argued that the willingness o f the venture capital firm to interact with the portfolio company
m ust be m atched with an independent consent b y the portfolio company. This consent is
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im portant because a portfolio com pany’s unwillingness to interact will not only hinder
involvem ent but can damage the whole relationship (W illiamson, 1975). Gom ez-M eija et al.
(1990) show ed that entrepreneurs’ reactions differ regarding the managerial involvement of
venture capital firm s in portfolio com panies and m any C E O s view it as counterproductive.

The overwhelm ing consideration fo r the entrepreneur is the loss o f authority and control within
the portfolio company. The entrepreneur will tend to avoid venture capital firm s’ involvement
unless factors exist which constrain his or her choice. Depending upon the availability of a
particular resource from a venture capital firm , the entrepreneur will be less hostile about
involvem ent if that particular resource is o f critical importance to the success o f the venture.
Similarly if the required resource is available from other sources the entrepreneur will have less
incentive to interact with the venture capital firm. M oreover, like the venture capital firm, the
portfolio com pany will be affected by the region’s venture capital culture50.

P roposition 5 : The w nture c a p ita lists perception

th eir ab ility to ad d w hte w ill depend on the

facto rs, which affect the w illin giess o fboth thep arties to interact.

P reposition 5 (a ): The Tenture ca p italist's perception c f th eir ab ility to ad d wdue w ill also depend
on th d rp o licy to rn rd im dwm enL

P roposition 5 (b ): The w nture c a p ita lists perception c f th eir ab ility to ad d 'ta k e w ill also depend
on the extent o fth eirfim n d al am ritm en t to the portfolio com panies.

P roposition 5 (c): The w nture c a p ita lists perception c f th eir ab ility

toad d w ine willalso depend

on w nture capital industryculture in whicha w itu re cap italfrmoperaXes.
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A ccording to the resource exchange m odel (Figure 4.3) the second primary requirement of an
exchange relationship is the resource configuration o f both the parties. The resource pool o f a
venture capital firm should have the right mix to be able to provide a valuable contribution to
the portfolio com panies. Conversely the resource com position o f the portfolio companies should
be such as to absorb the contribution by the venture capital firm s. A s explained in Chapter 4,
resource com position (need vs availability) is only a m atter o f perception. The following two sets
o f proposition analyses possible factors which m ay affect the w ay venture capitalists see the
configuration o f portfolio com panies' resources and their own. Akin to the idea of
need/availability is the right match between them as explained in Chapter 4.

The w ay venture capitalists will look at the resource configuration o f a portfolio company
depends on several factors. Alm ost all o f these factors have been linked to value added in
previous research studies. The business growth literature in general divides businesses, including
those involving venture capital investment, in term s o f sequential stages (Miller and Frieser, 1983;
Churchill and Lew is, 1983; Garvin, 1983; Ruhunka and Young, 1987). Each stage has different
financial needs and risk-reward options (Porter, 1986; Rubel, 1977; Henderson, 1986; Mashman
and Schlank, 1987). N ew businesses are subject to higher risks (Porter, 1980; Tobias, 1982;
Bygrave, 1989) and the greatest risk is associated with the least developed venture (Callinan and
D im ovski, 1985; R obinson, 1987; Ruhnka and Young, 1991). Bygrave (1987) has noted that co
investing am ong venture capital firms is greater fo r the earlier stages o f development because of
higher risks. M oreover Ruhnka and Young (1991) found that venture capital firm s’ demand for
rate o f return on investments was 73% and 55% at the seed and start-up stages and declined to
35% fo r late stage investm ents. The risk in the early stage stem s from the fact that the venture is
new and requires a wide array o f resources, including: inform ation (data, technical knowledge,05

50 Since this stu d y on ly exam ines perception o f venture capital firm s, the propositions have been restricted to venture capital firm s.
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political intelligence and expertise); physical and capital resources (funds, material, space and
time) and sym bolic support (endorsement, political backing, approval and legitimacy) (Kanter,
1983). There is thus serious need fo r the accumulation o f resources fo r a new venture.

It is com m on fo r technology-oriented new ventures to attempt to use the development of
products to get a foothold in the market (Tim m ons and Bygrave, 1986).

Fast changing

technology places heavy dem ands on the resources o f new ventures (Sapienza and Am ason 1993;
Pisano 1993). M oreover, while the new venture team m ay be competent technologists they m ay
lack in other skills (Gom ez-M ejia et a l, 1990). A s the management team tries to grapple with
com m ercial viability, they m ay find themselves lagging behind the operational demands of the
business (Tim m ons and Bygrave, 1990). Gonsequendy, the venture’s need fo r resources is also
greater when it is pursuing high technology.

Although Barney et aL (1996) found that venture capital perform ance was not related, ultimately,
to the value added b y venture capital firms, the presence o f other factors like the nature and
im portance o f the value-added activity needs to be discounted to arrive at a definite conclusion
regarding a relationship between value-added and venture performance. They stated that their
study w as cross sectional and involved only one m easure o f performance51. Seemingly, there are
good reasons w hy resource strength o f a portfolio com pany should be rated on the basis o f
perform ance. M intzberg (1973) observed that managers typically engage in varied and
fragm ented activities in part because interruptions occur frequendy. The fact that others initiate
m any interruptions points to the fact that a m anager's jo b is more reactive than pro-active. Since
there are always m ore problem s than the manager can handle, he/she is more likely to respond to
a problem if there is pressure fo r immediate action (Yuki, 1989). Assum ing that a venture
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capitalist's role is similar, h e/sh e is also more likely to concentrate on troublesom e companies. As
the perform ance o f a portfolio com pany will depend ultim ately on the resources that it is able to
m uster (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Rumelt, 1984), if a firm is not perform ing well, it is more likely
to be rated as short o f resources by a venture capital fin a

O ther factors likely to effect resource evaluation could be reputation and com petency of the
m anagement team . According to the resource based theory a positive reputation is a valuable
intangible asset that m ay allow a firm to establish a sustainable competitive advantage (Barney,
1991; H all, 1992). Reputation also allows firms better access to scarce resources. Because firms
also seek to reduce inform ational asymmetry and opportunism in exchange o f resources,
reputation is also likely to effect repeated inter-firm exchange relations (Granovetter, 1995;
'Williamson, 1991). Reputation can reflect on an alliance partner's characteristics (chapter 4,
section 4.5.1) in the areas o f management, product/service quality and financial position
(Dollinger, G olden and Saxton, 1997). An entrepreneurial team with a positive reputation is
assured to have a high level o f self-sufficiency in resources (Saxton, 1997). Since competence has
been found to relate to perform ance (Chandler, 1992), it follows that the perceived competency
o f the m anagem ent team should also impart an im pression o f resource adequacy. Reputation
here m eans a favourable track record o f the management o f the portfolio com pany (Vergin and
Q oronfleh, 1998; G om pers and Lem er, 1999; H erbig et al., 1994) while com petency means the
ability to optim ise resource usage.

P reposition 6 (a ): A t any p jw i tim e the venture c a p ita lists perception c f the resource needs c f
p o rtfo lio com panies w lldepen d upon the risk in ess c f the venture51

51 Financial perform ance as m easured b y dividing the ventures total incom e b y the num ber o f em ployees at the tim e o f first round
financing.
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Prcpostàm6 (b):Atany&witinvthewmœQtpti^tsspenE^^
portfolioœnpmies wttckpendupon thepetfcmurKBcflhwTüim
P roposition 6 (<ÿ: A t an y g w i tim e the venture c a p italist's perception c f the resource rm k c f

P ro p o sitio n 6 (d ): A to n y g w itim e th e w m œ c a p i^ lio n c f the resow œ needs fth e

The sam e factors, which are likely to affect the venture capital film s’ assessm ent of the resource
strength o f the portfolio com pany, can also affect the assessm ent o f their own resource strength.
However, m eaningful m easurem ents o f some o f these factors, in the case o f a venture capital
firm, require som e adjustm ents. The basic problem arises while measuring risk. Since a venture
capital film s risk is primarily based on the com position o f its portfolio, which in turn depends on
the risk profile o f the individual portfolio member, the overall riskiness o f a venture capital firm
is m uch m ore difficult to m easure. M oreover, while venture capital firm m ay provide information
on the risk profile o f any o f its individual ventures, it is unlikely to do so fo r the whole portfolio.
Therefore, the risk factor o f the venture capital firms has not been considered.

The reputation o f venture capital firm s also affects the value-added perception o f portfolio
com panies (Rosenstein et al., 1993). Since this thesis is restricted to the perceptions o f venture
capital firm s only, a question to venture capital firms on how they assess their own competency
and reputation w ould have carried litde validity. However, since the reputation o f the venture
capital firm is an im portant facto r to be considered, it has been measured indirectly, as explained
in chapter 7. The perform ance o f a venture capital firm has been taken as a contributory factor in
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overall reputation (Vergin and Q oronfleh, 1998). The perform ance o f a venture capital firm is
much more likely to attract new capital as well as quality proposals fo r funding which can result
in an increase in the size o f the venture capital firm (G om pers and Lem er, 1998). A larger size is
more likely to result in a larger variety o f the resource pooL H ie size o f a venture capital firm,
therefore, is also m ore likely to translate into the confidence with which a venture capital firm
evaluates its own resources.

Com petency has been replaced with experience since more experience tends to impart a feeling
of professionalism and com petency (Levinthal and M arch, 1993). Experience is especially
important in the case o f venture capital investment as “ (n)ot only is it difficult to raise a new
venture capital fund without a track record, but the skills needed fo r successful venture capital
investing are difficult and time-consuming to acquire” (G om pers and Lem er, 1999, p.4). As a
result o f the venture capital firm s’ previous investments in specific information about particular
industries, industry experience is an important resource that can be useful to portfolio companies
(Fiet, 1995).

P roposition 7 (a ): The venture cap italist’s perception o f h is/h er resource p o d m il depend upon
the reputation c f the venture cap italfirm
P roposition 7 (b ): The venture cap italist3s perception c f h is/h er resource p o d w ll depend upon
the siz e c f the venture cap italfirm
P roposition 7 (c ): The venture c a p italist's perception c f h is/h er resource p o d w ll depend upon
the experience cfth e venture cap itd firm

There are goo d reasons fo r venture capital firm s to add resources to the resource pool o f their
portfolio com panies. G om ez and M eijia (1990) have argued that venture capital firms are
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involved in their portfolio com panies to the extent o f their assessm ent o f the chances for the
success o f the venture. As a venture’s success, in large part, is dependent upon its resources, the
contribution o f resources by a venture capital firm will depend on its assessm ent of the resources
possessed b y the portfolio com panies.

Venture capitalists believe that providing advice/support is a way o f increasing the likelihood that
the venture will succeed (Rock, 1991; Peny, 1988), thus their advice/support m ay ultimately
affect the perform ance o f the firm (Rock, 1991; Sapeinza et al., 1995). The nature and extent o f
the venture capital firm s’ contribution is based on the needs o f the new venture including gaps in
managerial com petence, the skills available from the investor and the relevance o f specific advice
and support (W ame, 1988). I f venture capitalists believe that the resources possessed by portfolio
com panies are insufficient, they will make efforts to provide these from their own resource pool
o r assist portfolio com panies in obtaining them from outside sources (Stier and Greenwood,

2000).

According to social exchange theory, the larger the amount o f a resource possessed, the more
likely it is to be p assed on to others (Foa and Foa, 1980). Thus venture capital firms with larger
resource pools are m ore likely to transfer resources to portfolio companies. Sapienza et al. (1995)
have also noted that involvement will be m ore when venture capital firms appear to offer a
significant resource fo r the venture.

While there seem s to be sufficient incentive fo r venture capital firms to support their portfolio
com panies b y adding to their resource pool, Sapienza (1994) has speculated that venture capital
firm s m ay put in greater efforts on portfolio com panies that already have abundant resources and
consequently a greater probability o f success. This means that venture capital firms will be less
inclined to add to the resource pool o f a portfolio com pany which is not likely to succeed and
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m ay start looking fo r a quick exit instead (Ruhnka et aL, 1992). There has been, however, little
research evidence to support this speculation.

Portfolio com panies are in a position to accept o r resist resource intake from venture capital
firm s. It is debatable whether portfolio companies will always welcome resource input by venture
capital firm s and there is som e justification fo r the portfolio com pany not to acquire resources
from the venture capital firm. A s already stated, som e entrepreneurs do believe that venture
capital firm s get in the w ay o f a venture (Gom ez-M eija et aL, 1990; Stier and Greenwood, 1995).
Venture capitalists them selves believe that potential clients perceive venture capital firms to be
greedy, grasping o r avaricious (Murray, 1991). Venture capital firm s also concede that they
som etim es provide incorrect advice (MacMillan et al., 1989). M oreover, entrepreneurs value thencontrol over the portfolio company. Thus, despite a high regard fo r the resource strength o f the
venture capital firm , a portfolio com pany m ay system atically undervalue a venture capital firm ’s
assistance because o f a lack o f trust, the possibility o f a loss o f control or reservations about the
usefulness o f a resource.

Gonversely, there are also compelling reasons fo r portfolio companies to welcome resource
transfer from the venture capital firm. Past studies on the success of high potential ventures have
identified resources such as effective marketing, technological expertise (Maidique 1986), prior
experience o f the m anagement team (Hm m ons et al., 1977), strategic decision making (Van de
V en et aL, 1984) and strategic focus (Meyers and Roberts, 1986) as related to the success o f the
high potential ventures. It follow s that portfolio com pany management, will be looking fo r a
quick and optim al attainment o f resources by building network exchange structures with
outsiders that are identified as critical resource suppliers (Scherer, 1980; Larson, 1992). The
sm aller the firm ’s pool o f resources, the more likely they are to be sought from resource
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suppliers, including venture capital firms (Foa and Foa, 1989)52. Barney et al.’s (1996) finding can
also be cited as a case in point whereby a less experienced venture team, of a new technology
venture, assessed a venture capital firm 's operational assistance higher than did the more
experienced venture team. Lastly, it has also been aigued that less able entrepreneurs (low
resource pool) will choose to involve venture capital firm s, whereas the more able entrepreneur
(higher resource pool) will develop the venture without external participation (Amit et a l 1990).
Research indicates that the venture capital firm 's input is sometimes welcomed by portfolio
com panies (Bygrave, 1992; M acM illan et al., 1989; Rock, 1991) and there are even instances
where portfolio com panies have complained that their venture capital firms do not allocate
enough tim e to the portfolio com panies (Fried and H isrish, 1994).

Bygrave and Tim m ons (1992) have indicated that sociological factors, like lack o f personal
chem istry and lack o f open comm unication between the venture capitalist and the C E O s of the
portfolio com panies, m ay limit resource exchange. However, given the desire to succeed and a
reasonable level o f goal oriented behaviour, as would be expected from an entrepreneur (Weber,
1947), the resources possessed b y the venture capital firm , despite poor personal relationships,
m ay still be requisitioned and used by the portfolio company. M ore so because, this can be a
critical leveraging opportunity whereby resources can be gained, and competitive advantage
realised, w ithout incurring direct capital investment (Larson, 1992).

There seem to be sufficient reasons why venture capital firm s should transfer resources when
they perceive the need and availability.

52 Th is argum ent is com patible with inform ation processing; theory (G albraith, 1973) which im plies that when inform ation is
poten tially im portant to a com pany and it lacks inform ation, o r the resources to collect that inform ation o r an inform ation
p rocessin g capacity, it w ill seek and value greater interaction with other com panies.
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P roposition 8 : V enture cap ital firms who rate the resources ( f the portfolio com pany low er m il
rate w in e added oorrparath dy h itte r

P roposition 9 : V enture cap italfirm s vho rate th eir cm resources h itte r w ll rate w ine added a s

H$er.
Researchers have em phasised com patibility between a venture capital firm and the portfolio
com pany fo r a fruitful relationship. “ The right match (between entrepreneur and the venture
capitalist)53 can yield a synergistic relationship that propels the firm to higher levels o f excellence”
(Ehrilch et a l, 1994: p 81). This argum ent has been extended to the matching o f resources and it
is argued that the resource m ost likely to be exchanged will be the one that matches the
requirements o f the portfolio company.

It has been argued that the nearer the resources are to a sim ilar specification as to requirement,
the more likely they are to be exchanged (Foa and Foa, 1980). Knowledge specificity assum es an
im portant dim ension in the co-operative activity o f entrepreneurs and venture capitalists (Cable
and Shane, 1997). Sapienza et al. (1986) have also found that greater experience o f a venture
capital firm in the venture capital industry was not necessarily accom panied b y greater
interaction; but in cases where a venture capital firm was relatively more experienced in the
portfolio com pany's industry, interaction was greater. Jen g and Wells (2000) also asserted that
venture capital firm s can greatly add to the success o f the venture by providing a matching
function as needed by the portfolio company.

There is, how ever, an interesting argument against resource matching and value maximisation.
W em felt (1984) has referred to the close analogy o f resource-based theory with product portfolio

53 M y parenthesis
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theory. H e argues that since strong products in a firm ’s growth-share matrix supply weak ones
with cash, resources also support each other. This means that matching the needs o f the portfolio
com pany w ith the resource availability from the venture capital firm m ay not result in resource
transfer because a portfolio com pany that does not want to interact m ay cover up weaknesses
where the resources are needed by drawing on the extra resources it has in areas where it is
resource rich. A lso, fo r a resource needy portfolio com pany, the matching may not matter as it
m ay help itself to whatever resource it can get from the venture capital firm

It is proposed, on the basis o f previous arguments, that such a matching is more likely to generate
maximum value added. Thus a venture capital firm will try and add more to the resources where
a gap is perceived and will participate less if no gap is perceived.

P roposition 1 0 (a): H igh erp articip atio n occm in activ ities where, in term c f pen ciled resam e
strength, doe venture cap italfirm is in a superw rp osition com pared to d ie portfolio company

P reposition 1 0(h ): Low er p articip atio n a rm

in activ ities where, in term cfp en ciled resotm e

stren gh , th epcn fdk) com pany is in a su p eriorp ositk n cm p ared tod oew n tm

In the light o f resource exchange theory and the existence o f a network dyad relationship
between the venture capital firm and the portfolio com pany, it is argued that value added is the
result o f resource exchange. Thus, resource perceptions play a very important role in building up
a value added relationship. However, it has been dem onstrated that value addition, as vague as
this concept is, is also com plicated by the existence o f m any factors that can significantly alter the
benefits that can be derived from a fruitful relationship.
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In the next chapter the m ethodology that has been adopted to collect data fo r the examination of
the validity o f the research propositions is discussed An analysis o f the characteristics of the
participants who have chosen to respond to the research questionnaire is also undertaken.
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6.1

Chapter 6: Research M ethodology

Introduction

In this chapter the research plan, the actual research process and a justification of important
parameters that are used in this thesis are presented. It also includes a discussion on the problem
o f the response rate in view o f the closed nature o f the venture capital business. In the last part o f
this chapter, the characteristics o f venture capital firm s that have responded to the questionnaire
and the characteristics o f portfolio companies that venture capital firm s have chosen to report
on, are presented with reference to the possibility o f a response bias.

6.2

R esearch D esign

A self-adm inistered survey was utilised in this study. Surveys and interview techniques have been
found to be feasible and productive here and in past studies relating to venture capital research
(Brophy, 1986). This approach has been adopted because very little public data is available
relating to the internal working o f venture capital firm s. Because o f the very private nature of this
business, it is rather difficult to gain access into venture capital firm s. Because o f the fact that
venture capitalists, as highly specialised professionals, are extrem ely busy, it is equally difficult to
gain a fixed interview time. Theoretically, venture capitalists should be much more willing to
contribute tim e and effort to questionnaire based m ethods, which o ffer them flexibility in regard
to time.

Another reason fo r using survey-based research in this study is that this w ork was carried out
from Australia with subjects geographically dispersed around Asia. It would have been
impractical to visit each potential respondent o r to conduct lengthy interviews on the telephone.
One advantage o f a mail survey is that the survey instrument can be administered to a large
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num ber o f potential respondents in a short period o f time in a relatively affordable manner.
M oreover, since one o f the objectives in undertaking this study is to make it comparable with the
existing body o f literature, the technique used by previous researchers was ad opted The survey
was supported b y e-mail exchanges with a num ber o f venture capitalists inside and outside Asia.
Selected com m ents from som e o f the venture capitalists, received via e-mails, are drawn upon
wherever relevant in this thesis. Investor involvement activities at the post investment stage are
exam ined in this study by focusing on the network dyad relationship that exists between the
entrepreneur and the venture capital investor.

6.3

Survey Instrum ent

T o ensure quality o f the survey instrument a three-part approach was adopted First, previous
venture capital value added survey studies were reviewed in the light o f resource exchange theory.
The questionnaire was intentionally designed to be compatible with those used in the previous
research studies, o f sim ilar nature, in order to facilitate comparison. Faculty members at the
U niversity o f W ollongong, who had either experience in survey research o r venture capital
research were asked to examine the instruments and some m odifications were made by
incorporating their com m ents. Thirdly, the im proved instrument was mailed to four friendly
venture capital firm s and then revised further, based on their observations.

The questionnaire w as divided into three parts. The first part obtained basic inform ation only. In
the second part inform ation was sought on the involvement question and follow ed a similar
pattern to previous research. Lastly, inform ation regarding resource exchange was sought.
A ppendix m is a copy o f the actual survey instrument. The same survey instrument was sent to
all countries. H ow ever, m onetary values were expressed in terms o f the local currency.
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6.3.1

M ain Issu es in Survey Instrum ent

Investm ent funds were split according to type based on the A V Q ’s The G uide to V enture C ap ital
in A sia 1999. The A V Q has been publishing the G uide fo r m any years and its classification was

found to be broad and close to the realities in Asian countries where multiple views o f venture
capital and different industry structures have to be taken into account. F o r the purpose of this
research, the classification according to types is closely associated with the num ber o f people
working fo r the firm s/com panies and their experience. Som e previous research studies (Gorman
and Sahlm an, 1989) refer to the num ber o f partners and make further distinctions between
different partners. Such an approach assum es the existence only o f partnerships in the venture
capital arena, which is not the case in Singapore and H ong K on g (Guan and Cheong, 1989).

Determ ining the experience that a firm /com pany has available as a resource is com plicated by
m any different kinds o f experiences that employees at all levels bring with them. Therefore, the
questions were focused on senior management personnel only. "While searching fo r the right
term s to use, the approach o f the A V Q appeared to be pragm atic, in the Asian context, where it
refers to the term “professionals” working for venture capital firm s/com panies. Although the
A V Q guide does not explain what it means by a professional, this term when applied to a
venture capital market, broadly conveys the im pression o f som eone with experience in venture
capital working at a relatively senior level. The data on partners/senior management
personnel/professionals gathered fo r this research study com pares well with the A V Q data on
the num ber o f professionals working fo r the firm s/com panies.

Com panies who receive venture capital have been classified differently according to
developm ental stages. The European Venture Capital A ssociation (E V C A Y earbook, 1998) does
not classify “ turnaround” as a separate development stage, unlike the Asian Venture Capital
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Journal (G uide to Venture Capital in A sia, 1999). Similarly, P ra tt's G uide to V enture C ap ital Sources
published in the United States (V en ture E oononics, 1989) m entions rounds of financing in its
com pany classification. Researchers have adopted numerous different classifications fo r portfolio
com pany stages o f developm ent (Elango et aL, 1995). The classification follow ed by Cornelius
(1986) was found to be useful as it not only provides a comprehensive list o f possible
developm ental stages but also explains the meanings o f the term inology used54. D ata contained
in The G uide to V enture C ap ital in A sia published by A V Q was analysed. The respondents in each
country were sent questionnaires expressed in their own currencies based on the exchange rates
prevailing on January 25,1999.

6.3.1.1

Involvem ent

As m entioned in Chapter 3, the extent o f venture capitalist’s involvement in a portfolio company
has multiple dim ensions. T o confirm the results, the extent o f involvement is taken in this thesis
to include an investigation o f the num ber o f activities that the venture capital firm is involved in
with its portfolio company, the frequency o f interaction and the amount o f time spent by the
venture capital firm managing the affairs o f its portfolio com pany (measured in hours per
month). Follow ing previous research, only the role of the lead investor has been considered. In
order to m ake the study com parable (Macmillan et aL, 1988, Rosenstein et al., 1989, Ehrlich et aL,
1994), the venture capital firm ’s participation has been m easured on a Likert scale. The research
process began with a list o f 20 activities already identified by MacMillan et al. (1998). To make
the list m ore com prehensive, som e o f the activities were rephrased and then re-classified in the
light o f previous research regarding the involvement o f venture capital firms in their portfolio
com panies (Rosenstein et aL, 1989; Sapienza and Tim m ons, 1989; Stier and Greenw ood, 1995).

54 Seed is the research and planning stage, start-up m eans the m arket entry stage, early expansion is the m arket developm ent stage,
late expan sion is where a venture is ready to exploit the market and m ezzanine funding is taken to m ean the stage at which a
venture is read y to go public. Public com pany, leveraged buyouts and turnarounds are self-explanatory classifications.
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Representation as a board m em ber has not been included in the final list of activities because the
contribution b y the venture capital firm ’s representative on the Board o f D irectors can be
identified from other activities. A fter this exercise, a list o f 15 activities rem ained The same
approach as G orm an et al. (1986) and Elango et al. (1995), regarding the determination o f time
spent by the venture capitalist with the portfolio company, was adopted

Respondents were asked to report on the time that they had spent in direct contact with their
portfolio com pany. D irect contact includes three factors; the time the venture capitalists spent on
the telephone in conversation with representatives o f the portfolio company, attending form al
meetings; and attending informal m eetings. In order to arrive at the total direct contact time the
number o f m eetings in a year was multiplied by the average hours spent. This was added to the
number o f telephone calls multiplied by the time per call. It should be noted that this measure
does not include the time that venture capitalists spend on w ork that is not in direct contact (e.g.
reading reports, devising strategies privately, contacting others on behalf o f portfolio com pany
etc). The final result, therefore, is indicative and should not be construed as the total time spent
on managing a typical portfolio com pany

6.3.1.2

R esources

A s m entioned earlier, there are num ber o f ways to classify resources. The researcher has relied
upon previous studies as the starting point to determine resources to be used. A s mentioned in
Chapter 3, the resource-based theory has been criticised fo r being tautological in the sense that
resources are labelled as useful only after they have been identified as contributing to the firm s
success. In order to avoid the determination o f the usefulness o f resources after the fact, the
involvement activities already identified in previous research studies (MacMillan et al., 1988;
Gorm an and Sahlm an, 1989; Rosenstein et aL, 1989; Ehrlich et al., 1994) were converted into
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identifiable resources. Activities, in som e cases, could be identified as a resource. F or example,
crisis m anagem ent as an activity is also a resource. In cases where the activities were too narrowly
defined, a broader term used in the above m entioned research studies were used to identify that
activity. F o r exam ple, the ability to contribute b y negotiating a contract with a prospective
employment candidate, fo r its portfolio com pany, primarily stems from the expertise in the area
o f personnel m anagement. The resource and activity classifications, as shown in Table 6.1, agree
with the factor analysis perform ed by M acmillan et a l (1988) to classify these activities. Some of
the activities, however, do overlap and originate from multiple resources. In this case, the
resource has been split into prim ary and secondary resource. Since experience and industry
knowledge affect all activities, they have been m easured but not included. A detailed link between
resource based capabilities and the identified activity has been considered as follows: As
m entioned in Chapter 3, there is little consensus among researchers regarding the value-added
contribution o f venture capital firm s. Value-added seems to be a com plex issue because
numerous factors in multiple com binations affect the ultimate value added in varying degrees.
The list o f possible factors can be very long. It was believed that any attempt to measure all these
factors m ay result in a serious shortfall in the response rate, which already has a dismal record as
evidenced by past research in venture capital in general and in A sia in particular. Factors, which
are related to venture capital firm /portfolio com pany characteristics and the research exchange
paradigm were identified since partner characteristics and resources form the basis o f the
resource exchange m odel. T o narrow down the list, only those factors were selected which have
been identified with value-added in previous research studies.
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P lan o f the Study

The Australian venture capital market started out as the favourite for this study. However, the
idea w as later dropped fo r m any reasons. The Australian venture capital market is not only
sm aller in size, but is also not as well developed as the venture capital markets in some
neighbouring countries. With a record o f a low response rate from venture capital firms, an
empirical research project in Australia would have rendered the research result untenable. Some
venture capital firms in Australia were contacted but the lukewarm response made clear the
futility o f this exercise. Singapore appeared to be a good choice fo r this study. Singapore not only
has a fairly well developed venture capital market but, because of its open market policy houses a
variety o f venture capital firm s from all over the world. The proximity to Australia, as compared
to other Asian countries, was also an advantage making this exercise less expensive.
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A fter som e prelim inary investigation, it was decided to expand the focus o f research to more
Asian countries. Since the Japanese venture capital market is unique (Clark, 1987), the next four
largest A sian venture capital m arkets were selected fo r this study. These included H ong K ong,
Singapore, South K orea and Taiwan. The first point o f contact was the respective Venture
Capital A ssociations in Asia. N o response was received from any o f these after one letter
follow ed b y tw o reminders. The reason, it was realised later, is not difficult to understand. [“
M ost o f these very VC(venture capital) associations have acted as nothing more than lunch clubs
and have not really done any research to m y knowledge. M ost of them don't even have
perm anent offices and the current chairman's secretary is in m ost cases the administrator. I think
the best w ay is to have a well-funded pan-Asian venture capital association in the mould of
EV C A . W ho will do that remains up there.”]55. An Internet search fo r Asian venture capital firms
did not produce the desired results either because in early 1999, not many Asian venture capital
firms had a w ebsite or inform ation about them selves available on the web.

The A V Q publishes a very useful listing of venture capital firms operating in Asia. It also
includes very useful data. The inform ation contained in The G uide to V enture C ap ital in A sia with
particular focus on venture capital firms was the prim ary reason an Asian based research was
selected.

6.5

R esponse rate problem

The response rate in this kind o f study poses the biggest threat to the validity o f the research. The
response to questionnaire-based research depends primarily on the willingness of people to
respond to the questionnaires. While a 100% response rate is unlikely, it is entirely up to
respondents to decide whether o r not to respond. The response rate (KR) assum es enormous

55 P ersonal correspondence: A llen L ee, A ssociate E d itor, A sian V enture C apital Journal, Septem ber 1,1999.
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im portance here since a result based on a high response rate from a wide representation of the
whole population under study is generally perceived as dependable, valid, and reliable. It is
unclear, how ever, how high the response rate needs to be (Baruch, 1999). While studies have
been done on the variables that affect the level o f response (Heberiein & Baumgartner, 1978;
K elsall, P oole, & K uhn, 1972), there is no agreed norm as to what is or what m ay be considered
an acceptable and reasonable response rate. H enderson (1990) has argued that a response rate of
20-30% is fairly typical fo r mail-out surveys to a large sam ple o f firms. Organisational
representatives m ay decline to respond due to a variety o f reasons. Fenton-O 'Creevy (1996)
exam ined reasons fo r non-response in a study that had yielded a 33% response rate at the
organisational level. A random sam ple o f non-respondents reported various reasons fo r not
responding. F o r example, too busy (28%), not considered relevant (14%), address unavailable to
return the questionnaire (12%), and cases where it was com pany policy not to complete surveys
(22%). The remaining 24% did not state clear reasons fo r not responding. Even in the case of
questionnaires returned, the issue o f difference between returned and useable questionnaires
needs to be ironed out. Baruch (1999) argues that there should be a distinction between studies
directed tow ard top management (Œ O /M D etc.) o r official representatives o f organisations,
and others such as mid-level m anagers. F or the form er the norm m ay then be 36 + /- 13
responses out o f 100 whereas fo r m ost other populations it m ay be about 60 + /- 20 responses
out o f 100 (Baruch, 1999).

Em pirical

evidence

about venture

capital is

not easy to

develop

because

o f the

private/confidential nature o f venture capital firm s and their investments (Barry, 1994). The
prim ary source o f empirical evidence in venture capital has been the use o f survey instruments, in
which case, response rate turns into a m ajor issue. To determine the past levels of response rate
from venture capital firms, 24 research studies that used a mailed questionnaire and targeted
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either the venture capital firm s o r their portfolio com panies were exam ined The response rate
from venture capital firms in the United States presents a wide variation from 30% or less
(MacMillan et a l, 1988; Bm ton et aL, 1997; Carter et aL, 1994; Elango et al., 1995; Barney et al.,
1996; Sapienza et al., 1996) to 50% o r more (Gorm an and Sahlman, 1986; Ehrlich et al., 1994;
Fiet, 1995; Sapienza, 1992). Interestingly, MacMillan et al. (1988) and Sapeinza (1992) explored a
similar question, o f the nature o f venture capital firm s’ involvement with their portfolio
com panies, with a considerably different response rate. Sapienza’s (1992) study, however, with a
response rate o f 80% fo r the venture capital firms and 85% fo r the portfolio companies, was an
exception. The usual response rate o f portfolio com panies in such studies present a more
consistent pattern o f 20-30% (Barney et a l, 1989; Rosenstein, 1989). Unfortunately, many studies
do not cite the reasons fo r the wide variations in return rate. O nly two studies have specifically
acknowledged using Dillm an’s (1978)56 approach and both have ended with a comparatively
m odest response rate o f below 30% (Bruton et al., 1997, Barney et al., 1996). The response rate
of venture capital firm s does not seem to follow any particular pattern over time in the United
States.

N o one appears to have conducted research on venture capital firm /portfolio company
relationship in A sia. O f the two studies o f venture capital in Singapore, that were accessible, the
response rate w as abysmal (Ray, 1991; R ay 1994). In the later study, where this information was
provided, it to o k the intervention o f a powerful government official to lift the response rate from
2% to 7% (Ray, 1994). The sam e researcher, in collaboration with others, had earlier obtained a
much better response from Japan o f 25.7% (Ray et al., 1993) as have others in other parts o f Asia
(G iotigeat et al., 1994; Rah et al., 1994; Pandey and Ju n g, 1996). D espite the fact that H ong

56 H illm an (1978) has outlined the procedure to increase response rates in his b o o k “M ail and Telephone Surveys: The Total
D esign M ethod” . D illm an's approach is prim arily based on a series o f specifically tim ed mailings including an initial mailing
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K on g is one o f the largest venture capital markets in A sia, there is a serious dearth of research
studies there and previous response rates could not be assessed.

It was expected that the response rate o f this study w ould be governed by the following factors;

1) Traditionally, venture capital firms have been found to be reluctant to disseminate
inform ation even fo r academic purposes (Boylan, 1982; Bygrave, 1989);

2) Businesses in the targeted countries, especially in Singapore are inundated with
questionnaires com m issioned by governments and local academ ics. After a while this
creates a jaded reaction to the nth questionnaire (Ray, 1994);

3) A bsence from the workplace due to an overseas assignm ent, a long holiday, o r other
long-term absence could prevent otherwise willing respondents from participating in this
study;

4) Venture capital firm ’s offices m ay have changed, personnel being replaced o r the
respondents m ay not have received the questionnaire; and

5) Potential respondents may have perm anently or tem porarily ceased involvement in
venture capital.

6.6

The Survey

Since the response rate was considered to be particularly sensitive, the survey approach
recom m ended byD illm an (1978) was adopted The survey instrument was dispatched at the end
of June 1999. A total o f 334 questionnaires were sent to four different countries.

along with a co v er letter.
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6.2 Survey Response
Singapore

Hong Kong

Taiwan

S. Korea

Total

No. of Questionnaires Sent

83

150

43

58

334

Not Involved at the Moment

1

0

0

0

1

Returned Undelivered

7

11

4

7

29

Same Company as Other

1

0

0

0

1

Not a VC Company

0

6

1

2

9

Not Interested

1

2

0

0

3

No Response

49

116

38

49

252

Response Received

24

15

0

0

39

The addresses o f the venture capital firms were taken from the A V Q and The G uide to V enture
C ap ital in A sia , 1999. The letters were sent to the venture capital firm s during late June and the

early part o f Ju ly 1999. A reminder, enclosing the questionnaire again, in the middle of July 1999
followed this. Later, two fax reminders were sent at the end o f Ju ly with a one-week gap between
each reminder. A s expected and despite all precautions, the response rate in all cases was low.
Unfortunately, in m any cases, the venture capital firm s did not even acknowledge the receipt of
correspondence and fax reminders. The m ost responses came from Singapore, numbering 24 and
a response rate o f approxim ately 33% , followed by H ong K ong, with 15 and a response rate of
11%. N o response was received from either S. K orea o r Taiwan. It was decided to drop S. Korea
and Taiwan and proceed with the responses received. Putting together both Singapore and Hong
K ong yields a response rate o f approxim ately 20% which, considering past research in venture
capital, was considered acceptable.

Interestingly, the m ajority o f venture capitalists who responded to the questionnaire actually filled
up the survey instrument. A s a large number o f respondents did not respond to the questionnaire
or even acknow ledged receipt o f the questionnaire, despite reminders, it was not possible to find
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out the reasons fo r non-response. Thus not enough data

was available to perform a non

response analysis

6.7

Sam ple Characteristics & Response Bias

6.7.1 R espondent Profile
The responding firm s represent a broad cross section o f industries by preference57 and provide
little evidence o f response bias tow ard any industry.

6.3 Average Amount of Capital Under Management
Frequency
Percent

Less than US$30 Million
Between US$30 m-60 m
Between US$60 m-90m
Between US$90m-120m
More than US$150m
Total

7
10
4
4
14
39

17.9
25.6
10.3
10.3
35.9
100.0

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

17.9
25.6
10.3
10.3
35.9
100.0

17.9
43.6
53.8
64.1
100.0

The data from Singapore and H ong K on g indicated considerable diversity regarding size. The
A V Q study had the sam e result with a similar average capital under management o f U SD 94
million (A V Q , 1999). There is an indication that there are fewer mid-sized venture capital firms
with venture capital under management of U SD 60 million to U SD 120 million. The size spread
does not indicate an optim um size fo r the firms.

6.4 Type of Investm ent Fund

Government Sponsored
Corporate Subsidiary
Subsidiary of a Financial Institution
Subsidiaryof a Securities Firm
Independent Company/Partnersbip
A Joint Venture Company
Total

Singapore___________________Hong Kong
Percent
Frequency
Frequency
Percent
3
12.5
20.0
3
3
12.5
26.7
4
6
25.0
1
42
53.3
8
9
37.5
2
8.3
100.0
15
24
100.0

57 T his inform ation w as n ot a p art o f the research questionnaire. H ow ever, A V Q provides sim ilar inform ation about all venture
capital firm s operating in A sia. T he inform ation relating to venture capital firm s who have responded to this survey was
com piled from A V Q data.
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The respondents involved alm ost all types o f funds. H ow ever, in both countries, more responses
came from Independent firm s/com panies and subsidiaries o f financial institutions and
corporations.

A com parison o f the A V Q data according to types o f firm s in Singapore and H ong K ong
com pares well with the research data.

6.5 Venture Capital Firms by Types
Singapore(AVQ, 1999)

Bank Subsidiary
Corporate
Subsidiary
Other
Subsidiaries
Others
Government
Owned
Independent
Merchant Bank
Total

Hong Kong (AVQ,
1999)

Singapore &Hong
Kong(AVq, 1999)

Research Data
(Singapore &Hong
Kong)
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
26
18.71%
10
25.64%
19
13.67%
6
15.38%

Frequency
10
8

Percent
16.67%
13.33%

2

3.33%

9

11.39%

11

7.91%

1

2.56%

5
6

833%
10.00%

3
0

3.80%
0.00%

8
6

5.76%
4.32%

2
3

5.13%
7.69%

26
3
60

43.33%
5.00%
100.00%

40
0
79

50.63%
0.00%
100.00%

66
3
139

47.48%
2.16%
100.00
%

17
0
39

43.59%
0.00%
100.00%

Frequency Percent
16
2025%
11
13.92%

In both these countries more than 40% o f the firms are captives and an equal percentage are
independent firm s. The importance o f the captive and sem i captive structure o f venture capital
firms, as in Europe (EVGA, 1998), points toward a possibility o f influence of a corporateventure-capital-type governance structure in these countries. Government owned companies
comprise 7% , which though m ore than 4% reported in Europe, is not exceedingly different.
Since G overnm ents in these countries have played an active part in prom oting venture capital,
there is thus som e evidence that this has occurred through incentives and legislation rather than
active participation.
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6.6 Experience (Both Countries)

N
Years Firm has been in Venture Capital 39
Number of Professionals
39
Avg. -years of Experience-VC Industry
39
Avg. Experience Other Industries
39
Valid N (listwise)
39

Minimum
1.00
2
3.00
.00

Maximum
29.00
25
15.50
16.00

Mean
6.6154
6.36
7.3667
8.9231

S td . D ev iatio n

N
24

Minimum
1.00

Maximum
18.00

Mean
6.6667

Std. Deviation
4.3003

24
24
24
24

2
3.00
2.00

25
15.50
16.00

6.75
7.4083
9.4167

6.19
2.8087
3.8634

5 3095
5.24
2.7623
3.7407

Singapore
Years Firm has been in Venture Capital
Business
Number of Professionals
Avg. years of Experience-VC Industry
Avg. Experience Other Industries
Valid N (listwise)
Hong Kong
Years Firm has been in Venture Capital
Business
Number of Professionals
Avg. years of Experience-VC Industry
Avg. Experience Other Industries
Valid N (listwise)

N
15

Minimum
1.00

Maximum Mean
29.00 6.5333

Std. Deviation
6.7915

15
15
15
15

2
4.50
.00

14
5.73
12.00 7.3000
13.00 8.1333

3.31
2.7826
3.5176

The A V Q has provided inform ation relating to the age o f 163 venture capital firms in Singapore
and H ong K on g. A two tailed z test (z=1.35) was perform ed to com pare the mean age of venture
capital firm s at a 95% confidence level without discovering a significant difference between the
AVCf data and the data collected by this study. The mean age o f the venture capital
firm s/com panies in the sam ple was 6.5 years which com pares well with the average age of all
venture capital firm /com panies as reported by A V Q o f 4.8 years in Singapore and H ong Kong.
The oldest firm in the respondent sam ple claimed 29 years o f operation and only 4
com panies/firm s were less than three years old.

The average num ber o f professionals working in respondent com panies/firm s was 6.36 with a
high o f 25. A bout 80% o f the respondents had less than 7 professionals working fo r them. The
average num ber o f professionals in responding com panies/firm s is slightly more than the average
of 5 professionals fo r all A sia (A V Q , 1999) but compares well with the overall average of slightly
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more than 5 fo r H ong K on g and a little more than 6 fo r Singapore reported by the A V Q (1999).
The average experience in venture capital, o f the professionals working fo r respondent
com panies/firm s is 7 years, which is one year greater than their experience in other industries. It
is interesting to note that the average reported experience o f the professionals in the venture
capital industry was m ore than the average age o f the venture capital firm s/com panies. This is in
contrast to G orm an and Sahlman’s (1989) research study in the United States where the average
experience o f the venture capitalists was alm ost half the age o f the firm /com pany. I f this data is
considered indicative o f the industry in general, it points toward a possibility that m ost of the
venture capitalists working in Singapore and H ong K on g have gained their experience elsewhere.
In terms o f statistics regarding experience, there is not much difference between H ong K ong and
Singapore.

6.7 Num ber o f Professionals
Number of Investments at Present
Less than 5
Between 6-10
Between 11-15
Between 16-20
More than 25
Total

Mean
4.13
4.75
4.67
6.63
10.33

Std. Deviation
2.47
2.75
1.75
6.91
7.81

About 80% o f the firm s am ong sam ple respondents had less than 5 professionals working fo r
them. Although the average num ber o f professionals working with the venture capital
firm s/com panies, as expected, increased with size58, this increase is not accom panied by a
proportional increase in the num ber o f investments. This seem s to suggest the existence o f
venture capital firm s with larger num ber o f professionals managing sets o f a sm aller number of

58 A s m easured b y fun ds being m an aged
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investments. This also indicates that the num ber o f professionals managing investments depends
on other factors e.g. size o f investment, rather than num ber o f investments.

6.7.2

Investm ent Profile

6.8 Number of Investments Since Inception
Frequency
Less than 10
15
Between 11-20
8
Between 21-30
3
Between 31-40
4
Between 41-50
1
More Than 51
8
Total
39

Percent
38.5
20.5
7.7
10.3
2.6
20.5
100.0

6.9 Number of Investments at present
Frequency
Less than 5
15
Between 6-10
4
Between 11-15
6
Between 16-20
8
More than 25
6
Total
39

Percent
38.5
10.3
15.4
20.5
15.4
100.0

Valid Percent
38.5
20.5
7.7
103
2.6
20.5
100.0
Valid Percent
38.5
10.3
15.4
20.5
15.4
100.0

Cumulative Percent
38.5
59.0
66.7
76.9
79.5
100.0

Cumulative Percent
38.5
48.7
64.1
84.6
100.0

The average num ber o f investments per responding venture capital firm compares well with the
average o f 10 fo r Singapore and H ong K on g reported by A V Q (1999). Roughly, 65% of the
responding venture capital firm s have invested in less than 30 investments each since they began.
In contrast, a sim ilar percentage o f responding venture capital firms reported existing portfolio as
less than 15 com panies. This would suggest that alm ost half of the portfolio companies have
been exited since the inception o f the funds. The fact that the average age o f the venture capital
firms, am ong sam ple respondents, is 6.6 years would indicate that the holding period for the
investment is between 3-4 years. Thus, there is som e evidence that the holding period of
investments is shorter in this region than in the United States.
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6.10 Board Representation

Frequency
20
3
6
2
1
7
39

Less than 5
Between 6-10
Between 11-15
Between 16-20
Between 21-25
More than 25
Total

Percent
51.3
7.7
15.4
5.1
2.6
17.9
100.0

Valid Percent
51.3
7.7
15.4
5.1
2.6
17.9
100.0

Cumulative Percent
51.3
59.0
74.4
79.5
82.1
100.0

65% o f the responding com panies reported less than 15 companies in their portfolio and about
75% reported that they have board representation in less than 15 companies. Thus, though board
representation is clearly not practiced by all venture capital firm s in these countries, it is a popular
choice.

6.11 Stage Preference_________________________

Stage of
Development
Seed
Startup
Early
Expansion
Late
Expansion
Mezzanine
Public Go
BuyinsBuyouts
Turnaround

Preference Ranked by Stage
1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

6.00

7.00

8.00

Count
%
Count
%
Count

0
.0%
1
3.0%
2

0
.0%
0
.0%
3

1
3.0%
2
6.1%
6

0
.0%
2
6.1%
2

0
.0%
1
3.0%
5

0
.0%
1
3.0%
3

0
.0%
5
152%
0

6
182%
0
.0%
0

Do Not
Prefer
26
78.8%
21
63.6%
12

%
Count

6.1%
10

9.1%
12

18.2%
6

6.1%
4

15.2%
1

9.1%
0

.0%
0

.0%
0

36.4%
0

%
Count
%
Count
%
Count

30.3%
11
33.3%
0
.0%
8

36.4%
8
242%
3
9.1%
6

18.2%
5
152%
7
212%
5

12.1%
2
6.1%
6
18.2%
3

3.0%
0
.0%
3
9.1%
1

.0%
0
.0%
2
6.1%
0

.0%
0
.0%
0
.0%
0

.0%
0
.0%
0
.0%
0

.0%
7
212%
12
36.4%
10

%
Count
%

24.2%
1
3.0%

18.2%
1
3.0%

15.2%
1
3.0%

9.1%
0
.0%

3.0%
4
12.1%

.0%
5
15.2%

.0%
1
3.0%

.0%
0
.0%

30.3%
20
60.6%
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6.12 Ranking by Preference

Financing
Stage

Both Countries
Mean

Seed
Startup
Early Expansion
Late Expansion
Mezzanine
Public Go
Buyins-Buyouts
Turnaround

7.2857
5.0833
3.6667
2.2121
1.9231
3.7143
22609
4.8462

Std. Deviation Banking by
Preference
1.8898
8
2.0652
7
1.5916
4
1.1112
2
.9767
1
1.1892
5
1.2142
3
1.7723
6

Singapore
Mean
7.2857
5.4000
3.6429
2.1429
2.0526
3.8667
2.6000
5.3750

Ranking by
Preference
8
7
4
2
1
5
3
6

Hong Kong
Mean
0
3.5000
3.7143
2.3333
1.5714
3.3333
1.6250
4.0000

Ranking by
Preference
5
6
3
1
4
2
7

The collected data suggests that, irrespective o f age, venture capital firms in both these countries
are fairly clear about the stage o f investment they would prefer. The Asian venture capitalists’
inclination to prefer late expansion o r investment in mature com panies, as evidenced by the data
on total investm ent b y financing stage provided b y the A V Q (1999), is also depicted by the
survey data as shown in Table 6.11. More than 78% o f venture capital firms in both these
countries are not interested in seed stage financing. M oreover, more than 60% do not invest in
startups and turnarounds. A large m ajority o f venture capital firms are involved or would like to
be involved in late stage and mezzanine financing. While the stage preference for less
experienced59 and more experienced firms display sim ilar overall patterns, it seem s that firms
with m ore experience in the venture capital industry tend to have some preference for
buyouts/buy-in deals. Less experienced firms tend to prefer mezzanine financing.

A com parison o f the data accum ulated b y preference fo r stage of portfolio company
developm ent and the total investm ent by stage o f portfolio com pany development provided by
the A V Q brings forth som e interesting points regarding both these countries. A s per the A V Q ,
the largest chunk (44.4%) o f venture capital finance in Singapore goes to the expansion stage.
The A V Q data does not make any distinction between late stage and early stage and hence it is
not possible to corroborate this inform ation. The second largest investment according to the
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A V Q is startup financing. However, according to sam ple research data, startup financing is
ranked far below i.e. 7th on the preference scale o f the venture capital firms. The contradiction
can be explained. The Singapore Governm ent is biased tow ard high-tech start-ups and has
geared its tax and legislative concessions accordingly. Thus, even though, seed and startup
financing m ay not be to the liking o f the venture capital firm , the investment is governed by
other considerations. Another noticeable difference has been the buyout/buyin investments.
A ccording to the A V Q buyouts/buyins constitute only 1.6% o f the investment portfolio in
Singapore. H ow ever, venture capital firm s in Singapore rank buyouts/buyins as third on the
preference scale. Thus, either there are not enough buyout/buy-in opportunities in the market or
governm ent regulations have considerably influenced the pattern o f venture capital investment in
Singapore.

As fo r H ong K on g, the m ost noticeable difference between preference and investment has been
in relation to mezzanine financing. While it is only 2.4% o f the investment, according to the
A V Q , venture capital firms am ong respondents accord it 1st preference. In the Singaporean and
overall A sian context, mezzanine financing is o f considerable importance in terms o f investment.95

6.13 Returns on Investment

Less Than 20%
Between 21-40%
Between 41-60%
Total
Missing
Total

________________________________________________
Existing Returns
Projected Returns
Frequency
17
13
3
33
6
39

Percent
43.6
33.3
7.7
84.6
15.4
100.0

Valid Percent Frequency
12
51.5
18
39.4
3
9.1
33
100.0
6
39

Percent
30.8
46.2
7.7
84.6
15.4
100.0

Valid Percent
36.4
54.5
9.1
100.0

59 L ess than an overall average o f 6.6 years o f operation.
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F or over half o f the venture capital firm s studied, the existing rate o f return was below the 20%
m ark L ess th an l0% said that they were earning m ore than a 41% return on investment. Judging
by the targeted return, the m ajority o f the venture capital firm s (54%) in these markets are
anticipating better returns (Between 21% to 40% ). 58% o f Singaporean venture capital firms
contacted reported earning less than 20% returns whereas m ore than half o f venture capital firms
in H ong K on g reported earnings between 21-40% . In both these countries, the expectation
seems to outstrip the reality although this disparity is greater in Singapore. The claim o f high
return remains unproven.

6.8

Characteristics o f Portfolio Com panies

The average age o f the portfolio com panies considered in this study is 7.8 years, which is more
than the average age o f the respondent venture capital firms. O n average, it has been just under
2.5 years since the portfolio companies have received venture capital.

6.14 Age of Portfolio Companies

Years since venture capital received first
Years in operation
Valid N (listwise)

N
38
38
37

Minimum
.00
1.00

Maximum Mean
7.00
2.4474
34.00
7.8421

Std. Deviation
1.5369
7.5821

The research data seem s to suggest that companies in Singapore and H ong K ong would generally
receive venture capital, on average, in their sixth year o r later. Analysis based on countries, reveal
that the com panies in H ong K on g have to wait longer (on average 2 years) than companies in
Singapore fo r venture capital.
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6.15 Stage of Development
Stage o f D evelopm en t A t P resen t

Stage o f D evelop m en t w hen V enture

________________________________ _____________C apital F irst R eceived_______

Seed
Stait-up
Early Expansion
Late Expansion
Mezzanine
Public Company
Leveraged Buyouts
Turnarounds
Others
Total

Frequency
2
2
5
16
4
1

Percent
5.1
5.1
12.8
41.0
10.3
2.6

1
8
39

2.6
20.5
100.0

Frequency
7

Percent
17.9

19
4
4

48.7
10.3
10.3

4
1

10.3
26

39

100.0

About half o f the com panies, about which venture capital firms have provided information, were
at an early expansion stage when the venture capital was first received Seed stage companies
constitute approxim ately 18% o f recipients and the rest are evenly divided between late
expansion, m ezzanine and buy-ins/ buyouts. A t present 40% o f the companies are at a late
expansion stage. It is interesting to note that only one com pany has m oved to the public
companies stage while eight others have m oved to an “ other” stage. The data corroborates the
point made in chapter 3 that the initial public offering is not a frequently used path for exit by the
venture capital firm s in these countries.

6.16 Total Assets of Portfolio Companies

Frequency Percent
Between LJS$1.2-2.4
2
5.1
Between US$2.4-3.6
3
7.7
Between LJS$3.6-4.8
1
2.6
Between US$4.8-5
2
5.1
More than US$ 5 Million
31
79.5
Total
39
100.0

6.17 Technology

Very High
High
Medium
Low Tech
Veiy low Tech
Total

Frequency
5
8
3
14
9
39

Percent
12.8
20.5
7.7
35.9
23.1
100.0

The size o f the portfolio companies reported by the venture capital firms, as summarised in
Table 6.16, has been a surprise. The average investment per com pany in Asia, in general, is
around U S D lm illion (A V Q , 1999). While designing the questionnaire on a 5-point Likert scale,
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the total assets classification fo r the investee com panies with U SD 1.2 million gap in each scale
with a m axim um o f over U SD 5 million seem ed like a g o o d However, from the data collected
approxim ately 80% o f the investee companies have total assets o f more than U SD 5 million. In
terms o f technology, 59 /o o f the com panies arc low tech o r very low tech. High tech and very
high com panies constitute 33.3% .

6.18 Board Membership

Independent Board Members
Board members-Nominated by Financial Institutions
Board Members-Nominated by Others
Board Members-Nominated by Venture capital firms
other than respondents
Board Members- Nominated by Private Investors
Board Members-Nominated by Respondents
Board Members- Owner/Management
Total Board Membership

Minimum Maximum
0
1
0
2
1
1
0
3
1.00
1
2.00
2

3.00
4
6.00
12

Mean
.027
.30
.054
1.14

%Age
.36%
3.93%
.71%
15.00%

.76
1.59
3.70
7.57

10.00%
21.07%
48.93%
100.00

O n the average, each com pany in the sample had 7.57 board members, which is slightly more
than the U nited States average board size reported by Rosenstien et aL (1989) o f 5.62. Sixty seven
percent o f the portfolio com panies have an average board size between 7-9 members. The
m ajority o f the board m embers (48.9%) are owners/m anagem ent. Second are venture capital
firms with 36% . The current study differs from the research study by Rosenstein et al. (1989),
which reported an average 60% representation b y ow ners/m anagers and 19% by venture capital
firms in the U nited States. The fact that 80% o f the respondents had representation on the board
o f portfolio com panies, points tow ard widespread use o f this practice in these countries.

The prim ary data was collected using the research m ethodology outlined in this chapter. The next
chapter tests the validity o f research hypotheses set forth in Chapter 5 through a statistical
analysis o f this prim ary data.
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7

7.1

Chapter 7: Res earch Findings

Introduction

The fundam ental validity o f the resource exchange m odel when applied to the venture capital
value-added question is exam ined in this Chapter. The data compiled through questionnaires is
analysed and com pared with results from previous research.

7.2

Allocation o f Tim e

Previously, tw o research studies (Gorm an and Sahlman, 1989; Elango et al., 1995), based on
United States data, have been used to assess the time that venture capitalists actually spend with
their portfolio com panies. In both studies the m ethodology used was similar to the one used in
this study. In both studies the role o f the lead venture capital firm was considered separately from
other investors. The sum m ary o f data collected by G orm an and Sahlman (1989) relating to the
role o f lead venture capital firm s60 only, is presented below:-

7.1 Gorman and Sahlman (1989, p 245)

Mean
Visit per Year
Visit Duration (Hours)
Phone Conversation (per Month)
Conversation Length (min)
Annual Hours on site
Annual Hours on Telephone
Total Annual Hours (Direct Contact)

18.7
4.9
7.5
21.9
80.5
35.4
115

Standard
Deviation
12.9
2.7
5.0
15.4
44.0
37.9
N.A

High

Low

80.0
15.0
25.0
90.0
262.5
225.0
N.A

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
N.A

No.
of
Respondents
47
47
47
47
47
47
47

Elango et a l (1995) only considered the total time spent b y the lead venture capital firms instead
of dividing it am ong different m odes o f contact. Their data is presented below.

60 A lead venture capital firm fin ds the investm ent opportunity, negotiates the term s o f the deal, and finds the other co-investors,
■ which collectively form the syndicate.
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D ata: Elango-----et al.v---(1995,’ rp 175-176)
—7.2
--------:—
~
___________________
Assistance Provided Assistance Provided
by a VC (High)
by a VC (Medium)

Assistance Provided
by a VC(Lov)

Average Time Spent when a lead investor 36.65
(hrs/month)
Percentage of Lead Investments
59.08%

12.75

6.76

50.16%

57.38%

Average Time Spent when a lead (hrs/year) 439.80

153.0

81.0

Both studies were conducted in the United States where lead venture capital firm s have played an
active role in their portfolio com panies. Since these studies were not limited to venture capital
firms in any particular area within the United States or to any particular technology, the only
significant difference between the two is the time period. While standard deviations of total time
spent by venture capital firms with their portfolio com panies, in both cases, were not available, it
was evident that G orm an and Sahlman (1989) reported considerably less time (115 hours/year)
spent with the portfolio com pany com pared to the time (153 hours/year) reported byE lan go et
al (1995).

Presented below' is the data collected, fo r this study, which details the involvement o f venture
capital firm s with their portfolio com panies in H ong K on g and Singapore using three different
modes o f involvem ent. The data includes inform ation on frequency o f involvement and the time
spent with the portfolio com panies. The total time using all three modes o f involvement have
been sum m ed to obtain total direct time as m easured in term s of number o f hours per year.
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7.3 Involvem ent Statistics

Mean
(Singapore)
Number of Formal meetings (Per Year) 4.73
Hours of Formal Meetings (Per Meeting) 2.64
Times Informal Meetings (Hours Per Year) 6.09
Flours of Informal Meetings (Per Meeting) 2.59
Total Number of Meetings
10.8
Hours per meeting
2.74
Total Meetings (Hours Per Year)
30.73
Number of Telephone Calls (Per Month) 6.96
Minutes of Telephone Calls (per Call)
15.43
Annual Hours on Telephone
23.30
Total Direct Contact Time (Hours per54.95
Year)

Mean
(Hong Kong)
5.07
3.00
8.00
3.21
13.36
3.05
41.64
6.27
19.67
21.73
64.0

Mean
(Overall)
4.86
2.78
6.83
2.83
11.81
2.86
34.97
6.68
17.11
22.68
58.67

Std. Deviation
(Overall)
3.77
.95
6.94
1.66
7.82
.804
23.37
5.85
9.27
23.42
34.42

A z test61 was perform ed to com pare the means o f sam ples collected b y this study and Gorman
and Sahlm an (1989) and to find out if any significant difference existed between the two. Table
7.4 contains a statistical com parison o f Gorm an and Sahlman’s (1989) data with the data gathered
by this study.

7.4 Comparative Statistics

Standard Error of Z value
Differences in Means
Visit per Year & Number of Meeting per Year
230
3.00
Visit Duration (Hours/meeting) & Average Hours per Meeting .42
4.90
(Formal and Informal)
Phone Conversation (per Month)/Number of Telephone Calls (Per 133
0.67
Month)
Conversation Length (Converted into annual hours) & Annual Hours 2.74
1.75
on Telephone
Annual Hours on site & Annual Hours in Meetings
7.54
6.04
Annual Flours on Telephone & Annual Hours on Telephone
6.80
1.87

In the case o f telephone contact (number o f calls and the duration), there was no significant
difference betw een the two sam ples62. H ow ever the differences on meetings (number and
duration) are significant, indicating, that venture capitalists in the United States hold more

61 The z test here m easures the difference betw een m eans o f the tw o sam ples. A tw o-sam ple z test has been perform ed because
standard deviation in the case o f both the sam ples is known and the sam ple size is large (Le. n >30).
62 The z value h as been com pared with test statistics ±1.96(95% Confidence)
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frequent m eetings and allocate more time to conducting these meetings than venture capitalists in
H ong K on g and Singapore

In order to com pare the Asian responses with the United States ones further, a com parison was
also made with the data collected by Elango et aL (1995). That study only considered inform ation
about the total tim e that venture capitalists spent with their portfolio companies. In the absence
of exact inform ation about standard deviation in the case o f Elango et a l (1995), a t test63
comparing 153 hours64 with the data collected for this study was performed. Significant
differences betw een the two averages are clearly depicted (p < 0 1 ).

7.5 Test Value = 153

T
Total Direct Contact lime-16.445
per Year

df

Sig. (2-tailed) Mean
Difference

35

.000

-94.3333

95% Confidence Interval of
the Difference
Lower
Upper
-105.9789
-82.6878

The possibility that venture capitalists in the United States, Singapore and H ong K ong maintain
the same level o f telephone contact cannot be ruled out. However, there is sufficient evidence to
suggest that the total time allocated to involvement activities by venture capitalists in the United
States is significantly more than that allocated by venture capitalists in H ong K on g and
Singapore.

The proposition (1) that V enture cap italfirm allocate less m e to m anagng p o rfo lio com panies in H ong
Kong an d Sin gapore th an in the U ntied S ta te s is strongly supported Thus, venture capitalists in H ong

K ong and Singapore visit their portfolio companies less often and spend less time with them

63 "Student" (real name: W. S . G ossett [1876-1937]) developed statistical methods (t test) to solve problems stemming from his
employment in a brewery. The t-test assesses whether the means o f two groups are statistically different from each other. This
analysis is appropriate whenever the objective is to compare the means of two groups. A T test has been used here because
standard deviation in the case o f data by Elango at aL (1995) is not available.
64 Average time venture capitalists spend with their portfolio companies in direct contact in a year.
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than do venture capitalists in the United States. There is, however, nothing to suggest that the
contact through telephone is any different.

It is relevant to note that the mean difference between time spent by venture capitalists in
Singapore and H ong K on g is not significant. Unlike Elango et al. (1995) the research data is
much more easily divided into two categories with the active venture capitalists spending around
100 hours per year in direct contact with the portfolio com pany and the less active spending
around 40 hours per year.

7.3

N um ber and Im portance of Activities

Venture capital firm s were asked to indicate the extent o f their involvement with their portfolio
companies. Table 7.6, which follow s, sum marises their responses. The question on involvement
was designed to cover the contribution o f the venture capital firm s, in different activities,
com pared to their portfolio companies. These activities were based on a list o f 15 activities
(Table 6.1) that have been extracted from previous research studies relating to venture capital
(MacMillan et aL, 1988; G orm an and Sahlman, 1989; Rosenstien et a l, 1989; Ehrlich et al., 1994;
Elango et a l, 1995). Involvem ent was rated on a 5 point Likert scale vis-a-vis contribution o f the
portfolio com panies. A score o f 3 indicated as much contribution by a venture capital firm in an
activity as a portfolio company. A score o f 1 meant that a venture capital firm has never been
involved in that activity.
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7.6 Involvement Activities of Venture Capital Firms65
Both Countries
Mean
Std.
Deviation
3.37
0.91
Monitoring Performance
1.27
Obtaining Alternative Sources of Equity 3.29
Finance
Interfacing with Investor Groups
3.00
1.36
2.74
Ongoing Strategy Development
1.29
Obtaining Alternative Sources of Debt 2.71
1.14
Finance
Formulation of Initial Business Strategy 2.63
1.24
226
Management of Crisis
1.20
Development of Professional Support 1.79
1.14
Groups
1.76
Personnel Motivation
0.85
Interview and Selection
1.76
0.79
Personnel Search
1.63
0.82
Negotiation of Terms with Prospective 1.53
0.51
Candidates6
656
Personnel Replacement
1.37
0.49
Development of Production Techniques 1.37
0.54
Selection of Vendors and Equipment
0.46
129

Singapoine
Mean Std.
Deviation
3.22
0.90
3.04
1.40

Hong Kong
Mean Std.
Deviation
3.60
0.91
3.67
0.98

2.87
2.39
2.52

1.52
1.31
1.24

3.20
3.27
3.00

1.08
1.10
0.93

2.48
2.04
1.43

1.38
1.11
0.95

2.87
2.60
2.33

0.99
1.30
1.23

1.61
1.65
1.39
1.52

0.72
0.78
0.72
0.51

2.00
1.93
2.00
1.53

1.00
0.80
0.85
0.52

1.39
1.30
1.22

0.50
0.47
0.42

1.33
1.47
1.40

0.49
0.64
0.51

Table 7.6 indicates that venture capital firm s in both countries are involved in all the identified
activities, to a lesser o r greater extent. The following activities scored least based on the criteria
that 50% o f the venture capital firm s claim that they had never been involved in these or in cases
where venture capital firm s were involved, their involvem ent in these activities had never been
more than that o f the portfolio company;

1) Selection o f vendors and equipment;

2) D evelopm ent o f production techniques;

65 The list o f th ese activities has been derived from previous research studies regarding involvem ent activities o f venture capital
firm s as d iscu ssed in C hapter 5.

66 F or induction into portfolio management team.
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3) Personnel replacement;

4) N egotiation o f term s with prospective candidates fo r employment;

5) Personnel search;

6) Interview and selection;

7) Personnel m otivation; and

8) D evelopm ent o f professional support groups.

Except fo r 3 activities, out o f a total o f 15, the venture capital firm ’s involvement averaged more
than 1.50, which is halfway between no involvement and less involvement than the portfolio
company. This means that venture capital firms are involved in 12 out o f 15 activities in which
venture capital firm s from U nited States are known to be involved. N o venture capitalists, among
respondents, have added to the list o f 15 involvement activities. Thus, proposition (2) that venture
cap ital firm s in Stn gtpore an d H ong K ong are inedw d in sim ilar aam ties w th th eir portfolio com panies as
venture cap italfirm in the U n ited S tate s, is supported

To identify the areas of activities where venture capital firm s in these countries believe they have
made the greatest contribution, the five point Likert scale was averaged fo r each activity and
ranked accordingly67. The statistical com parison o f this research with the research studies
conducted in the United States proved to be a difficult task because of the different scales
(MacMillan et al., 1988; Ehrlich et a l, 1994) and m ethodologies (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989;
Rosenstein et a l, 1989) used by these researchers to rank the activities in which venture capital

67 N one o f the respondent reported a score o f 5 in any activity, which represented m ore contribution than the portfolio company.
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firms are involved, in order o f im portance. Therefore, ranking o f activities by two studies were
com piled Ehrlich et al. (1994) was selected fo r com parison purposes since it was the m ost recent
com parable study. Rosenstien et al. (1989) was selected from earlier studies because the list of
activities, contained in that study, com pared well with the list used in Rosenstien et aL’s study.
The results and a com parison o f the findings are shown in Table 7.7.

7.7 Ranking of Activities

Rankings
Rankings
Rosenstein et aL (This Stud})
(1989)
Monitoring Performance
2
1
Obtaining Alternative Sources of Equity 5
2
Finance
Interfacing with Investor Groups
1
3
Ongoing Strategy Development
3
4
Obtaining Alternative Sources of Debt 4
5
Finance
Formulation of Initial Business Strategy 7
6
Development of Professional Support
Groups
Interview and Selection
6
7
Negotiation of Terms with Prospective 8
8
Candidates
Personnel Replacement
6
9
Development of Production Techniques
Selection of Vendors and Equipment

Rankings
Ehrlich et
(1994)
3
2

Rankings
aL (This Stud})
1
2

1
4

3
4

4
8

5
6

7
6
5

7
8
9

It should be noted that some o f the activities that do not appear in the selected research studies
were not com pared with activities in this study. Additionally, som e of the activities that do not
appear in this research study, but appeared in the selected studies, have been placed against the
nearest relating activity. In order to find out whether the ranking assigned in this study is any
different from the ranking assigned b y the two selected authors, a W ilcoxon signed-rank test68
was perform ed.

68 The W ilcoxon sign ed rank test can be considered a non-param etric equivalent o f the m atched paired t-test It is used to test the
prop osition that tw o paired sam ples based on ranks have com e from die sam e population. Because it is non-param etric, it makes
no assum ption s ab ou t the distribution o f the data. It is preferred over sim ple m atched pair sign test, in cases where the extent o f
difference (in ranking), as in this case, needs to be incorporated.
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7.8 T est Statistics

Ehrlich et aL(1994) - This study
Z
-.755a
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .450
a Based on negative ranks.

Rosenstein et aL(1989)-This study
-.647a
.518

There is little indication in the test that the ranking assigned to activities based on the previous
research studies is any different from the ranking assigned in this study. The proposition (3) th at
the im portance c f value added activ ities attrib u ted to venture cap italfarm d isp lay sim ilar pattern s in Singapore,
H ong K ong an d the U nited S tates is also supported

7.3.1

Value addition

Since this study covers only the venture capital firm s’ perspective, it does not include a direct
question regarding the assessm ent o f value addition because such a question is likely to be self
testing, tautological and leading. This aspect, therefore, needed to be assessed from a different
angle. If venture capital firms do add value, it stands to reason that the time spent should be
accom panied b y what venture capital firm s perceive to be their participation in the value added
activities. Although the time spent by the venture capital firm s with their portfolio companies
provides a m easure o f involvement, it does not necessarily explain whether this time is used fo r
value adding activities o r reducing inform ation asymmetry.
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7.9 Correlation69 Direct Contact Time and Average of Activities
Total Direct Contact Time perTotal Direct Contact Time per
Year- Singapore
Year- Hong Kong
217
Average of Activity Pearson
.538
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
.010
.455

N

22

15

As expected, significant correlation was found between the involvement activity level and the
time venture capitalists spend with their portfolio companies in Singapore, as indicated in Table
7.9. H ow ever, the correlation in H ong K ong although positive, was not significant and hence the
result inconclusive. Overall, the result implies that venture capitalists use the time that they
allocate to the com panies fo r actual participation and value addition. The proposition (4) th at
venture cap italfirm

in Singapore an d H ong Kong see them ehes a s addin g w ine to the business th ro u fi th eir

im dw ren t is thus partly supported.

7.3.2

Value added and intention o f venture capital firm to in teract

The actual participation o f the venture capital firm s was taken to be their intention to participate
since the difference between venture capital firm s’ actual participation and their expected
participation has not been found to be significant (MacMillan et al., 1988). A s explained in
chapter 4, out o f many possible factors that affect involvement levels, firm policy, venture capital
culture and the extent o f commitment were m easured herein. The average score of the
importance, on a scale o f 1-5 that venture capitalists assigned to their activities has been
calculated an d used fo r com parison purposes.96

69 A correlation te st has been perform ed because there has been no assum ption o f any causal relationship between the tim e spent
by venture capitalists with th eir portfolio com panies and the num ber o f activities that venture capitalists are involved in their
portfolio com pan ies. Sim ple (Spearm an’s) correlation has been used, in this thesis, in cases o f correlation between param etric
data o r correlation betw een param etric and non-param etric data.
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H ie tables (7.10-7.12) show correlations and a regression model o f the effect o f three factors,
which were expected to affect the willingness to be involved, on the level of involvement.

7.10 Value added and intention of venture capital firm to interact

Correlations
Total
DirectAverage
Contact Time perActivity
Year
1.000
.467

Total Direct GontactPearson
Time per Year
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed).
N
36
Pearson
.467
Average of Activity
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed) .004
N
36
Your Company Policy Pearson
.303
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed) .073
N
36
General Trend in thePearson
.105
Industry
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed) .543
N
36
.021
Percentage Share inPearson
Equity
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed) .902
N
36

ofYour CompanyGeneral TrendPercentage
Policy
in the IndustryShare
in
Equity
.303
.105
.021

.004
36
1.000

.073
36
.636

.543
36
.010

.902
36
.390

38
.636

.000
38
1.000

.951
38
.171

.016
38
.305

.000
38
.010

38
.171

.304
38
1.000

.062
38
-.155

.951
38
.390

.304
38
.305

.

38
-.155

.353
38
1.000

.016
38

.062
38

.353
38

39

.

7.11 Model Summary
Std. Error of the Estimate
R
Adjusted R Square
R Square
.4894
.671
.450
.401
a Predictors: (Constant), Percentage Share in Equity, General Trend in the Industry, Your Company Policy
7.12 Coefficients
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std. Error
B
.363
(Constant)
.786
.077
Your
Gompany.328
Policy
.086
General Trend in-3.81 IE-02
the Industry
.054
Percentage Share7.995E-02
in Equity
Dependent Variable: Average of Activity
*p<01

t

Sig.

.584

2.164
4.254

.038
.000*

-.058

-.441

.662

.202

1.478

.149

Standardised
Coefficients
Beta

The findings are mixed. It seem s that the venture capital firm ’s understanding o f the trends in
their industry (their culture) does not affect their decision to get involved in value added
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activities. H ow ever, the venture capital firm ’s policy, regarding involvement, is not only related
both to the extent o f participation in activities and the time venture capitalists spend with their
portfolio com panies, but significantly affects the level o f activity (p < 0 1 ), as shown in the last
column o f table 7.12). The extent o f commitment, as m easured by the percentage of equity in the
portfolio com pany, was also found to be related to the activity level but not associated with time
spent. The proposition (5) that the m læ ad d ed penoeption c f venture cap italfirm m il also depend on the
facto rs, which effect the w illingness c f both the p arties to in teract is supported in the case o f firm policy,

partly supported in case o f the equity share and not supported in the case of venture capital
culture.

7.4

Perception o f Resource N eed o f the Portfolio Company

The affect o f four factors i.e. riskiness of the venture, performance o f the portfolio companies,
reputation o f the management team o f the portfolio companies and com petency o f the
management team o f the portfolio companies, on the resource needs/dem ands o f portfolio
com panies was m easured. The results are presented in Table 7.15. As explained in Chapter 5, risk
has been m easured in term s o f level o f technology (low to high) and the stage o f development of
the portfolio company. Inform ation from the venture capital firms was sought on the reputation,
com petency and perform ance o f the portfolio company. The resource demand as a function of
the technological nature o f the project was not significant, although the relationship between the
stage o f developm ent o f the portfolio company and the resource perception o f the portfolio
com pany w as significant at the 10% level (proposition 6a). The performance of the portfolio
com pany seem s to play a significant role in what venture capital firms perceive as the resource
needs/dem ands o f the portfolio com pany so proposition (6b) is supported. The proposition (6c)
that the assessm ent o f the resource strength of portfolio companies depends on the perceived
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reputation o f the portfolio com pany was also supported. The com petency o f the management of
the portfolio com pany as an indicator o f resource need was not supported (proposition 6d).
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7.13 Portfolio company assessment - Correlations
Portfolio Company Assessment

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
General Competency
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
General Reputation of the PC/Mgt Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Stage of Development At Present
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Technology
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Performance of the PC
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Model Summary
Model
R
1
.685

RSquare
.470

Portfolio
CompanyGeneral Competency General Reputation ofStage of Development AtTechnology
Performance of the
Assessment___________________________ the PC/Mgt________ Present_______________________________PC_______________
1.000
.348
.211
.563
-.012
.506
.035
.000
.203
.943
.001
37
38
37
38
37
38
.348
1.000
.784
.128
.072
.507
.035
.000
.444
.669
.001
37
38
38
38
38
38
.784
.563
1.000
.000
-.001
.568
.000
.000
1.000
.997
.000
37
38
38
38
38
38
.211
.128
.000
.017
1.000
-.090
.444
.203
1.000
.919
.590
38
38
38
39
39
38
-.012
.072
-.001
.017
1.000
.146
.669
.997
.943
.919
.381
38
38
38
39
39
38
.506
.507
.568
-.090
.146
1.000
.001
.001
.000
.590
.381
37
38
38
38
38
38

Adjusted R Square
.384

Std. Error of the Estimate
4.6812

Coefficients
Unstandardized Coefficients
B
23.607
(Constant)
.682
Stage of Development At Present
-.137
Technology
2.045
Performance of the PC
4.366
General Reputation of the PC/Mgt
-2.535
General Competency
a Dependent Variable: Portfolio Company Assessment

Std. Error
4.102
.338
.608
.959
1.482
1.442

Standardised Coefficients
Beta
.274
-.030
.349
.664
-.383

t

Sig.

5.755
2.021
-.226
2.133
2.946
-1.758

.000
.052
.823
.041
.006
.089
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7.4.1

Perception o f R esource Availability with Venture capital firms

The average am ount o f capital under m anagem ent and num ber o f professionals working fo r the
venture capital firm were taken as a m easure o f the size o f the venture capital firm To determine
the im pact o f experience, two factors directly affecting the accumulated experience o f the venture
capital firm w ere used, which included the average experience o f professionals working fo r the
firm in the area o f venture capital and the average experience o f professionals working fo r the
firm in other industries. A ssessing reputation is a com plex process. The factors that go into the
evaluation o f reputation are not only num erous but frequently a subject o f debate Ja c o b , 1995).
In order to evaluate reputation three factors were relied upon. These could be obtained
objectively fro m the venture capital firm and are known to affect the reputation o f a business.
These factors include financial perform ance (Vergin and Q oronfleh, 1998), age o f venture capital
firm (G om pers and Lem er, 1999) and the num ber o f credibility transactions70 (Herbig et al.,
1994). The returns generated by the venture capital firm were taken as an indicator o f financial
perform ance. T o represent credibility transactions, the num ber of investments financed by the
venture capital firm s since inception were considered

The proposition 7(a) regarding reputation affecting resource perception received mixed support.
There was a significant correlation between the num ber o f investments and the existing returns
being generated b y venture capital firm s and both these factors seem to affect resource
perception71. The results indicate that venture capital firm s consider the returns generated by
their investm ents a better indicator o f their resource pool, rather than the num ber o f investments

70 The num ber o f sim ilar transactions that a person has com pleted in the past
71 In cases w here there is a high degree o f correlation betw een independent variables, it is not advisable to test both variables
against the dependen t variable at the sam e tim e since it can cause the problem o f muki-collinearhy. H ow ever, in this case, the
correlation betw een the tw o is n ot large enough fo r them to p o se a problem .
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that they have been able to handle. A link betw een the age o f a venture capital firm and resource
perception is not indicated.

The proposition 7(b) that venture capital firm s’ assessm ent o f their resource strength depends on
their size was not supported. The size o f the venture capital firm, as m easured by capital under
management and the num ber o f professionals working fo r the firm, does not significantly alter
the assessm ent o f their firm ’s resources. The proposition 7(c) relating higher resource strength
with m ore experience was also not supported. Apparently, som e venture capital firms do not
believe that more years in the venture capital business increases the pool o f those resources that
they can pass on to their portfolio com panies. Similarly, the experience o f professionals, in the
venture capital industry, working fo r the venture capital firms also does not alter the perception
of venture capital firms regarding their resource strength. However, venture capital firms with
experience in other industries besides venture capital feel more confident in terms o f their
resource pool.
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7.14 Venture capital firm’s Assessment- Pearson Correlation___________________________________________________________________
Venture capital firmsNumber
Assessment
Professionals
Number of Professionals
.345’*'
Years Firm has been in Venture Capital-.297
Business
Avg years of Experience-VC Industry
-.021
Avg. Experience Other Industries
.211
Average Amount of Capital Under.357*
Management
Number of Investments Since Inception
.386*
Existing Returns
.589**
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
* * Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Model Summary
R
RSquare
.591
.769

Adjusted R Square
.476

ofYears Firm has been inAvg
years
CapitalExperience- VC
Venture
Business
Industry

ofAvg. Experience OtherAverage Amount ofNumber
Underinvestments
Industries
Capital
Management
Inception

of
Since

.104
-.018
-.125
.561**

.489**
-.255
-.158

-.418**
-.130

.034

.557**
.469**

.131
-.201

.126
-.080

-.046
-.048

.626**
.434*

.665**

Std Error of the Estimate
2.4788

Coefficients
Unstandandized Coefficients
B
(Constant)
25.818
Years Firm has been in Venture Capital Business -.110
Avg. years of Experience-VC Industry
.283
.407
Avg. Experience Other Industries
Average Amount of Capital Under Management .301
Existing Returns
2.511
-6.409E-02
Number of Investments Since Inception
Number of Professionals
.113
a Dependent Variable: Venture capital firms Assessment

Std. Error
2.804
.106
.199
.137
.375
1.116
.455
.107

Standardised Coefficients
Beta
-.178
.234
.428
.174
.452
-.037
.182

t

Sig.

9.208
-1.034
1.424
2.969
.803
2.250
-.141
1.055

.000
.311
.167
.007
.429
.033
.889
.302
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7.4.2

Venture capital film /Portfolio Company Resource perception and value added

The possibility o f a relationship, between the

resource

assessm ent o f the portfolio

com pany/venture capital firm , time spent with the portfolio com pany by the venture capital firm
and the level o f involvement in activities by the venture capital firm , has been measured. In order
to obtain another indicator o f value added, the total time that venture capital firms spent with
their portfolio com panies and the sum o f the activities in which venture capital firm s were
involved, w as divided into 5 categories (dummy variables). The resultant dummy variables were
multiplied to obtain a figure, which represented high involvem ent as a combination o f time and
activities. In order to discover a relationship Spearm an’s m easure o f correlation was used.

7.15 Correlations (Spearman's rtio72)

Portfolio
Company
Assessment
.010

Venture capital firmsGorrelation Coefficient
Assessment
Sig. (2-tailed)
.952
N
38
Total Direct ContactCoirelation Coefficient -.124
Time per Year
Sig. (2-tailed)
.480
N
35
Average of Activity Correlation Coefficient -.384*
Sig. (2-tailed)
.019
N
37
Product
(ActivitiesGorrelation Coefficient -207
and Time)
Sig. (2-tailed)
.233
N
35
* Gomelation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

Venture
capitalTotal
DirectAverage of
firms Assessment Contact Time perActivity
Year

-.222
.200
35
-.337*
.041
37
-.231

.460**
.005
36
.859**

.810**

.183
35

.000
36

.000
36

N o significant relationship was found between the venture capital firm’s assessm ent o f their own
resources and the time they spent with their portfolio com panies. The relationship o f resource
assessm ent o f venture capital firm s with the num ber o f activities in which they participate
produced a negative correlation. A significant negative relationship was found between venture27

72 Instead o f P earso n ’s correlation, Spearm an’s ih o has been used since it is considered to be better suited fo r rank ordered nonpaiam etric data.
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capitalist’s assessm ent o f portfolio com panies’ resources and the num ber o f activities that venture
capital firm s are involved in their portfolio companies.

Based on an overall measure of involvement, both the propositions (8 & 9 respectively that
venture capital firm s who rate the resources c f the portfolio com pany lo iter w ill rate ta k e added corrparadtdy
U § x r and that venture cap italfirm s who rate th eir am resources h i§ x r w ill rate ta k e added a s h i$ e r are not

supported Apparently, fo r venture capital firm s, their resource strength does not encourage
involvem ent in their portfolio companies.

7.4.3

Value added and activities.

Venture capital firm s generally assess their resource strength in the following areas as highest:

1) P roject/Id ea Evaluation;

2) M onitoring Performance;

3) N um ber o f contacts-Financial Institutions;

4)

Crises M anagement;

5)

Strategy Planning; and

6) Financial Expertise;

Venture capital firm s assess and rank the resources o f portfolio companies highest in:

1) N um ber o f contacts-other industries;

2)

O perational Planning;
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3) Industry Know ledge;

4) Personnel M anagement; and

5) N um ber o f Gontacts-PC Industry;

Apparently, when a venture capital firm perceives itself as being strong in particular resource
areas it will perceive the portfolio com pany as weak in those areas.

The average scores o f individual strengths fo r both venture capital firm s and their portfolio
companies in an activity were matched and the differences calculated to indicate a resource gap.
A high positive figure represented a higher resource gap with venture capital firms in superior
position whereas a high negative figure represented a resource gap with portfolio companies in a
superior position in terms o f that resource. The resultant figures were then ranked according to
the perceived gap. The resource gap ranking was m atched with the actual participation results of
this study based on classifications discussed in the chapter on research m ethodology (Table 6.1).

7.16 Resource Gap_____________________________________________________ '________________________

Venture capital firm- Portfolio
Resource Gap Resource Ranking Based on
Resource
Company
________________________ Availability_______ Resource Need___________________________________
Mean Score
Mean Score
Resource Actual
___________________________________________Gap______ Participation
Number of Contacts- Other ~ 0, 0A~.
-1.131579
9
4
10
Industries
2'868421
9
7
Operational Planning
3.105263
-0.81579
3.921053
8
Personnel Management
3
-0.789474
8
3.789474
6
7
-0.736842
Number of Contacts P C on_ ,/f>.
3.710526
Industry
Z973684
5
6
-0342105
Project/Idea Evaluation
3.184211
3.526316
2
5
Number of contacts Financial - C70Q .7
0.052631
3.526316
Institution
3.378947
1
4
0.105263
Monitoring Performance
3.605263
3.5
6
3
0.157894
3.552632
Crises Management
3.710526
4
2
0.289474
3.447368
StrategyPlanning
3.736842
3
1
0.394736
3.421053
Financial Expertise
3.815789
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Since it w as postulated that resource gap and actual participation go together, a positive
correlation betw een the tw o should exist. In order to determine the correlation between the two
Spearm an’s rank correlation was conducted between the final rankings.

7.17 Correlation (Spearman's rfao)

Actual Participation

Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

Resource Gap
.748*
.013
10

The results show significant correlations between the two rankings. Thus, the proposition that
higher participation is rated in activities where perception o f resource need and resource
availability (resource gap) is greater is generally supported.

Although the overall result seem s to support the gap/parricipation proposition (10), there are
clearly tw o sides to the issue. Instances where a gap is perceived with venture capital firms in
superior position (positive) and instances where the gap exists with portfolio companies in
superior p osition (negative). The basic premise does not follow from all individual resources. F or
example, though m onitoring is rated as the primary participation activity it stands at number 4 in
the resource gap scale. The splitting of rankings according to positive and negative resource gaps
sheds som e light on the final analysis. While, fo r lack o f significant results, the evidence remains
inconclusive as regard the justification fo r areas o f higher involvement (positive resource gap),
the verdict regarding areas o f least involvement seem ed to be supported (p < 0 5 ). This means that
venture capital firm ’s involvement pattern does take into account resources where portfolio
companies are perceived to be w eak
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N ot all propositions set forth in Chapter 5 were supported by the prim ary data. The next chapter
is used to discuss the results in relation to the propositions and to explore alternative explanations
in cases where these propositions were not supported. O ther aspects o f the venture capital
firm /portfolio com pany relationship that can be extracted from further analysis o f the primary
data are also explored.
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8
8.1

Chapter 8: D iscussion

Introduction .

The analysis in this chapter is intended to shed more light on the research findings. The results
produced b y the last chapter is studied in greater detail and with the help o f available data, further
analysis is perform ed to lo ok at all possible aspects o f the propositions put forward in Chapter 4.
The results have also been com pared with past research studies which have produced similar
data. In the light o f this and past research, plausible reasons fo r results that were contrary to
expectations have been offered.

8.2
8.2.1

D iscussion
The Extent o f Involvement-Time Allocation

The data produced by testing o f proposition 1 produced interesting results. The survey indicated
that venture capitalists spent on average about 58 hours in a year in direct contact with a
portfolio com pany. Venture capitalists in H ong K on g tend to spend slightly more time (64
hours) than venture capitalists in Singapore (55 H ours). M ost o f this time (39%) is spent on
interaction through the telephone. Pandey and Jang (1996) found a similar trend in the Taiwanese
market. The second m ost im portant means of interaction between venture capital firms and
portfolio com panies was the inform al meeting, which accounted fo r about 35% o f direct contact
time. H ie rest o f the direct contact was through form al meetings. On average, the time venture
capitalists spent in direct contact with their portfolio companies worked out to be just over an
hour per w eek This contact was further divided into a number o f modes o f involvement. The
results supported G orm an and Sahlm an’s (1989) findings, conducted in the United States, that
venture capital firm s tend to spend their time with com panies in small increments. Typical
venture capital firm s in Singapore and H ong K ong engaged in a form al meeting with the
portfolio com pany just over once a quarter and spent around three hours per form al meeting.
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The frequency o f inform al m eetings was greater but the duration o f the inform al meetings was
similar to that o f form al m eetings. A s expected, the time spent in inform al meetings varied more
than that in form al m eetings. All in all, venture capitalists, in general, met face to face with their
portfolio com panies’ management ju st under once a m onth. Venture capitalists in these countries
talked to their portfolio com pany's management on average about 6.8 times in a m onth with each
call lasting fo r about 17 minutes.

8.1 Analysis- Involvement Statistics
Mean
(Singapore)

Total Time of Formal Meetings12.8636
(hours)
Total Time of Informal Meetingsl7.8636
(Hours)
Total Telephone Time per Year 23.3043
Total Direct Contact Time per54.9545
Year
Total Number of Reports
3.1053

Mean
Overall
(Hong Kong) Mean
15.6667

14.0000

Percentage ofStd. Deviation
Time
(Direct
Contact)
23.86%
12.2020

25.0000

20.6389

35.17%

18.4331

21.7333
64.5000

22.6842
58.6667

38.67%

23.4211
34.4184

2.5000

2.8485

2.1812

The overall results show that venture capitalists spent less time with their portfolio companies in
Singapore than in H ong K ong. H ong K on g venture capitalists spent about ten hours more per
year in conducting meetings than their counterparts in Singapore. While in both countries similar
time is spent on the telephone; venture capitalists in H ong K on g are likely to put significantly
more efforts into inform al m eetings, as indicated by the frequency and time allocated. The later
result is unexpected because Singapore is sm aller in size (637 sq km) com pared to H ong K ong
(1092 sq km) m aking travelling easier and thus personal meetings more convenient. M oreover, a
large am ount o f venture capital in H ong K on g is invested in Mainland China (A V Q , 1999)
making personal contact m ore difficult. One possible reason fo r this unexpected finding, as
mentioned in Chapter 2, m ay well be that the venture capital investment per project in H ong
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K ong (approx. U SD 7 million) is m uch larger than that in Singapore (approx. U SD 2 million)
making a personal visit a feasible73 option.

There is a clear indication that inform al contact like telephone calls and informal meetings
occupied a prom inent place (74%) in the venture capital firm /portfolio company’s direct
interaction. This m ay be because sm all businesses, more likely to be a portfolio company, usually
conduct business more inform ally than large businesses (C h ow et al., 1997), and this influences
the m ode o f their interaction with the venture capital firm. The inform ality in the relationship is
probably greater than in western venture capital firm /portfolio com pany dyads because these
countries boast a Chinese business philosophy with an em phasis on relationship rather than
systems (Whitley, 1992; Jam es, 1995).

The fact that venture capitalists spent only just over an hour per w eek in direct contact does not
support the view that venture capital firm s, in anyw ay, are involved in the day-to-day affairs o f
the portfolio com panies in these countries. As the A V Q (1999) data demonstrated, venture
capitalists in H ong K ong and Singapore manage about 2 projects each. Thus, direct contact with
their portfolio com panies account for, at the m ost, about 5% o f their working time74.

8.2 Correlations: Modes of Involvement

Total lime of Informal MeetmgsPearson Correlation
(Hours)
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Total Telephone lime per Year Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Total Time of FormalTotal Time of Informal
Meetings (Hours)
Meetings (Hours)
.128
.458
36
.061
.719
37

.063
.717
36

73 M ore regular m onitoring pntails m ore expenses. H ie costs o f m onitoring a project m ust ju stify the am ount o f investm ent to be
financially viable.
74 B ased on 300 w oriring days in a year and 8 hours p er day.
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Table 8.2 show s the results o f a simple correlation between m odes o f direct contact. N o
significant correlation existed between the total time spent in inform al meetings and the total
telephone contact time per year. This means that venture capital firms are not likely to use these
m odes o f interaction as a substitute fo r each other.

Table 8.3 shows data on direct contact classified according to the type of ownership o f the
venture capital firm.

8.3 Type of Venture capital firm and Modes of Involvement
Corporate
Subsidiary
Subsidiary
Institution
N
Mean
N
Times Formal Meetings
6
3.83
10
Hours of Formal Meetings
6
3.33
10
Times Informal Meetings
6
8.67
10
Hours of Informal Meetings
6
3.00
10
Number of Telephone
6
6.67
10
Minutes of Telephone Calls
6
12.50
10
Total Time of Formal Meetings (hours)
6
12.1667
10
Total Time of Informal Meetings (Hours) 6
23.6667
10
Total Telephone Time per Year
6
16.0000
10
Total Direct Contact Time per Year
6
51.8333
10
Total Number of Reports
6
2.3333
8

of a Financiallndependent
Company/Partnership
Mean
N
Mean
5
16
4.56
2.80
16
2.62
5.10
15
7.53
2.60
15
3.07
7.90
17
535
21.50
17
17.65
15.6000
16
12.0625
13.1000
25.6667
15
38.4000
17
15.1765
67.1000
15
55.0000
3.5000
15
3.0667

As Table 8.3 show s, corporate subsidiaries are involved in a com paratively smaller number of
formal m eetings com pared to the number o f their inform al meetings with the portfolio
companies. M oreover, the num ber o f form al reports is also higher in the case of corporate
subsidianes than in subsidiaries o f financial institutions or independent venture capital
firm s/com panies. This result is rather unexpected since corporate subsidiaries usually borrow
form alised structures from the parent com pany and tend to rely more on form al procedures, like
a predeterm ined decision making process (Chesbrough, 2000). Table 8.3 highlighted the fact that
subsidiaries o f financial institutions spent com paratively more time in involvement activities
com pared to corporate subsidiaries o r independent venture capital firm s. M ost o f this time is
spent on the telephone rather than in face-to-face meetings. Independent venture capital firms
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and corporate subsidiaries spent more time on informal meetings than other m odes o f
interaction.

Reports are infrequent and the num ber o f reports required to be filed by the portfolio companies
does not exceed 4 at one tim e. These research findings tend to side with G om pers (1995), who
has argued that the role o f reports is relatively insignificant in portfolio com pany monitoring,
rather than with Robbie et al. (1992) and Sweeting (1991).

Since entrepreneurs in A sia are unaccustom ed to third party involvement, the lack of time
allocated b y venture capitalists to portfolio companies m ay be due to entrepreneurs resisting the
venture capital firm ’s involvement. This argument was also a basis for the proposition that
venture capital firm s in Singapore and H ong K ong allocate less time to their portfolio companies
than venture capitalists in the United States. The results of the survey provide an alternative
explanation fo r the low level o f a venture capital firm ’s involvement in its portfolio company.
About 46% o f venture capital firms cited time constraints as the m ajor reason for less
involvement. T o further investigate why venture capitalists allocate less time to their portfolio
companies in Singapore and H ong K ong, several possibilities were explored. The possibility that
the venture capital firm ’s tim e allocation has decreased over time, as a worldwide trend, is not
supported when research surveys conducted in the United States by Gorm an and Sahlman (1989)
are com pared to Elango et al. (1995). The later study reports more time allocated to portfolio
companies rather than less. The explanation that venture capital firms in H ong K ong and
Singapore are managing m ore portfolio companies per professional or managing more funds per
professional, com pared to the United States, was also not supported by secondary data. The
number o f investm ents m anaged per professional in H ong K ong was 1.6 whereas it was 2.5 in
Singapore. The investm ent p er professional is U SD llm illion in H ong K on g and U SD 4.6
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million in Singapore75. In the United States, the number o f investments per professional is
around 2 and the amount o f investment per professional is close to U SD 20 million (Elango et
al., 1995). Another plausible explanation steins from the general belief that venture capital deals
are fairly hard to find in A sk because company transparency is a general problem (Lee-Young,
2000). Put together, this inform ation points toward the likelihood that venture capital firms in
H ong K on g and Singapore m ay spend more time than their counterparts in the United States, in
finding the right deal. There is also a possibility that venture capitalists m ay have to spend more
time screening proposals although these propositions have not been tested herein

Table 8.4 below shows correlations between experience and the use o f different modes o f
financing.

8.4 Experience and the use of modes of involvement
Total Time ofTotal Time ofTotal Telephone Time
Formal Meetmgslnformal Meetingsper Year
(hours)
(Hours)
Years Firm has been inPearson Correlation .145
.060
.346*
Venture Capital Business
Sig. (2-tailed)
.391
.730
.033
Avg. years of Experience-VCPearson Correlation .329*
-.089
.338*
Industry
.038
.047
.606
Sig. (2-tailed)
-.062
-.476**
Avg. Experience OtherPearson Correlation -.185
Industries
.717
.003
.272
Sig. (2-tailed)
.061
.128
Total Time of FormalPearson Correlation
Meetings (hours)
.719
.458
Sig. (2-tailed)
.063
.128
Total 'lime of InformalPearson Correlation
Meetings (Hours)
.717
.458
Sig. (2-tailed)
.063
Total Telephone Time perPearson Correlation .061
Year
.717
.719
Sig. (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
^
.
It is quite clear that venture capital firm s, with more experience in venture capital make much

more use o f telephone contact with portfolio company management than venture capital firms

75 A V Q , 1999 (F o r detail calculations see appendix I and II).
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with com paratively less experience o f venture capital. M oreover, they are also much more likely
to spend m ore time in form al m eetings. The striking point in the above analysis is a strong
negative correlation between a venture capital firm ’s experience in the portfolio company’s
industry and the use of telephonic contact. Why this happens is a difficult question to answer. It
may be that since venture capital firms with industry experience know practical industry
environments, they are in a much better position to assess the developments in a portfolio
company in person. They may, thus, prefer personal visits to telephonic conversations.

Table 8.5 shows different m odes o f involvement against the level of technology being pursued by
the portfolio company.

8.5 Technology and modes of Involvement____________________________________________________
Technology
Total lime ofTotal lime ofTotal TelephoneTotal
DirectTotal Number of
Formal Meetingsinformal MeetingsTime per Year Contact TimeReports Provided
(Hours)
per Year
to Venture Capital
(Hours)
Finns
Very low Tech N
7
7
6
7
7
Mean 24.7143
2.0000
20.5714
65.5714
202857
Low Tech
N
13
13
12
14
12
3.3077
Mean 11.2308
54.9167
18.9167
212143
Medium
4
N
4
4
4
4
3.5000
Mean 8.7500
43.7500
212500
13.7500
Higk
6
N
9
9
9
9
2.8333
61.5556
Mean 13.5556
26.0000
22.0000
4
Very High
4
N
4
4
4
2.0000
662500
Mean 10.5000
33.5000
222500

There is little evidence that venture capital firms in Singapore and H ong Kong allocate more time
to higher technology businesses. However, a noticeable pattern, shown in Table 8.5, is of venture
capital firm s allocating less time to medium technology companies and more time to companies
at both ends o f technology spectrum . Linked to that is comparatively more reliance on formal
reporting in the case of medium technology companies. There is also little indication of any
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significant relationship between stage o f portfolio com pany developm ent and the allocation o f
time to it b y the venture capital firm

8.2.2

The E xten t o f Involvement- Activities

The data gathered fo r the purpose o f testing proposition 2 and 3 provides detailed inform ation
about the extent and focus o f involvement activities o f venture capital firm s in Singapore and
H ong K on g. O n a five point Likert intensity scale, where a score o f 1 represented no
involvem ent and a score o f 5 represented 100% of the activity being undertaken by the venture
capital firm , the average level o f intensity for all activities was 1.8, indicating low levels of
involvement. M ore than 90% o f venture capital firms have reported average activity levels of less
than 3, a score representing as much contribution as the portfolio company.

The cluster analysis reported in Table 8.6 reveals three clusters o f venture firm s grouped by time
and activities. The clusters were not as clear as the division determined by Macmillan et al. (1989),
on either tim e o r activities alone but became more obvious when the variables were com bined

8.6 O uster Analysis: Time allocation and activities
Initial O uster Centres
Ouster 1
112.00
Total Direct Contact Time per Year
1.87
Average of Activity

Ouster 2
60.00
3.27

Ouster3
8.00
1.13

Iteration H istory
Iteration
Change in OusterChange in OusterChange in Ouster
Centres 3
Centres 3
Centers 1
14.562
2.998
1
11259
4.580
4.988
2
3254
.875
2.515
3
.000
.000
.000
4
.000
a Convergence achieved due to no o r sm all distance change. The maximum distance by which
any centre has changed is .000. The current iteration is 4. The minimum distance between initial

centres is 52.019.
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Final O uster Centres

Total Direct Contact Time per Year
Average of Activity
Number of Cases in each Ouster

Ouster 1
97.50
2.48
10.000

Ouster 2
64.63
2.62
8.000

Ouster 3
28.00
1.86
17.000

Although the cluster analysis o f time spent and average o f activities exhibits a direct
corresponding relationship between these two variables, it also highlights the heterogeneity of
venture capital firm s in terms o f the time spent and levels o f involvement in activities with the
portfolio com panies. Table 8.6 shows three clear clusters o f venture capital firms. One apparent
class o f venture capital firms operates within a limited tim e allocation.

This group includes

venture capital firm s whose average participation in any activities is rather limited. These can be
termed hands-off venture capital firm s and can be com pared to Macmillan et aL’s (1988) laissezfaire group. The second cluster’s comparative low time allocation is accompanied by high
involvement and they can be identified with Macmillan et a l ’s (1988) close-tracker group. The
third cluster o f venture capital firm s is more difficult to define. This cluster shows a stronger
relationship betw een time allocation and level o f involvement in activities (averaged). Thus, they
seem to adjust the time according to their participation in different activities. It is highly probable
that this group is involved in the portfolio com pany on a case-bycase basis.

It is interesting to note that none o f the venture capital firm s in the survey added to the list o f 15
activities that they were being asked to rate. This means that either venture capital firms are not
involved in other activities o r their involvement in other activities is minimal or they prefer to
keep their other activities confidential There is a marked similarity in the kind of activities in
which venture capital firm s are involved in Singapore and H ong K ong. Typically the venture
capital firm s’ m ost important area o f activity in these countries, besides monitoring, relates to
their com m on area o f expertise le . equity financing. It is obvious from the study of comparative
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ranking, that although som e research studies (G orm an and Sahlman, 1989; Elango et aL, 1995)
have treated obtaining finance as a single activity, venture capital firms continue to attach more
importance to assisting portfolio companies in obtaining equity rather than debt finance. Apart
from obtaining equity finance, a very important contribution from venture capital firms is crisis
management. M ost previous research studies did not rank this activity. The activities with the
least reported involvem ent are in personnel management and operations. A comparison of this
research with oth er studies shows that venture capital firm s in Singapore and H ong Kong attach
more im portance to the function o f monitoring than any other activity.

A W ilcoxon-Mann-W hiney rank sum test76, as shown in Table 8.7, was perform ed to find out
any significant difference between the means o f the score that indicate venture capital firms’
involvement betw een H ong K on g and Singapore.

76 This test is u sed to determ ine the difference in raking betw een tw o independent sam ples drawn from two populations. In this
case Singapore an d H on g K on g.
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8.7 T est Statistics

Mann-WhineyU Wîlcoxon W Z
Personnel Search
94.500
Interview and Selection
138.000
Negotiation of Terms with Pnospectivel70.500
Candidates
Development of Professional Support95.500
Groups
Personnel Motivation
136.000
Personnel Replacement
162.500
Formulation of Initial Business Strategyl39.500
Ongoing Strategy Development
102.000
Management of Crisis
128.500
Development
of
Production152.500
Techniques
Selection of Vendors and Equipment 141.000
Interfacing with Investor Groups
153.500
Obtaining Alternative Sources of Debtl32.000
Finance
Obtaining Alternative Sources of 131.500
Equity Finance
Monitoring Performance___________143.500
a Not corrected for ties.
b Grouping Variable: Country

370.500
414.000
446.500

-2.597
-1.110
-.069

Asymp. Sig. (2-Exact Sig. [2*(1tailed)_____
tailed Sig.)l
.009
.018
267
.314
.945
.953

371.500

-2.617

.009

.020

412.000
282.500
415.500
378.000
404.500
428.500

-1.178
-.357
-1.017
-2.163
-1.368
-.722

239
.721
.309
.031
.171
.470

.286
.768
.329
.035
.191
.555

417.000
429.500
408.000

-1.197
-.584
-1.258

.231
.560
208

.359
.575
.235

407.500

-1284

.199

.224

419.500

-.920

.358

.391

The results do not show a significant difference in involvement in m ost o f the activities in Hong
K ong and Singapore. H ow ever, venture capital firm s in these countries differ significantly in their
involvement in personnel search, development o f professional support groups and ongoing
strategy developm ent.

Pandey and Jan g (1996) found that venture capital firm s in the Taiwanese market indicated
involvement in hands-on activities, such as the internal management o f the firm and product
development.

This finding is in marked contrast to the overall results herein. Since venture

capital in Taiwan, Singapore and H ong K ong developed along similar lines in a similar period,
why do the Taiwanese venture capital firms operate differently? The venture capital market in
Taiwan derives a larger share o f venture capital from corporations (A V Q , 1999) than the venture
capital m arket in Singapore o r H ong K ong. Corporations tend to have more investee specific
resources than independent venture capital firms (Chesbrough, 2000). Thus, corporations, which
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provide funds to venture capital firm s can become part o f a network passing on resources to
investees indirectly in unconventional areas.

The usefulness o f activities that venture capital firm s are involved in with their portfolio
companies can be confirm ed by determining whether these activities create any advantages for
the portfolio com panies. In order fo r their involvement o r provision o f resources to be useful,
the activities need to qualify resource characteristics as specified in the resource-exchange model
(Barney, 1991; G iant, 1991; Am it and Shoem aker 1993; Collis and Motgomery, 1995). However,
the characteristics applicable to any particular resource depend primarily on the required
resource-configuration o f a business. This in turn depends on the industry in which a firm is
operating and the event m ilestones77 (Liechtenstein, 1997). Thus, the experience o f the venture
capital firm in the portfolio com pany's particular industry, as a resource, m ay not be equally
valuable to venture capital firm s operating across several industries. In H ong K ong and
Singapore especially, the industries, in which venture capital firms invest are far more diverse
than those in the United States78. This diversity makes it more difficult for the venture capital
firm to provide industry specific resources to all their portfolio companies.

77 This m ay b e th e poin t o f eligibility fo r the next financing round.
78 In the U nited States, over 70% o f venture capital is invested in only 3 basic industries. In Singapore about 70% o f the venture
capital is distribu ted betw een 6 industries and in H on g K on g between 4. (F o r detailed calculations see appendix II)
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8.8 G assification of Activities: Principal Axis Factoring Rotated
Normalisation)____________________________________________
1
2
Financial/Strategic Activities
Obtaining Alternative Sources of Equity.803
.242
Finance
Interfacing with Investor Groups
.789
Monitoring Performance
.628
Obtaining Alternative Sources of Debt Finance .595
.288
Ongoing Strategy Development
.550
32 6
Formulation of Initial Business Strategy
.476
.647

Operations
Personnel Motivation
Development of Production Techniques
Management of Crisis
Selection of Vendors and Equipment

.163
.248

Personnel firing Decisions Artivities
Interview and Selection
.324
Negotiation of Terms with Prospective.359
Candidates
Team Building Activities (Internal and External!
Personnel Search
.201
Development of Professional Support Groups .260
Personnel Replacement
.112
Eigenvalues
2.988
^Absolute values less than .10 suppressed

Matrix (Varimax with Kaiser

3

4

.244

.130

.168
.189
.403
.247

.167
.364
.238
.520
.330

.898
.666
.538
.499

.255
-291
.290
.124

.156

.869
.644

.104

.137

.370
.473
-.142
2.152

.832
.503
265
1.854

.107
.113
2.508

.422

In order to confirm the results o f the data collected fo r this study a rotated varimax analysis was
conducted, as shown in Table 8.8. This was done in order to determine any clear pattern of
involvement so that the results could be com pared to MacMillan et aL’s (1988) findings. The
same m ethod o f analysis has been used as used by MacMillan et al. (1988).

The first factor, financial/strategic activities, is similar to the patterns o f involvement found by
MacMillan et al/s (1988). Since venture capital firms specialise in raising finance, channelling it
toward strategically placed high return businesses and guiding these businesses through profitable
operations, they are more likely to possess more complementary resources com pared to other
businesses. The second factor, operations, involved activities that are commonly associated with
the operations o f a business. Form ulation o f initial business strategy can be identified with both
these categories given a high loading associated with both factors. Operational activities, except
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for the selection o f vendors and equipm ent, recorded the second highest involvement of the
venture capital firm s in their own rankings. The third factor involved management selection
decisions like the interview o f and negotiations with prospective candidates. The last factor
represents the team building activities o f their venture capital firm s within their portfolio
companies. This m ay involve eliminating non-performing personnel and searching for new
members fo r the portfolio com pany’s team. This factor supports the assertion by some
researchers that venture capital firm s play a vital role in assembling and developing a competent
management team (Ehrlich, 1994; Stewart, 1989). Team building activities also involve cultivating
relationships with outside organisations. While not matching all modes o f involvement
considered by M acM illan et al.’s (1988), is study o f activities undertaken by Asian venture capital
firms produced sim ilar results in regard to financial activities and management selection activities.
The

noticeable

differences

occurred

in

what

MacMillan

et

al.

(1988)

classify as

developm ent/operations activities and personnel management activities. It seems that venture
capital firm s in H on g K on g/Sin gapore are not involved with their portfolio companies in the
same w ay as those in the United States, at least in regard to these activities.

Table 8.9 show s the results o f correlations based on the four factors found previously using
principal axis factor analysis classifications o f activities and the time allocated by venture capital
firms to their portfolio com panies. Table 8.9 makes it clear that a venture capital firm’s greatest
involvement is related to finance/strategy. A high correlation between financial/strategic
activities and the tim e allocated b y venture capital firms confirms then to any other. The
correlation between need based activities and time allocated to portfolio companies is also
significant although less so.
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8.9 Direct Contact Time and G assification of Activities
Financial
andNeed
Strategic Activities Activities
Mean
3.0211
1.8632
Std. Deviation
.9938
.6772
Pearson Correlation Total.501**
.367*
Direct Contact Time per Year
Sig. (2-tailed)
.002
.027
N
36
36
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

BasedPersonnel
Activities
1.6447
.6030
.107

HringTeam
Activities
1.5965
.6445

.535
36

.130
36

Building

257

Table 8.10 show s the results o f allocation o f tune to then* portfolio companies by venture capital
firms and the average score o f involvement in activities, placed against the stage o f development
of the portfolio company.

8.10 Time Allocation, Activities and Stage of Development of Portfolio Companies
Stage of Development At PresentAverage of Activity
Total Direct Contact Time
______ ____________________________________________(Hours per Year)_______
Seed
2.27
86
Start-up
1.63
56
Early Expansion
2.44
56
Late Expansion
2.31
63
Mezzanine
2.12
100
Public Company
2.27
15
Turnarounds
1.20
8
Others
1.97
40
Total
2.17
59

It seems that venture capital firms allocate m ost o f their time to portfolio companies that are at a
mezzanine79 financing stage. The nature o f mezzanine financing suggests that the holding period
for this m ode o f venture capital would be short. There is, thus, a possibility that venture capital
firms are choosing to follow a “ home run” strategy (Sapienza, 1994) in the case of mezzanine
financing and consequendy, allocate more time to com panies at the mezzanine financing stage.
A balanced com bination o f time and involvement activities seems to occur at the seed stage of
financing. Venture capitalists are more involved with companies at the early expansion stage
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rather than at start-up, although, time allocation is similar. D espite a lower commitment of the
venture capitalists’ tim e, the venture capitalists feel that their participation in the activities of
public com panies is considerable com pared to other stages.

8.2.3

E x te n t o f Involvem ent- T im e A llo catio n , A ctivities an d V alue A dded

In order to verify proposition 4 a question was included in the research questionnaire which
asked venture capital firm s about the usefulness o f their interaction with their portfolio
com panies. Alm ost all venture capitalists believed that the interaction was useful. These results
were also checked with m easures o f involvement. A strong positive correlation existed between
the value o f interaction, as perceived by venture capitalists, and their contribution as measured in
terms o f the num ber o f activities and the time they spent with portfolio companies.

Past research studies in the United States have found that venture capital firms add the greatest
value through board m em bership (Sapeinza and Tim m ons, 1989; Landstrom , 1990). The lack of
correlation between m easures o f involvement and the number o f board members representing
venture capital firm s (Table 8.11) shows that quantity in this case m ay not mean value-added.
This finding does not negate the previous studies but does raise a question about how board
membership adds value to the portfolio company. Time spent in formal meetings, at least in Asia,
was also n ot significantly correlated with value adding activities. The cultural differences between
Asian venture capital firm s and the United States venture capital firms offer an explanation about
why form al m eetings, although popular with the foreign-trained Asian financiers, m ay not sit well
with the psychology o f A sian entrepreneurs.

F o r venture capital firms in Asia, the Board

meetings w ould appear to be directed less at tackling issues and more at reducing information
asymmetry.97

79 Preparation fo r IP O stage
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8.11 Correlations Spearman's rho

Board
Membeis-Total Time ofTotal Time ofTotal Telephone
Nominated
byFormal Meetingslnformai
Time per Year
Subject
Venture(hours)
Meetings
Total Time of FormaJComelation
Meetings (hours)
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Total Time of InformalCorreladon
Meetings (Horns)
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Total Telephone TimeCorrekdon
per Year
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Average
Score
ofCorreladon
Ratings of Activities
Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

-.051
.789
30
-.161

.314

.403
29
-.164

.062
36
.100

.388

.387
30
-.130

.554
37
.293

.020*
36
.490

.473

.495
30

.078
37

.002**
36

.003**
38

Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

8.2.4

What triggers Involvement?

Venture capital firm s seem to be unim pressed with local traditions and practices relating to
involvement. This raises m any questions. Is it because their reading o f the venture capital culture,
relating to involvement, is incorrect? Is it because all venture capital firms operate differently at
different levels o f participation? O r, is it because they w ould like to be seen as different from
others?

It is difficult to conceive that with the extent o f networking with competitors that goes

on in this unique business (Bygrave, 1987), venture capital firms will be unaware o f the
involvement culture. It is also unlikely, as some convergence in the data collected by this study
shows, that all venture capital firm s operate at significantly different levels o f involvement. The
research data show s a standard deviation of .97 on a 1-5 Likert scale measuring intensity of
involvement, which is not significant under these circum stances. One explanation o f the venture
capital firm s’ comparative difference on cultural readings can be ascribed to the comparative lack
of contact o r networking in the Asian market with local com panies. This m aybe because venture
capital in A sia is more outward looking and international in nature than in the United States.
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Findings in this study have confirm ed the earlier results o f MacMillan et al. (1989) regarding the
profound influence o f the prior policy o f venture capital firm s on their later involvement in a
portfolio com pany.

The spread o f responses regarding the venture capital firm s’ policy of

involvement m akes interesting reading. More than 3 / 4 ^ o f the respondents reported a close or
very close involvem ent in their portfolio com pany as a m atter o f firm policy. There is a
significant correlation (r=0.634, p < 0 1 ) between their stated policy and their assessm ent of
involvement in the com panies that they reported on. H ow ever, close or very close involvement
does not seem to translate into time actually spent with portfolio companies when compared to
the time venture capital firms in the United States spend with their portfolio companies. In Hong
K ong and Singapore, involvement m ay can y slighdy different connotations. Why venture capital
firms see them selves as closely involved m ay have to do with cultural settings and the institutions
that they are com paring them selves with. Venture capital is still a new concept in these markets.
Traditionally, entrepreneurs have relied on funds from friends, relatives and banks. In these
modes o f financing, investors do not usually get involved. Thus when the venture capital firms in
these m arkets report close involvem ent, they are com paring venture capital with traditional
modes o f financing.
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8.12 Multiple Factors as predictors of Involvement
Model Summary_______________________________________
R__________________ R Square
Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
.177
.018
1.12
.421___________________________ ______________________
a Predictors: (Constant),Number of Investments at present, Avg yeais of Experience-VC Industry, Number of Lead
Investments, Avg. Experience Other Industries, Years Finn has been in Venture Capital Business, Average Amount
of Capital Under Management

ANOVA

Sum
ofdf
Mean SquareF
Sig.
Squares
Regression
8.323
6
1.387
1.113
.378
Residual
38.651
31
1.247
Total
46.974
37
a Predictors: (Constant), Number of Investments at present, Avg. years of Experience-VC Industry, Number of Lead
Investments, Avg. Experience Other Industries, Years Firm has been in Venture Capital Business, Average Amount
of Capital Under Management
b Dependent Variable: Your Company Involvement
Coefficients
Unstandardized
Standardised
t
sigCoefficients
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
Beta
(Constant)
4.650
.982
4.734
.000
Years Firm has been in-3.830E-02
.042
-.181
-.911
.369
Venture Capital Business
Average years of Experience-6.520E-02
.084
.162
.780
.441
VC Industry
Average Experience Other-3.303E-02
.057
-.106
-.581
.565
Industries
Average Amount of Capital-8.315E-02
.118
-.148
-.702
.488
Under Management
Number of Lead Investments 2.340E-02
.063
.066
.368
.715
Number of Investments at-.140
.126
-.228
-1.116
.273
present
a Dependent Variable: Your Company Involvement
Since firm policy regarding the involvement of venture capital firms proved to be a very
important factor in later involvement, possible links between firm policy and other parameters
that m ay have an effect on firm policy were explored as shown in Table 8.12. Firm policy
relating to the extent o f involvement with portfolio companies seem s to be independent o f all
parameters o f experience that have been m easured Neither years of experience nor the size o f
venture capital firm appears to have an impact on the policy decision about levels of involvement
with portfolio com panies.
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Table 8.13 details the involvement policy o f venture capital firm s according to their type of
ownership structure. Because o f a sm aller num ber o f responses, a conclusion cannot be drawn in
all cases. H ow ever, the num ber o f responses in the case o f independent firms, corporate
subsidiaries and subsidiaries o f financial institutions are large enough to draw a tentative
conclusion. A low er mean score in the case o f subsidiaries o f financial institutions indicates that
they have a policy o f lower levels o f involvement com pared to independent firms and corporate
subsidiaries. The reason is inherent in their traditional debt-financing role, which is basically
collateral based, and tends to be hands-off.

8.13 Involvement policy, industry reading and type of Investment Firm
Type of Investment Fund
Your
Involvement
Government Sponsored
Mean
3.00
Std Deviation
.00
Corporate Subsidiary
Mean
4.33
Std Deviation
.52
Subsidiary of a Financial Institution
Mean
3.80
Std Deviation
1.14
Subsidiary of a securities firm
Mean
4.00
Std Deviation
Independent Company/Partnership
Mean
429
Std Deviation
1.10
A Joint Venture Company
Mean
2.00
Std Deviation
1.41
Total
Mean
3.97
Std Deviation
1.13

8.2.5

GompanyGeneral Trend in the
Industry
3.50
.71
2.83
.75
3.00
1.05
2.00
2.94
1.09
2.50
.71
2.92
.97

Resources Assessm ent, Involvement and Value-added

The inform ation produced by testing o f basic assum ptions about the Singaporean and Hong
K ong venture capital market (propositions 1-4) when com bined with the data produced by
testing the research m odel propositions (5-10)80 shed more light on involvement mechanism of
venture capital firm s in these countries.

80 as explained in ch apter 4 (Figure 4 3 )
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There seem s to be a pattern in the areas where venture capital firms consider themselves superior
to their portfolio com panies. These include finance, strategy, monitoring performance and crisis
management. These are the sam e areas identified by factor analysis. There is som e evidence to
support the view that venture capital firms are more involved in those where they consider their
strengths to be greater.

Venture capital firm s, because o f the size o f capital under management and the services of
professionals at their disposal, have reasons to feel confident about their resource strength. The
lack o f correlation between their perceived resource strengths and their size as measured by
capital under m anagem ent and num ber of professionals working for them (Table 8.14), discounts
the im pression that a larger size or more professionals means a larger pool o f resources useful to
portfolio com panies. A fter these findings, the results on the relation between the number of
investments and resource strength was as expected.

It is pertinent to note that only those resources have been assessed which are usually passed on to
the portfolio com pany by the venture capital firm This set of resources m ay be special. One of
the venture capital firm s, in its correspondence, has suggested that they “ ...built an investment
team with this [value added potential] in mind” 81. In order to find out whether firms consciously
accumulate resources, a zero order correlation was calculated between firm policy, firm
experience and the perceived strength of venture capital firm resources. N o significant results
were obtained
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8.14 Correlations (Spearman)__________________________________

Venture Gapitalists’Avge. ExperienceAvge years of Experience
__________ .___________________________ Assessment______ Other Industries VC Industry_______
Avge. Experience OtherGoirelation Coefficient .255
Industries
Sig. (2-tailed)
.122
N
38
39
Avge years of Experience-Correlation Coefficient -.035
-.368
VC Industry
Sig. (2-tailed)
.833
.021
N
38
39
Your
CompanyCorrelation Coefficient .008
-.183
.125
Involvement
Sig. (2-tailed)
.961
271
.454
N
37
38
38

The lack o f relationship results in the case o f experience m ay indicate that this set o f resources
are not consciously accum ulated o r do not automatically get accumulated over a period of time
within a venture capital firm.

Venture capital firm s that possess more resources logically should be more involved with their
portfolio com panies. If perceived resource strength is related to experience in other industries, it
should also be related to involvement. However, the statistical results do not favour this premise.
In fact the relationship between experience in other industries is negatively related to the time
that venture capital firms spend with their portfolio com panies(r=~0.368, p < 0 5 ) and negatively
related to the intensity o f involvem ent in different activities (r=^0.304, p < 10).

Venture capital firm s in Singapore and H ong K ong do not rate portfolio com pany resources
lower when they are pursuing high technology, for good reason. Technology in Asia has a
different connotation than in the United States. In the United States, the technology being
adopted by the portfolio com pany m ay be completely new or untried, adding to the risk factor.
As opposed to this, m ost o f A sian high technology is an adaptation, and hence carries far less18

81 C om m ents b y a venture capitalist (Identity: Confidential). A ugust 2 3 ,2000J?ersonal correspondence record
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risk. W hy venture capital firm s perceive reputation as an indicator o f the resource strength of the
portfolio com pany is also evident Reputation is em bedded in the past as opposed to
competency. It represents the accumulation o f resources backed by a successful track record in
using these resources. Although managerial competency m ay provide confidence to the venture
capital firm s in terms o f the future o f the portfolio company, venture capitalists have reason to be
more com fortable if entrepreneurs have prior standing in the industry A zero order correlation
between perceived reputation and all resources shows that venture capital firms associate it with
almost all resources, but m ore so to those resources which relate specifically to the industry of
the portfolio company. These include operational planing, industry knowledge and number of
contacts in the portfolio com pany industry. This result is worth comparing to an earlier finding,
which was that the venture capital firm s are more confident about their resources when they have
experience in the portfolio com pany industry. Thus relevant industry experience is much more
important than other resources fo r venture capital firms in H ong K ong and Singapore.

It is interesting to note that venture capital firms in Asia rate portfolio companies much higher in
terms o f their resource strength, fo r their contacts with companies in other industries. As
explained in Chapter 2, business in H ong K ong and Singapore is dominated by Chinese family
businesses. The Chinese fam ily business network, which taps social network based on kinship,
common dialect, trade associations, education etc, is more pervasive and venture capital firms are
unlikely to m atch them in num ber o f contacts.

The relationship between resource gap and higher participation in an activity is difficult to define.
Part o f the problem stem s from the fact that although venture capital firms participate in areas of
high resource strength they do not see themselves significantly better off than the portfolio
companies in these areas (except in the case o f financial expertise). An indication of why that
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happens is the low ranking venture capital firm s ascribe to their industry knowledge vis-a-vis the
portfolio com pany and the im pact this has on their perception o f the usefulness o f almost all
resources. This fact has been corroborated by a venture capitalist who stated “ There is no way
that a V C can understand the business as well as the C E O . Otherwise, if we have this situation,
the V C shouldn’t have invested in the com pany anyway” .82

There are resources in which venture capital firms perceive themselves to be better equipped
than their portfolio companies and resources in which they perceive the strengths o f portfolio
companies to be stronger than those o f the venture capital firms. Thus a resource “ gap” can be
two sided. It is quite clear that venture capital firm s' high participation activities are not the result
of a resource gap o r need/availability match. It seems that venture capital firms, at least in Asia,
are less prone to involvement in activities/resource areas in which they perceive portfolio
companies to be strong. Thus perceived inadequacy in the portfolio company does not always
result in higher participation although adequacy (or strength) diminishes venture capital firm ’s
involvement. The venture capital firm s seem to be very conscious o f the fact that their area of
expertise is finance and they will be more useful to portfolio companies by advising them on
financial m atters. It seems, understandably, that the venture capital firms are also well aware that
their industry knowledge is never a m atch fo r the knowledge o f the portfolio company. However,
they feel m ore resourceful if they have more relevant industry experience. This is reflected in the
tendency o f venture capital firm s, as pointed out earlier, to specialise in industries and
technologies.

82 Mr. G odw in P o n , Investm ent M anager, A gri-food E q u ity F u n d . A pril 4 ,2 0 0 1 : Personal correspondence record
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8.3

Sum m ary o f Findings

A s hypothesised, it was found that venture capitalists in Singapore and H ong K ong allocate less
time to portfolio com panies than do venture capitalists in the United States. However, the
overwhelming reason fo r this is not resistance by the entrepreneur, as hypothesised, but time
restrictions on the part o f the venture capital firm s. Although the results are not significantly
different, venture capitalists in H ong K on g spend more time with their portfolio companies than
venture capitalists in Singapore. Venture capitalists in both these countries spend about 60% of
their direct contact time with the portfolio com pany management in face-to-face contact and the
rest through the telephone. It was also found that inform al m ethods, like telephone calls and
informal m eetings, constitute m ore than three quarters of the direct contact time. Formal
reporting occupies the least prom inent role in venture capital involvement. Overall, Asian
venture capitalists do not allocate m ore than 5% o f their time to involvement activities. It was
found that venture capital firms do not use m odes o f involvement as a substitute fo r each other.
It seem s, fro m the research data, that venture capitalists with more experience in venture capital
rely more on telephonic contact whereas venture capitalists with experience in the industry o f the
portfolio com pany prefer face-to-face contact. It was also found that direct contact is greater in
the case o f com panies pursuing m edium technology rather than high or low technology.

The second proposition, where it w as suggested that venture capital firms are involved in similar
activities with their portfolio com panies regardless o f country, found support The fact that no
venture capital firm has added to the list o f activities in the questionnaire would indicate that
other activities, not already identified through previous research, are not important. Unlike m ost
o f the previous research studies, crisis m anagement was added to the list o f involvement activities
in this study and it was found that venture capital firm s in H ong K on g attach high importance to
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this activity. Overall, it seem s that the involvement activities have not been significantly affected
by differences in cultures.

It was found that venture capital firm s in Singapore and H ong K ong rank the importance of
involvement activities similarly to the ranking provided b y venture capital firms in the United
States. The notable difference is that, unlike venture capital firms in the United States, monitoring
perform ance is the highest priority area o f involvement. Unlike other research studies, little
indication was found o f any cluster form ation regarding direct contact time. However, the data
shows cluster form ation within these countries if it is analysed on a two dimensional (time
allocation and involvement in activities) basis (Table 8.6). Apparently, there are Asian venture
capitalists with a clear and relatively firm idea o f how much time to allocate to portfolio
companies.

It was found, through principal axis factoring analysis, that some involvement activities are
related to each other and can be classified accordingly. These are finance and strategy, team
building, personnel hiring and other general activities, which are related more to the operational
side o f the business. It was found that venture capital firm s are m ost involved in activities related
to finance and strategy. This is follow ed by their involvement on the operational side of the
business. Their participation in team building and personnel hiring activities seems to be of lesser
importance. It was found that venture capital firm s in Singapore and H ong K ong allocate more
time to portfolio com panies at the mezzanine stage o f financing. However, their involvement in
activities is greater in portfolio com panies at earlier stages o f financing.

It was found that venture capital firm s see themselves as adding value to their portfolio com pany
through interaction. It was found that the number o f venture capitalists on the board of directors
of the portfolio com pany has no relation to their involvement activities. Form al meetings occupy
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only one quarter the time that the venture capital firm s spend in direct contact with their
portfolio com panies.

It was foun d that the intention o f the venture capital firm s to participate in the portfolio
com pany is not affected b y the practices o f their counterparts in the venture capital industry.
Similarly higher com parative stakes in a portfolio com pany do not necessarily mean that the
venture capital firm will be m ore actively involved. Venture capital firm policy was the only factor
which was correlated (positively to a willingness to interact with portfolio companies. Although
this result does not affect the fundam ental validity o f the proposition that involvement depends,
to som e extent on willingness to be involved, it narrows down the possible factors. While testing
this proposition, it was found that m ost o f the venture capital firms in H ong K on g and Singapore
see them selves as closely o r very closely involved with their portfolio companies and that this is a
m atter o f policy. They are also very likely to abide b y their stated policy. Firm policy shows little
relation to experience or size o f the venture capital firm , as m easured by number o f professionals
and capital under management. Since it was not the focus o f the research, the question about
what guides firm policy cannot not be pursued. How ever, it was found that subsidiaries of
financial institutions have a policy o f lower levels o f involvement com pared to independent
venture capital firm s and corporate subsidiaries.

While exploring the resource need/availability prem ise, it was found that the resource assessm ent
o f venture capital firm s, o f their own resources, shows far less variation than their assessm ent of
portfolio com panies. Venture capital firm s assess their own resources differently from the
resources o f their portfolio com panies. H ow ever, resources like expertise in crisis management,
perform ance m onitoring, p roject/idea evaluation and strategy planning show sim ilar assessm ents.
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A noticeable characteristic o f these resources is their non-specific and general nature, within the
context o f venture capital/portfolio com pany relations.

It was found that from the perspective o f the venture capitalist, the portfolio company's need for
particular resources does not depend entirely on risk factors. Thus, risk relating to the complexity
of technology is not affected by resource strengths in these areas. There is sufficient evidence that
com petency o f the portfolio com pany management, in the eyes o f venture capital firm s, also does
not affect the venture capitalists’ perception o f the portfolio company's resource strength. Thus,
resources and the capacity to use them competently are perceived to be different. However,
venture capital firms are m ore likely see resource weakness if the portfolio com pany is new, the
management team is not reputed o r if the com pany is not perform ing w ell

It was found that the venture capitalists’ perception o f their own resource strength does not
depend on either the size o r experience o f venture capital firm s in the venture capital industry but
is im pacted b y their experience in other industries. Where this experience exists the venture
capital firm is perceived to have greater resource strength. It is hard to avoid the impression that
venture capital firms are in the best position to add value if they have professionals with
experience in industries other than venture capital. H ow ever, little relation was found between
higher resource assessm ent and m easures o f value added. Thus, resource transfer from the
venture capital firms to the portfolio com pany does not depend on the perceived resource
strength o f venture capital firm s.

Although the validity o f the proposed resource-exchange m odel was only partly supported, this
research has highlighted m any aspects o f a value-added relationship between venture capital
firms and their portfolio com panies. The next chapter concludes this thesis. Areas in the existing
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literature in which a contribution has been made are described Possible directions that any
further research on this topic m ay take are also suggested
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9

9.1

Chapter 9: Conclusion and Further Research

Conclusion

Through this study insight has been provided into how the resource exchange relationship affects
the involvem ent o f venture capital firm s in their portfolio com panies. Prior work has been
extended in at least three directions:

1) B y choosing to conduct this study in Asian markets, the nature and effect o f venture
capital firm s’ involvement across a largely unexplored territory has been described This
research has added to a very limited literature on Asian venture capital.

2) Previous studies have examined the effect o f isolated factors on the value-adding role of
venture capital firms. Throughout this study an attempt has been made to classify,
integrate and develop a model that not only accom m odates previous findings but also
sets up a logical relationship between findings.

3) Resource exchange theory has been identified as a potential vehicle to explain the valueadded relationship. In order to tackle the question o f whether venture capital firms add
value to their portfolio com panies a three-dimensional m odel was put forward in this
thesis.

These

three

dimensions

include

the

characteristics

o f venture

capital

firm s/portfolio companies, the characteristics o f relationships and the characteristics of
resources. The focus o f this research has been on the characteristics of venture capital
firm s/portfolio companies in term s o f their interrelationships and resources.
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While it is true that little dragon economies are diverse, a review o f the venture capital subset of
the market suggests that there are certain com m on features. The view expressed by Hbfstede
(1984) that cultural factors significantly affect the conduct o f business has been supported by the
research undertaken fo r this thesis. The common features o f Asian venture markets may be the
result o f shared cultural norms. Geographical proxim ity may also have explained similarities in
the venture capital markets in Asia. Another reason is that Asian markets, in general, began to
develop institutionalised venture capital markets later than the United States and Europe and
consequently, still have the comm on features o f a developing venture capital market. Venture
capital, in alm ost all little dragon economies, has been taken up as a development tool.
Governments have played a large role in developing these markets and, during the process,
influenced the direction, com position and structure o f the industry. There are unique features to
these venture capital markets due to their environments. Because o f the initial active role of the
government in the developm ent o f the industry in Asia, venture capital definition is closely linked
to the government’s perception and sometimes even defined by it. M ost of the venture capital
funds within little dragon econom ies are derived from different sources than those relied upon in
the west. There are still large untapped sources o f venture capital funds in Asia such as banks (as
in Europe) and pension funds (as in the United States). Another salient feature of venture capital
in m ost o f these countries is the focus on infrastructure for development rather than high-tech
innovations, as in the United States, and consum er goods, as in Europe (Rausch, 1998; EVCA,
1998). Because o f the higher risk generally associated with the Asian environment,83 venture
capital firms are inclined to exit their investments quickly. Another feature of these markets that
was found particularly important is the expertise available to venture capital firms. It appears that

83 As the A sian crisis displayed
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venture capital firm s, in m ost o f Asia, are in the process of acquiring skills in related areas like
leveraged buy-outs.

As fo r venture capital governance, venture capital firms in Hong K ong and Singapore clearly rely
much more on inform al methods o f communication such as telephonic and informal meetings
rather than form al meeting and reports. The exceptionally small role of formal reporting in
venture governance by venture capital firms in H ong K ong and Singapore was also highlighted in
this thesis. A reason generally put forward for less reliance on formal reporting is that accounting
reports tend to tie down early stage businesses, which is in contrast to what is required (Hayes
and Abernathy, 1981). The fact that accounting practices in Singapore and H ong Kong are still
developing, m ay also have added to this tendency.

The research has corroborated the fact that venture capitalists in Singapore and Hong Kong
spend less time with their portfolio companies, com pared to venture capitalists in United States.
Many theoretical reasons were offered for the justification of development o f this hypothesis.
The result o f the survey has disproved some of the assumptions. F or example, the findings that
portfolio com pany resistance fo r lesser involvement o f venture capitalists rules out the possibility
of cultural factors o r the importance of family owned business and dilution. This leaves very few
explanations and reinforces the point that low involvement of venture capitalists m aybe because
venture capitalists in these markets are not ready or equipped for more involvement. While there
has been no longitudinal study which compare venture capitalists’ involvement, in the light of
these results it is probable that venture capitalists involvement in portfolio companies increases as
the venture capital industry matures.

Previous researchers in the United States have made it clear (MacMillan et al., 1989), and this
researcher has also found it true in the Asian context, that venture capital firms vary in the extent
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of their involvem ent with portfolio companies. If the decision to be involved is pre-set in the
company's policy, it is more likely to be adhered to. Although the reasons fo r policy differentials
were not pursued, it seem s highly improbable given the lack o f correlation between perceived
industry practices and firm policy, that it is influenced by general trends in the venture capital
industry. R ock (1991) stated that venture capital firm s who adopted a hands-on approach
believed that in order to maximize the chances o f portfolio company's success and consequent
high returns on their investment, involvement was necessary.

It has been highlighted in this thesis that there is a marked similarity, at international levels,
regarding the areas in which venture capital firms are involved The importance that venture
capital firm s attach to involvem ent activities also shows a sim ilar pattern as revealed in research
conducted in other countries.

Past research has been less than convincing regarding the effect of business risk, as expressed by
the com plexity o f technology and stage o f portfolio com pany development, on the ability of
venture capital firms to add value to portfolio com panies. From the resource-based viewpoint,
technology and stage o f portfolio com pany developm ent seem to have little impact on the
venture capitalist’s perception o f the resource-pool o f the portfolio company. However, the
reputation o f the portfolio com pany does bear a significant weight in the resource perception of
the venture capitalist Because the perception o f greater resource strength increases the
expectations fo r successful results, reputation m ay well be associated with less risk among
venture capitalist's in H ong K on g and Singapore.

This study has dem onstrated that there are differences between the resource pools o f firms. The
resource p o ols o f firm s within an industry are likely to exhibit a similar com position and pattern.
The difference in resource com position can provide a useful theoretical basis to capture the
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relationship dynam ic between businesses. As firms strive to increase their pool o f resources they
set-up netw ork links with potential sources of supply. The nature o f subsequent relationships will
be affected b y resource com position, the intensity of need and the willingness o f the concerned
parties to share the resources.

O n the basis o f the argum ents put forward in Chapter 4, it seem ed improbable that venture
capital firm s with adequate resources would not get involved with their portfolio companies.
Som e venture capitalists indicated that value-added was a question o f resource strength. “ V G
(venture capitalists) add value in m any ways depending on their team competencies and on the
contract betw een V C

(venture capitalists) and the investee.” 84 Contrary to expectations, the

findings o f this project indicate that the competency o r resource strength o f the venture capital
firms has little to do with their involvement in different activities. This finding is linked with
another result; that is that venture capital firms do not consciously accumulate these resources for
the purpose o f involvem ent. Thus, even those venture capital firms with an overall larger
resource p o ol, m ay not be anymore inclined to get actively involved in their portfolio companies.
Even where venture capital firm s believe their portfolio companies to be inadequate in a
particular resource85 they do not necessarily pick up that activity. B y default, finance remains the
m ost likely area in which venture capital firms will participate in their portfolio com pany and be
of use to the portfolio com pany. Bygrave and Tim m ons (1992) reported that a venture capital
firm indicated that venture capitalists spend greater energies on making the good great rather
than m aking a dism al poor. The above findings seem to be indicating that venture capitalists’
involvement are influenced m ore b y characteristics o f the portfolio com pany rather than their
own

84 C om m ents b y ja n e C raw ford, M anaging D irector, 31 pic South E ast A sia, Singapore via E m ail
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The pattern o f venture capital firm s’ involvem ent in their portfolio companies in H ong K ong
and Singapore is fairly similar. It seem s likely that this pattern extends to m ost o f the Asia-pacific,
if not the w hole o f Asia. The time allocated to involvement activities in these countries is much
smaller com pared to a successful venture capital market like the United States. Since it was
concluded, fro m this research, that the resistance from entrepreneurs is not a likely reason fo r
low levels o f involvem ent; the constraints m ust be im posed by venture capital firm s. There is a
lot o f room fo r expanding frequency o f interaction and time allocation if value-added is a desired
objective, because som e researchers believe that more interaction seem s to result in greater value
added (Sapienza and G upta, 1994; Sapienza, 1992).

The im plication o f this line o f reasoning is that venture capitalists in H ong K ong and Singapore
interact less with their portfolio com panies because o f reasons em bedded in the environment in
which they operate. Two o f which, as indicated earlier, are the comparative novelty of this
concept and lack o f experience in venture capital.

Researchers have suggested that portfolio com panies should be careful in choosing their venture
capital firm (Ehrlich et al.; 1994, Sapienza, 1992) because the value o f the venture capital firm ’s
involvement can vary significantly. It has been confirm ed that portfolio companies do have a
meaningful choice in selecting venture capital firm s. The potential value added service is given as
one o f the reasons fo r portfolio com panies to approach a particular venture capital firm (Smith,
1999) 86.
58 A n im plication arising from the resource exchange paradigm , as explained in this
research, is that A sian portfolio com panies who seek support in areas other than finance will be
better o ff with venture capital firm s that specialize in their sam e industry. M oreover, if a venture

85 e.g. relevant in dustry experience.
86 This research stu d y h as fou n d that m ore than 71% o f entrepreneur have adm itted receiving m ore than 1 o ffer horn a venture
capital firm fo r financing, while m ore than half claim to have received three o r m ore offers.
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already possesses a particular resource its alliance with any venture capital firm who is
accustom ed to providing the sam e resource m ay not be useful in terms o f exchange. Companies
who do wish to obtain the involvem ent o f venture capital firms should request information on
the relevant involvem ent policy o f those firm s. Lastly, portfolio companies need to understand
that value-added largely depends on their own initiative. A venture capital firm, which perceives
the resource strength o f a portfolio com pany as adequate, is unlikely to get involved in that
portfolio com pany. M oreover, venture capital firm ’s resource capacity does not automatically
means that support will be offered to their portfolio companies. As with venture capital firms
who intend to be involved, the real issue is not only finding partner who shares a perspective on
resource strength, but is also willing to cultivate an exchange relationship.

This research highlights a possible direction that governments in H ong K ong and Singapore
could consider while designing policies relating to the promotion of venture capital Generally,
Asian governm ents have played an active role in venture capital promotion. The involvement
activities o f venture capital firm s are one o f the m ost important attributes of venture capital,
which sets venture capital apart from other m odes o f financing. It has been found that venture
capital firm s feel better equipped and more able to add value (exchange resources) when they
have relevant industry experience. Thus existing individuals with industry experience seem to be a
better source o f future venture capitalists than those without such experience. Governments
should target these individuals while creating venture capital development initiatives. More value
creating venture capital firms can also be added by encouraging greater specialization among
firms, based on particular industries. It has been found in this research, that venture capital firms
place minimal reliance on form al reporting b y portfolio companies. This may result in an
information gap. Inform ation asym m etry can be minimized through the establishment and
enforcement o f accounting standards and reporting procedures.
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It is interesting to note that the areas which past studies have identified as prim ary contributors to
the success o f a high potential ventures (M aidique, 1986; Tim m on, Sm ollen and Dingee, 1977;
C ooper and Bruno, 1977; M eyer and R oberts, 1986) are not necessarily the ones in which venture
capital firm s in A sia report their highest activities. There are other factors, besides the
involvement o f venture capital firm s, which can affect the efficiency o f the venture (Chan, 1983;
Berglof, 1994, Adam ati and Pfleiderer, 1994). Thus, the value that venture capital firms add
through involvem ent is lim ited both in scope and effect. “What matters is that venture capitalists
do not substitute fo r good full time executives” 87.

This thesis has dem onstrated that the venture capital firm /portfolio com pany relationship can be
seen as other than an agency relationship. A gency perspective analyses agency conflicts in
isolation from other realities o f the venture capital process. Inform ation asymmetry, moral hazard
or adverse selection does play a role in this relationship; however, agency theory takes away the
focus from other characteristics o f this relationship which are as important if not more so.
Furtherm ore, it seem s inappropriate to ignore a large num ber o f venture capital practitioners who
believe this relationship to be more than a principal/agent relation. The network dyad concept
sees venture capital firm s/portfolio com panies as equal partners rather than in confrontational
relations as the agency theory im plies. It also recognises portfolio com pany relations with other
venture capitalists and venture capitalist’s relations with other portfolio com panies/venture
capitalists and the potential influences that these relationships can create on the dyadic relations.
As suggested, the netw ork dyad m odel not only captures the essence o f this relationship but is
ideally suited to a resource exchange perspective.

rnmmpnK hy Anil Thadani, Chairm an, Schroeder C apital Partners (A sia) P te L td via Em ail
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This thesis sheds further light on how the elem ent of risk is perceived in relation to the resource
adequacy o f a company. While it has been determined, as explained in Chapter 4, that the
developm ent stage o f a com pany, the intricacy o f technology being pursued by a company and
com petency o f the m anagem ent team is associated with risk, it was not found to be associated
with perceived resource strength. The fact that com pany performance was strongly associated
with the strength o f resources more or less sets apart risk and resource p o o l This means that at a
practical level, perceived adequacy o f resources m ay not necessarily mean that a business is more
or less risky.

While the resource exchange paradigm seem to be an interesting angle to look at the inter-firm
relationship, the classification and definition o f resources can pose a serious problem to this
process. A s discussed in Chapter 4, resources have been classified differently which can have
some bearing on the results o f resource assessm ent and m ay produce different results. This may
be the reason why few attem pts have been made to analyse inter-firm resource exchange relations
com pared to relations at individual level In the case o f this thesis, this job was made easier by
prior research studies which have already identified a limited set o f activities/resources which
could be w orked with. Thus, at theoretical level, any practical research on resource based theory
may provide a better result if the resources being exchanged are pre-determined. Nevertheless
resources when assessed appropriately can becom e a powerful tool to explain the dynamics of a
relationship and can add detail to the analysis o f risk factor.

According to the resource exchange theory, the probability that resources will be transferred to
others depends on the am ount o f resources possessed (Foa and Foa, 1980). The results of this
research do not seem to corroborate this assum ption. The explanation of this behaviour is a
m atter o f conjecture. F o a and F o a (1980) have used this assumption in the case of individual
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relations an d it m ay not be possible to extend it to inter-firm relations. Secondly, the venture
capital firm /portfolio com pany relation, as has been discussed in Chapter 4, does not neatly fit
into more popular relationship with a well developed theoretical basis.

9.2

Lim itations

Besides the general limitations associated with survey-based research, already cited in Chapter 1,
this study has som e specific limitations. Firstly, this thesis only examines the perceptions of the
venture capitalists in terms o f resource exchange. Although researchers (Sapienza and Timmons,
1989; Sapienza, 1992; Ehrlich et a l, 1994) have not found significant statistical differences
between the perceptions o f venture capital firms and portfolio companies, regarding the value
added and the activities that venture capital firms are involved in, it would be interesting to see
whether this finding is relevant in the Asian context.

Another lim itation o f this study is that the venture capital firm s/portfolio companies resources
exchange relationship has been exam ined in a post funding state. It is quite possible that the
portfolio com panies whose resource needs are greater and which do not match the resource
availability o f the venture capital firm m ay have been selected out during the screening process.

The researcher has relied on cross-sectional data and, in term s o f size of sample, this study has
som e obvious limitations. Although it seem s to be an uphill task in an Asian market, a larger
sample fo r the study o f the resource-exchange paradigm could have added further validity to the
findings.

In this kind o f research study, it is difficult to overcom e self-reporting because the nature o f
m any o f the variables em ployed precludes alternative sources.
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lik e any research study spanning a num ber o f years, there is also a possibility of response error
due to the tim e lag between the tim e o f evaluation of data collected and the responses received

Readers are urged to exercise the follow ing cautions when comparing this study with others
conducted in the United States and Europe. Firstly, the difference in the time period of the
surveys m ay have caused differences in results, which are immeasurable. Secondly, there are
language and cultural disparities that directly impact on the definitions and concepts u sed These
problems exist both in the case o f prim ary and secondary data. Both these limitations are usually
present in alm ost all cross-cultural studies. Since this is the first study o f this kind in the
Singaporean and H ong K on g m arkets, it is suggested that any future study should try and include
variables to control fo r cultural differences.

9.3

Further R esearch

The findings in this thesis support the view that value added in venture capital can be seen as a
function o f resource exchange and that this can be a rich area fo r further research on inter-firm
relations. This study can be extended further. Two m ore areas o f research pertain to factors,
which could n ot be analysed, because doing so w ould have made the questionnaire more
com plicated adversely affecting response rates and jeopardizing credibility. One of the two areas
of research is the study o f the relationship characteristics affecting a value-added outcome.
Secondly, an exploration could be m ade o f the characteristics associated with a resource/activity
and any bearing these m ay have on the relationship between venture capital firms and their
portfolio com panies. It is suggested that relationship factors should be recognized separately,
from the dim ensions o f resources and studied further. Similarly, the characteristics o f resources
being transferred should be considered in an industry scenano and their effect on performance
noted. It w ould be interesting to find out differences in resource capabilities between the types of
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venture capital firm s, as assessed by portfolio companies. This issue would help us understand
whether the type o f venture capital firm makes any difference to value added as some suspect
(Barney at el, 1996). Wile resource assessm ent by venture capital firm s of portfolio companies
has been exam ined in the context o f portfolio com panies’ stage o f development, Norton and
Tenenbaum (1993) and Sapienza and Am ason (1993) have suggested the exploration o f a similar
question to determine whether the type o f assistance varies by the financing stage. The proposed
research will help identify any pattern in the nature of resources that are being transferred in early
stages as com pared to later stages. Future research should also explore the resource capabilities of
a venture capital firm as com pared to other private equity investors. D o venture capital firms
have an advantage over other private equity investors in terms o f resource availability and does
that translate into value addition?

An additional avenue fo r further research in to resource exchange in the venture capital
firm /portfolio com pany dyad would seek responses from entrepreneurs whose venture failed.
While it w ould be difficult to obtain such information, it will not only add further material to the
resource exchange theory but m ay be helpful in isolating factors, which can result in failures.
Further research could also explore the resource exchange dynamics within a portfolio company.
What are the costs and benefits to a portfolio com pany o f utilizing resources from venture capital
firms rather than offsetting88 these from existing resources o r obtainmg them from outside
sources? I f a robust resource exchange process occurs which favorably reflects on the resource
pool o f a portfolio company, does it in any way affect the long-term development o f the
com pany o r cognitive developm ent o f an entrepreneur. If a particular resource is being
exchanged freely, would that encourage companies to explore further areas o f exchange?

88 Strong resou rces su pport w eak resources (W em felt, 1984).
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D ifferential exchange relations could also reflect on the motivation of the entrepreneur or the
management team .

Future research should determine to what extent the needs and the resource availability reflects
on the selection o f portfolio com panies b y venture capital firms. D oes the resource need guide a
portfolio com pany to approach a particular venture capital firm? Venture capital firms initially
assess com panies on the basis o f their resources. D oes inform ation asymmetry on that score
scare venture capital firm s away from portfolio com panies? Can portfolio companies reveal their
resources/capabilities without jeopardizing the possibility o f a relationship? It would be
interesting to find out how different levels of resource assessm ent o f the portfolio companies
impact the term s and conditions o f the form al contract. Finally, it would be worthwhile to follow
venture capital frrm s/portfolio companies longitudinally to see how their resource exchange
relationship changes overtim e.

Future research should determine to what extent the resource exchange perspective is an issue
during deal evaluation and the negotiation process. Unfortunately, the research data, because of
its size, does n ot allow analysis on this score. It could be a very important area o f research with
profound effects on policy issues.

The fact that m ost o f the tim e venture capital firm s co-invest (Bygrave, 1987) also makes a very
interesting testing ground fo r resource exchange theory. H ow do venture capital firms differ in
resource assessm ent o f the sam e company? D o all co-investors, as regards resource contribution,
offer the sam e level o f support o r do they differ according to their own resource perception. Are
venture capital firm s, who habitually choose to co-invest and do not assume a lead role in any
way, m indful o f the deficiency o f their own resource pool?
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There is a growing trend am ong venture capital firm s to form what is known as “global
networks” . It w ould be interesting to investigate whether cultural factors in any way effect the
resource perceptions o f venture capital firms within these networks. Similarly, does the required
resource p o o l com position differ, in any way, across countries? D o venture capital firms
experience difficulties o r a variation in resource assessm ent prior to the funding o f companies
when they are from different countries?

Lastly and m ost importantly, this study has found that venture capital firm s’ policy toward
involvement in their portfolio com panies has a profound effect on their actual involvement. The
factors that shape the policy o f a venture capital firm regarding its level o f later involvement
would make a very worthwhile research endeavor.

M ost o f the A sian venture capital markets are set to enter maturity during the first decade o f this
century. F o r A sians, it m ay be the period of realization and acceptance o f venture capital as a
viable alternative to traditional financing. The focus, thus, should also be on educating
entrepreneurs. A sian venture capital, as has been seen, has evolved into a unique market. The US
model o f venture capital is neither viable nor existent in Asia. Asian venture capital will benefit
more from further research being carried out in the Asian environment to yield a deeper
understanding o f the forces that drive this industry.
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Appendix-1

10 Appendix I- Secondary D ata Source
1. There have been som e discrepancies in the data contained in The Guide to Venture Capital
in A sia, 1999 published by Asian Venture Capital Journal, Hong Kong. The data has been
adjusted fo r these and the final results may not exactly match the data in the above guide.
The details are.
a) A V Q has rounded figures and therefore, the total in m any cases does not exactly sum up.
Since I have taken direct figures, all total are correct to the best of my knowledge and thus
might differ slightly from A V Q .
b) According to the A V Q Directory, the seed and Mezzanine investment in Singapore is 3.6%
and 24% receptively whereas according to Singapore government survey available on the net,
it is 34% and 12% respectively. Following is the A V Q response to explain the extent of
discrepancy. “When we are talking about Seed, we mean the stage where initial concept of
the business is being formed. From my knowledge, there is no way that Singapore could
have 34% invested in Seed stage since it is the m ost risky stage among all. If the info is from
E D B , they m ay have accounted Start-up and Early stage into that 34% figure. One reason
why the E D B publishes the data so differendy from ours is that they account only the funds
that are raised in Singapore and invested in Singapore. F or your information, Singapore
firms get only about 10-20% o f all fund raised locally.” 89 A V Q data has been used.
c) F o r reporting total venture capital pool in 1991 in Sri Lanka, A V Q has used a currency
conversion rate of SR 79.50/U SD . Historical records do not verify this rate. A V Q claims
that this rate is supplied by Sri Lanka government and cannot be wrong. For the purpose of
this study a rate o f SR 42.53/U 5D has been used.

89 Personal correspondence record
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4

O n page 139 o f the directory the Philippines’ total pool fo r 1996 is reported P 4,372 million
and new funds raised as P 920 million. This has been reported equivalent on page 25 to
U S$166 and U S$ 47 respectively.

If calculated the rate amount to P26.34/U S$ and

P 19.57/U S$ which are markedly different.

As admitted by AVCJ this is an error and a

conversion rate o f P26.34/U S$ has been used for calculating new funds raised
e) The reason why Korean venture capital investment portfolio in 1997 is more than total
venture capital pool has been explained by A V Q as follows:- “As most of the foreign private
equity investments in K orea are denominated in US$ and Won had fell more than 50%
during 1997, the accumulative portfolio become somewhat huge after converted into
W on.” 90
f)

O n Page 92 o f the directory the data depicted relating to investment portfolio in Japan 1991
1996 is erroneous. Instead, data supplied later by A V Q directly to me has been used

g) The venture capital pool reported separately in U SD Million fo r China and Hong Kong for
1997 is U SD 3,500 Million and U SD 9,632 Million respectively. The total comes to U SD
13,132 M illion whereas it is reported as U SD 10,670 Million on page 28 when reported
jointly. Similarly, new funds raised and annual investments in the separate country details
when joined together do not produce the results indicated on page 25 for joint reporting. The
A V Q explains, “ PE firms treated Hong K ong and China very differently from other
countries in A sia .... m ost Chinese investee compames here have businesses and investments
in both China mainland and H ong K ong because o f political and economical tie between the
two places. T o be most accurate, we have decided to run three different sets of survey China (including SAR) as a whole, China mainland, and SAR. If you add China mainland
and SA R together, the result is much larger than China as a whole due to overlaps of how

90 Personal correspondence record
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funds and investments. In other words, it's v ery difficult to break down the overall figure for
China into two sets o f data since the percentage is hard to estimate.”91 Due to his difficulty, I
have taken up the figures reported separately for both China and H ong Kong and thus there
might be som e overlap in the figures.
h) Unlike A V Q , because o f significant cultural differences, venture capital markets of Australia
and N ew Zealand have not been included in Asia.
2. E V C A has presented its private equity data in EC U . In order to make it comparable with
other data an exchange rate E C U /U S D existing as on D ec, 31 of respective years has been
used. It has been taken from the historical records maintained by Board of Governors of
Federal Reserve Systems, USA, available on the Internet.
3. The data on sources o f funds in case of Europe represent new funds raised 1997, in case of
Asia total venture capital pool up to 1997 and in case o f U S sources o f capital commitments.
This data m ay not be stricdy comparable but provides a good idea of sources of funds in
respective regions.

91 Personal correspondence record
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A ppendix-II- R ecalcu lated D ata (A V Q , 1998)
(USD Millions, unless specified otherwise)

Venture Capital Pool

China
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Japan
Korea
Malaysia
Myanmar
Pakistan
Philippines
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Taiwan
Thailand
Vietnam
Total
Calculated from AVQ, 1999

1991
184
0
93
76
15352
1547
75
0
4
16
868
8
412
64
10
18709

1992
878
0
113
57
16028
1629
147
0
4
26
896
16
470
90
22
20376

1993
1422
0
149
99
17750
1687
160
0
3
58
1013
20
508
98
131
23098

1994
2384
0
243
225
17750
1902
194
0
3
85
1833
49
562
117
247
25594

1995
3458
0
281
245
14851
2567
437
112
7
123
3164
64
696
165
303
26473

1996
3612
8019
784
289
11254
3224
448
112
6
166
3981
67
1336
201
276
33775

1991
16
0
23
52
782
207
39
0
0
0
54
0
50
17
10
1251

1992
583
0
31
0
870
151
71
0
4
10
42
5
28
25
12
1831

1993
677
0
13
31
605
97
23
0
0
3
307
6
66
7
109
1944

1994
898
0
90
117
1951
268
20
0
0
33
631
19
45
14
115
4202

1995
1028
0
51
29
1633
895
228
69
0
41
1058
19
154
29
53
5287

1996
294
621
433
45
1582
1041
9
0
0
35
721
8
420
33
22
5262

1997
3500
9632
1016
426
7722
1857
406
113
6
169
4468
71
1913
177
292
31767

New Funds Raised

China
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Japan
Korea
Malaysia
Myanmar
Pakistan
Philippines
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Taiwan
Thailand
Vietnam
Total

1997
96
1920
263
146
1010
291
20
0
0
25
1167
6
570
47
17
5577

Calculated from AVQ , 1999
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Sources of Venture Capital-1997
Corporations Private
Pension Government Insurance Banks Reinvestments Others
Individuals Funds Agencies
Companies
(C Gains)
China
54.0%
0.7% 13.7%
2.5%
11.2% 12.4%
0.5% 5.0%
Hong Kong
51.9%
3.5% 12.9%
1.0%
20.4%
4.6%
0.0% 5.7%
India
49.1%
10.2%
2.8%
6.6%
2.0% 15.2%
0.0% 14.0%
Indonesia
25.3%
6.3%
7.6%
23.6%
5.9% 11.6%
0.0% 19.7%
Japan
51.8%
1.8%
5.4%
2.9%
11.9% 13.1%
0.0% 13.1%
Korea
37.0%
3.1%
1.3%
10.0%
2.3%
8.0%
3.6% 34.7%
Malaysia
28.8%
0.6%
1.3%
48.2%
2.0% 10.5%
0.0% 8.6%
Myanmar
46.3%
0.2%
0.0%
20.2%
5.7% 12.8%
0.0% 14.8%
Pakistan
60.0%
15.0%
0.0%
5.2%
0.2% 15.0%
0.0% 4.6%
Philippines
50.3%
4.8%
0.0%
7.9%
0.0% 23.8%
0.0% 13.2%
Singapore
43.9%
5.9%
3.5%
8.8%
6.4% 22.0%
0.0% 9.5%
Sri Lanka
32.0%
9.1%
1.1%
1.6%
5.1% 47.8%
0.0% 3.3%
Taiwan
66.7%
16.6%
3.0%
3.9%
4.8%
0.0% 2.0%
3.0%
Thailand
38.1%
11.6%
6.1%
0.0%
6.9% 31.4%
0.0% 5.9%
Vietnam
29.1%
0.9% 23.8%
2.4%
7.1% 24.6%
0.0% 12.1%
Calculated from AVQ, 1999

Annual Venture Capital Investments
1992
China
65
Hong Kong
NA
India
29
Indonesia
18
Japan
406
111
Korea
11
Malaysia
NA
Myanmar
0
Pakistan
8
Philippines
120
Singapore
3
Sri Lanka
61
Taiwan
22
Thailand
1
Vietnam
854
Total

1993
242
NA
33
11
322
111
34
NA
0
10
186
6
148
22
4
1129

1994
645
NA
55
37
1754
443
63
NA
0
14
236
8
132
30
29
3446

1995
678
NA
71
99
1467
745
73
15
0
16
240
5
216
34
32
3692

1996
609
1183
101
55
1429
1139
58
27
0
16
461
7
429
35
84
5632

1997
550
778
112
62
992
920
49
0
0
12
388
5
643
76
27
4615

Calculated from AVQ , 1999
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Venture Capital Investment Portfolio
1991
1992
China
0
274
Hong Kong
NA
NA
India
49
73
Indonesia
8
27
Japan
5305
6008
Korea
1211
1268
Malaysia
22
46
Myanmar
NA
NA
Pakistan
0
0
Philippines
10
19
Singapore
399
460
Sri Lanka
0
9
Taiwan
297
352
Thailand
22
49
Vietnam
0
1
Total
7322
8585
Calculated from AVQ, 1999

1993
330
NA
100
37
6219
1348
78
NA
0
24
720
12
488
70
5
9431

1994
1071
NA
138
56
9688
1522
125
NA
0
39
924
21
417
84
34
14121

1995
1704
NA
183
152
8286
1989
191
20
1
46
1124
25
587
116
66
14490

1996
2273
4076
281
202
7174
2752
249
47
1
60
1530
29
905
133
150
19863

1997
2812
4691
357
245
6412
2490
214
47
1
49
1574
30
1277
155
163
20517

Venture Capital Investment by Stage-1997
Others
Expansion Mezzanine Turnaround Buyout
Seed
Start-up
1.4%
12.3%
4.1%
50.3%
6.8%
China
3.3%
21.8%
1.6%
10.0%
2.4%
0.5%
Hong Kong
4.4%
34.5%
46.6%
0.8%
0.3%
0.4%
46.4%
5.2%
9.1%
37.8%
India
1.3%
0.9%
1.1%
5.0%
84.6%
6.3%
Indonesia
0.8%
0.0%
0.0%
1.1%
35.1%
10.8%
50.7%
Japan
2.3%
0.0%
3.3%
6.2%
15.0%
46.1%
19.8%
9.6%
Korea
15.5%
7.8%
0.0%
15.0%
42.3%
19.4%
0.0%
Malaysia
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
4.9%
0.0%
39.9%
55.2%
Myanmar
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
5.0%
95.0%
0.0%
Pakistan
0.0%
12.1%
0.0%
5.0%
69.6%
13.3%
0.0%
Philippines
0.0%
1.6%
2.1%
24.1%
44.4%
242%
3.6%
Singapore
0.0%
1.8%
2.8%
4.6%
22.0%
67.9%
0.9%
Sri Lanka
0.0%
0.5%
1.1%
24.2%
50.3%
16.3%
7.6%
Taiwan
1.7%
0.0%
7.0%
14.9%
53.4%
21.4%
1.6%
Thailand
0.0%
0.0%
1.1%
0.0%
61.2%
37.5%
0.2%
Vietnam
Calculated from AVQ, 1999
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Disbursement by Industries-Amount
Consumer Computer Electronics Industrial Medical/
Communications Energy Transportation Construction Financial Other
Other
Products Biotechnology
Related
Related Related
Services Services Manufacturing
China
355
52
34
458
123
375
31
277
322
689
21
75
Hong Kong
1,004
99
145
938
145
615
202
432
647
127
230
103
India
72
80
15
86
35
13
9
11
25
8
4
0
Indonesia
5
84
1
14
73
3
2
33
3
5
12
10
Japan
1,231
398
468
795
147
212
199
917
814
135
571
526
Korea
167
391
261
628
50
252
37
79
86
127
374
40
Malaysia
19
24
23
23
2
3
64
0
6
44
5
0
Myanmar
0
2
0
0
18
0
0
0
12
11
4
0
Pakistan
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
9
0
2
0
Philippines
8
10
0
1
5
7
2
6
249
Singapore
201
178
133
39
165
182
26
119
131
73
78
1
2
9
0
1
Sri Lanka
0
3
2
0
3
1
7
94
365
495
13
97
Taiwan
20
8
31
41
8
20
84
4
14
24
3
14
29
0
Thailand
0
38
2
14
12
0
0
7
0
0
1
Vietnam
50
0
49
25
2
30
1,884
568
1,532
1,450
778
1,039
3,228
3,232
Total
2,251
862
1,438
2,253
Calculated from AVCJ, 1999
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Disbursement by Industries-Numbers
Consumer Computer Electronics Industrial Medical/ Communications Energy Transportation
Related
Related Related
Products Biotech.
59
7
China
52
7
37
8
26
Hong Kong
167
154
17
41
48
27
38
India
122
78
16
102
41
195
19
50
204
2
9
Indonesia
180
21
8
Japan
2242
968
1,368
200
821
253
284
254
526
100
Korea
226
170
151
31
21
22
4
3
Malaysia
26
15
3
1
0
0
0
Myanmar
0
3
0
0
0
0
Pakistan
2
0
0
3
2
3
9
10
3
Philippines
3
147
79
92
169
81
77
7
Singapore
9
2
2
7
5
2
38
Sri Lanka
77
20
289
375
96
15
16
Taiwan
19
3
11
15
35
3
3
Thailand
2
0
0
0
14
0
0
Vietnam
2,716
527
1,924
707
453
3135
1,710
Total
Calculated from AVQ, 1999

Construction Financial Other
Other
Services Services Manufacturing
21
30
34
41
5
41
72
14
17
38
13
9
0
41
66
13
62
114
19
18
189
979
663
1,200
1,358
31
58
84
26
211
0
5
0
30
37
0
4
2
1
0
0
0
2
0
7
4
4
7
6
5
14
34
27
47
72
4
4
8
5
28
6
6
27
13
114
0
24
9
14
13
1
16
9
3
8
347
1,275
817
1,702
1,946
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Exits/Divestments

----------------------- -----------------

1992
1993
1994
1995
China
-209
186
-96
45
Hong Kong
Error
Error
Error
Error
India
0
0
16
10
Indonesia
-2
1
16
1
Japan
0
820
124
1286
Korea
0
0
301
321
Malaysia
-13
0
20
7
Myanmar
Error
Error
Error
0
Pakistan
0
0
0
-1
Philippines
-1
4
1
7
Singapore
64
-64
98
72
Sri Lanka
-6
2
-1
0
Taiwan
0
0
203
31
Thailand
-4
0
18
1
Vietnam
0
0
0
0
Total
-171
948
700
1781
Calculated from AVQ, 1999

China
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Japan
Korea
Malaysia
Myanmar
Pakistan
Philippines
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Taiwan
Thailand
Vietnam
Total

Capital
Under Investment/
Management/ Venture Project
Capital Fund
76.1
105.8
24.2
9.3
32.0
14.5
21.4
37.7
2.0
21.1
75.7
7.1
25.8
25.3
41.7
40.5

Capital
Management/
Professional
8.6
7.0
0.5
0.3
0.6
1.3
1.3
4.3
0.1
0.9
1.9
0.3
1.2
1.0
3.1
1.2

1996
40
384
2
0
1666
197
2
0
0
2
68
1
112
17
0
2491

1997
11
163
1
21
924
150
1
0
0
2
113
2
123
6
14
1531

Under Investment/
Professional
17.8
22.6
4.6
2.1
4.2
4.4
7.7
11.3
1.0
3.8
13.1
3.1
5.9
3.8
9.7
7.6

14.3
11.0
1.6
1.2
3.5
5.9
4.0
4.7
0.2
1.1
4.6
1.3
3.9
3.3
5.5
4.9

Calculated from AVQ , 1999
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Available Capital for
Investment
China
688.0
Hong Kong
4,945.0
India
659.5
Indonesia
181.3
1,309.2
Japan
Korea
-633.8
Malaysia
191.8
Myanmar
66.0
Pakistan
4.9
Philippines
119.8
Singapore
2,894.2
Sri Lanka
41.3
Taiwan
635.5
Thailand
21.4
Vietnam
128.0
Total
11,252.1
Calculated from AVQ, 1999

China
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Japan
Korea
Malaysia
Myanmar
Pakistan
Philippines
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Taiwan
Thailand
Vietnam
Average

Percentage
Relation
Investment/Pool
1997
80.3%
48.7%
35.1%
57.4%
83.0%
134.1%
52.7%
41.6%
18.9%
292%
352%
41.9%
66.8%
87.8%
55.8%
64.6%

Professional /Fund
4.3
4.7
5.3
4.4
7.5
3.3
2.8
3.3
2.0
5.6
5.8
2.3
4.4
6.7
4.3
5.3

Investment
Portfolio/Fund
61.1
51.5
8.5
5.3
26.6
19.5
11.3
15.7
0.4
6.2
26.7
3.0
173
222

23.4
26.2

Percentage Relation
Investment/Pool 1996
62.9%
50.8%
35.8%
70.0%
63.7%
85.4%
55.6%
42.0%
20.0%
36.1%
38.4%
42.9%
67.8%
66.2%
54.3%
58.8%

Projects per
professional

Projects/
Fund

Average Expenses
Per year (2.5%)

Available per
Professionals

1.7
1.6
32
3.5
5.8
4.4
3.1
1.1
2.3
1.2
2.5
5.0
32
32
1.8
4.1

7.1
7.4
16.7
15.2
43.7
14.6
8.7
3.7
4.7
7.0
14.3
11.4
14.2
213
7.6
22.0

1.9
2.6
0.6
0.2
0.8
0.4
0.5
0.9
0.1
0.5
1.9
0.2
0.6
0.6
1.0

0.4
0.6
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
02

0.3
0.0
0.1
03
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2

Calculated from A V Q , 1999
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12 Appendix III- Questionnaire

University of Wollongong
Department of Accounting and Finance

Nam e :

Address :

Telephone:

Fax:

Em ail:

Please Complete

All information provided by you will be kept strictly confidential.
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Section 1
General Inform ation
1-1. Y ear this fund became operational 19
1-2. H um an Resource
N um ber o f Partners/Senior Management Personnel:
Average Years o f Experience o f Partners/Senior M anagement Personnel
in the Venture Capital Industry:
Average Years o f Experience o f Partners/Senior M anagement Personnel

N os.

in Other Industries:

Yrs.

Yrs.

1-3. Rank by your preference for Stage(s) of development of your investees at the time of
the initial investment (Please lic k v' and Rank)
0 Prefer

Rank
Seed (Research and Planning)
Start-up (Market Entry)
Early
expansion
(Market
Development)
Late expansion (Market Exploitation)
Mezzanine funding (Preparation for
IPO)
Public Company (self explanatory)
Leveraged buyouts
Turnarounds

0 No Particular Preference

1-4. Average Amount of Capital under M anagement during the last one year. (Please Tick

0
0 Less than KRW10 billion
0 Between KRW 20-30 billion
0 Between KRW 40-50 billion

0 Between KRW 10-20 billion
0 Between KRW 30-40 billion
0 More Than KRW 50 billion
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1-5 Y early A verage P ercentage R eturn on In vestm en t (Please Tick S )

1-6. R ole as L e a d Investor(Please Tick vQ

1-7 B o a rd R epresen tatio n (Please Tick S )
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Section 2
Involvement as a lead investor (Please provide the following infoimation in relation to
any portfolio com pany in which you are acting as lead investor. In case vou are not acting
as lead investor in any investm ent kindly provide the following information about any
one of your portfolio company of vour choice)

Name of the Portfolio Company:
Address:

Phone No:
Fax:
Email:

19

2-1. Y ear this com pany became operational:

2-2. Total A ssets (Please Tick S )
0 Between KRW 2-3 billion
0 Between KRW 4-5 billion
0 More Than KRW 6 billion

0 Less than K R W 1-2 billion
0 Between KRW 3-4 billion
0 Between KRW 5-6 billion

2-3. The percentage of your share in the total equity (Please Tick S )
0

Less than 15% 016-30% 0 31-45% 0 46-60% 0 61-75% ©More than75%

2-4. Y ear Venture Capital Received First

19
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2-5. C o m p an y stag e o f d evelop m en t (Please Tick S)

mm

W ; •
ire
Capital was fust
Received

I

At Present

Seed (Research and Planning)
Start-up (Market Entry}
Early expansion (Market Development)
Late expansion (Market Exploitation)
Mezzanine (Preparation fo r IPO)

Public Company (self explanatory}
■ I • . , i I -1 1 i
Turnarounds f

am

2-6. O n the Scale o f 1-5 where w ould you place this com pany in term s o f technology?
(Please Tick *S)
Very H igh Tech © © © © O

Low-Tech

2-7. C o m p o sitio n o f B o ard o f D irectors o f the C om pany

2-8. N u m b e r an d duration o f m eetings th at you had with the M an agem en t/C E O o f the
P ortfolio C o m p an y durin g the la st one year :N um ber o f Form al Meetings each lasting for________ Hours on Average
N um ber of Inform al Meetings each lasting for________ Hours on Average
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2-9. F req u en cy o f co n tact w ith M an ag e m e n t/C E O o f your portfolio com pany on
telephone du rin g the la st one m onth?
______ Tim es, each call lasting fo r approxim ately___________ minutes.

2-10. N u m b e r o f reports required to be filed b y the portfolio com pany
Frequency
Num bers

D aily

W eekly ;

Fortnightly

« i l t e f l y " Yearly

2-11. H ow u sefu l do you believe has been the interaction with your Portfolio Com pany for
you? (Please Tick v')
0
0

V ery Useful
U seful

0
0

N ot sure/C an’t say
N ot Much

0

N ot Useful at all

2-12. I f you are facin g an y constraints preventing you from interaction with your portfolio
com p an ies p lease tick / a n d /o r list
0
0

N o Constraints
Time

0
0

Non-Go-operation o f the Portfolio Company
A ny O ther:________________________

2-13. H o w w ould you rate the perform ance o f this portfolio com pany so far? (Please Tick
0 Outstanding
0 U nsatisfactory

0 G ood

0 Satisfactory

0 P oor

2-14. Involvem ent R atin g (Involvem ent in the affairs o f portfolio
venture -cap italist) (Please Tick V)

com pany by the

245

Appendix III

trend in

Your Involvement
i; in the referred
portfolio company

country

2-15. H ow w ould you rate the gen eral reputation o f the portfolio com pany /m an agem en t
team w ithin its p articu lar industry ? (Please Tick S)
0 Well Above Average
0 Average
0 M uch Below Average

0 Above Average
0 Below Average

2-16. H o w do you rate the com petency o f your portfolio com pany/m an agem ent team
regard in g the o p tim al u sag e o f resources available to it/th e m (Please Tick vQ
0 Well Above Average
0 Average

0 Above Average
0 Below Average

0 M uch Below Average
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2-17. State the level o f your p articipatio n in the follow ing activities in your portfolio
com pany. (Please Tick vQ
1 N ever
2 Less Than Venture Management Team
3 As much as Venture Management Team
4 More than Venture Management Team
5 All participation by You
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Section 3
R esou rce A sse ssm e n t
3-1. H ow w ould you rate resou rce strengths o f your fund m an agem en t team and their
ability to a s s is t y o u r portfolio com p an y in the follow ing areas:(Please T ick
1. Well Above Average
2. A bove Average
3. Average
4. Below Average
5. Well below Average

3-2. H o w w ould you rate the in-house resources o f your Portfolio Com pany in term s o f
the follow ing cap ab ilities vis-à-vis com pan ies in the sam e industry o f your country:1. Well A bove Average
2. A bove Average
3. Average
4. Below Average
5. Well below Average
(Please T ick S)______________________________________________________ _
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A ppen dix -IV Correspondence R ecord

Correspondence Record: Asian Venture Capital Journal

Identity: Tom m y Y ip, Editor, Asian Venture Capital Journal
D ate: Wed, 26 M ay 1999
Country: H ong K on g
D ear Mr. N aqi,
I am replying your earlier email about some errors that you have found in the Guide to
Venture Capital in Asia.

1. Page 28. There seem s to be a discrepancy regarding reporting of total venture capital pool in
China and H ong K on g. The venture capital pool reported separately in U SD Million for China
and H ong K on g fo r 1997 is U SD 3,500 Million and U SD 9,632 Million respectively. The total
comes to U SD 13,132 Million whereas it is reported as U SD 10,670 Million on page 28.
Similarly, new funds raised and annual investments in the separate country details when joined
together do not produce the results indicated on page 25. Same is the case with number of
venture capital firm s.
This is N O T a discrepancy. Since 90% of the private equity firms treat Hong Kong and China
as one pool, we have compiled one overall figure for H ong K ong & China. This overall figure
is N O T the sum o f the figures in H ong K ong and China section. Please read Pg. 15 fo r more
detail.

2. Page 151 - A ccording to the your directory the seed and Mezzanine investment in Singapore
is 3.6% and 24% receptively whereas according to Singapore government survey available on
the net it is 34% and 12% respectively. Why so large a difference.
When we are talking about Seed, we mean the stage where initial concept of the business is
being form ed. From m y knowledge, there is no way that Singapore could have 34% invested in
Seed stage since it is the m ost risky stage among all. If the info is from E D B they may have
accounted Start-up and Early stage into that 34% figure. One reason why the E D B publishes
the data so differently from ours is that they account only the funds that are raised in Singapore
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and invested in Singapore. F or your information, Singapore firms get only about 10-20% o f all
fund raised locally.

3. Page 28- As per page 28 the venture capital pool in Pakistan was U SD 3 M illion. The details
provided in the Pakistan sections records Pak Rs. 250 Million and thus usage of an exchange
rate o f P ak R s. 8 3 /U S D . Similarly Sri Lanka venture capital pool on page 28 has been recorded
at U SD 4 Million in 1991 and details in the Sri Lanka section exhibits SR 319 million indicating
conversion rate o f S R 80/U SD . As far as 1 remember, exchange rates in these countries have
never touched 80/U SD .
As per page 28 the venture capital pool in Pakistan was U SD 6 Million N O T U SD 3 Million. If
you use Rs. 250 million to be divided by 6, you get 41.6 N O T 83. Exchange rate for Sri Lanka
in 1991 is provided by the Sri Lanka Government and 1 believe this rate is accurate.
Page- 126. The N ew Zealand -Sources o f venture capital pie chart seems to be wrong since the
total com es to 109 instead o f 100.
This is an error. The percentage of Insurance Companies should be 8% instead of 17.4%.
Thank you for your kind attention.

5. Page 105. K orean venture capital investment is more than total venture capital pool in 1997.
Page 61. The total amount in U SD fo r H ong K ong comes to U SD 4687 Million and not to
U SD 4,691 Million.
Since m ost o f the foreign private equity investments in Korea are denominated in US$ and
Won had fell more than 50% during 1997, the accumulative portfolio become somewhat huge
after converted into Worn Please refer to Pg. 15. The total amount in U SD for Hong Kong
com es to U SD 4,691 Million and not to U SD 4,687 Million.

6. Page 25. There seem s to be a currency conversion rate error in either the total venture capital
pool in 1996 on page 28 for Philippines or the new funds raised.
This is N O T an conversion rate error. As you may be aware of, the Peso had devaluated so
much during the second half o f 1997 It was around P26/U S$ during 1996, and came down to
around P 4 0 /U S $ in 1997.
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7. Page 68- The graph relating to Indian venture capital investment portfolio is wrong as it
depicts IR 16,528 in 1997 instead o f 14,628 as on page 65.
This is an error. Please refer to 14,628 in Pg. 65 and ignore the 19,528. Thank you for your
kind attention.

8. Page-92 The data depicted relating to investment portfolio in Japan 1991-1996 seems to be
seriously flaw ed 1 can pick up data 1995-1997 from page 91 but will appreciate if you can
supply the correct data from 1991-1994.
Attached please find the excel file with the figures that you need
If you have any further questions, please send me an email. Thank you.
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Appendix IV- Correspondence Record: Venture Capital Professionals

ID E N T IT Y :
JU N G -K Y O O
YANG,
C H IEF,
IN TER N A TIO N A L
D E P A R T M E N T , K O R E A T E C H N O L O G Y CO RPO R A TIO N
D A T E : M A R C H 18,1999

BU SIN ESS

CO U N TR Y : S O U IH K O R E A
Q. 1. D o you believe that there is a difference between the American and Asian
style/definition o f venture capital? if yes, please elaborate.
Ans: Asian venture capital is not a venture capital, but a private equity capital. 1 define this way
as Asian V C does not take a risk o f technology or commercial feasibility. They do not invest in
start-up o r young stage. We see some American style in Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, but
m ost cases are large sized private equity investments in stabilized and proven companies for
their growth or expansion purpose.
Q~2. Please state your opinion about the hindrances to the development of venture capital in
Asia?
Ans: Investm ent exit mechanism m ust be well developed fo r venture capital growth. Without
this, how and w hy do they invest?
Q.3. What is your opinion about the effect of Asian crisis on venture capital market of Asia?
Ans: 3. In K orea, the crisis was the once in a life time opportunities for venture capital
investments as it nosed down deal price and many good ventures were in need of working
capital and growth capital which were financed in debt form. In addition, the crisis made them
change their attitude on debt financing. They became to carefully listen to equity financing.
Q.4. What is your opinion about the involvement of venture capitalist in the affairs o f the
portfolio com panies? Please elaborate.
Ans: A s venture capitalists have observed various cases of business matters in other portfolio,
they are in good position to give advises. In financial side, their contribution cannot be
neglected and annoyed. Their role in bringing the portfolio to public stock market will be of
critical significance.
Q.5. What kind o f activities do you think are best suited for the venture capitalist to be
involved in its portfolio companies?
Ans: Advising on financial matters. Helping establishing business alliance. Assisting in IPO
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ID E N T IT Y : C O N F ID E N T IA L (O N R EQ U EST)
D A T E : M A R C H 23,1999
C O U N T R Y : SIN G A P O R E
Q .l. D o you believe that there is a difference between the American and Asian style/definition
o f venture capital? If yes please elaborate.
Ans; Cannot com m ent, we are not an American V G
Q.2 Please state your opinion about the hindrances to the development of venture capital in
Asia?
Ans: H indrances include over-supply o f cheap debt with risks m ispriced Also poor treatment
o f m inority shareholders, poor transparency and lack of familiarity with dealing with external
shareholders.
Q.3. What is your opinion about the effect o f Asian crisis on venture capital market o f Asia?
Ans: It has devastated portfolio returns, which were already poor. There is a short term need
fo r capital, but whether the structural and altitudinal changes have taken place to make the
market more attractive is unproven.
Q.4. W hat is your opinion about the involvement of venture capitalist in the > affairs of the
portfolio com panies? Please elaborate.
Ans: VGs can add-value in m any ways depending on their team competencies, and on the
contract between V C and investee. What matters is that VGs do not substitute for good full
time executives.
Q.4. What kind o f activities do you think are best suited fo r the venture capitalist to be
involved in its portfolio companies?
Ans: A ppropriate areas for VGs to contribute surround strategy, projects outside the usual
business like acquisitions and IPOs.
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ID E N T IT Y : N O E L SA N B O R N , PR IN C IPA L, A T .K E A R N Y
D A T E : A P R IL 5 ,1 9 9 9
C O U N T R Y : SIN G A P O R E
Q .l. Please state your opinion about the hindrances to the development of venture capital in
Asia?
Ans:
•

There are very few experienced V C teams. Too many people in the industry are few driven
rather than carry driven deals.

•

There is too much m oney chasing to few good

•

Com pany transparency

•

Bank bankruptcy laws are in adequate corruption and criminal with in investee companies
and som etim es in V C funds

Q.2. What is your opinion about the effect of Asian crisis on venture capital > market of Asia?
Ans: M ore opportunity to invest but must still be careful
Q.3. What is your opinion about the involvement of venture capitalist in the affairs of the
portfolio com panies? Please elaborate.
Ans: A good V C person should be able to add a lot of value and should be sought after by
investee com panies. Instead, many firms just want cheap money with minimal strings attached.
Q.4. What kind o f activities do you think are best suited for the venture capitalist to be
involved in its portfolio companies?
Ans: A nything in which they can add value.

ID E N T IT Y : N IC H O L A S A SH BY , M A N A G IN G D IR EC T O R , G LO B A L A LLIA N CE
C A PITA L (M ALAYSIA)
D A T E : A P R IL 5 ,1 9 9 9
C O U N T R Y : M A LA Y SIA
Answers below , and brochure attached fo r your perusal. G ood luck with your project - 1 look
forward to seeing the results of your work when complete.
Q .l. D o you believe that there is a difference between the American and Asian style/definition
o f venture capital? if yes, please elaborate.
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Ans: Y es - in U S it means capital for start-ups or early-stage companies, whereas in Asia and
particularly in M alaysia it refers to pre-IPO funding, across a broader range of sectors than
would be the case in U S. There is less o f a pioneer spirit and more o f a quick profit motive
here
Q.2. Please state your opinion about the hindrances to the development of venture capital in
Asia?

There are many:
•

Unrealistic price expectation

•

Opaque accounting e.g. profits depressed for tax reasons)

•

Insufficient management depth / capability / experience to give investors confidence to
invest

•

Poorly prepared / ill thought-out business plans

Q.3. What is your opinion about the effect of Asian crisis on venture capital >market of Asia?
•

Reduced num ber o f opportunities

•

M any financial projections unattainable

•

More difficult to exit by listing

•

Therefore V C 's need higher IR R hurdle to justify investment, so inevitably the
volum e/value o f investments has declined and will continue to do so.

Q .4. What is your opinion about the involvement of venture capitalist in the affairs of the
portfolio com panies? Please elaborate.
Ans:
•

Should restrict to board meeting attendance and inspection of monthly management
accounts

•

N ot interfere in day-to-day business or management

•

Should be ready to help when company in trouble or when asked

•

Should not lose sight o f partnership with owner

Q .5. What: kind o f activities do you think are best suited for the venture capitalist to be
involved in its portfolio companies?
Ans: See above. There is a trend towards greater management involvement and control, largely
a sym ptom o f the A sia crisis and need for VC's to maximise their returns. However this is very
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time consum ing, so they need to appoint outsiders to take on the key roles. In this way they
becom e part o f a management buy-in team.

ID E N T IT Y : C O N F ID E N T IA L (O N R EQ U EST)
D A T E : A P R IL, 07,1999
CO UNTRY: H O N G K O N G
D ear M r N aqi
M any thanks fo r your emails and I apologise for the delay in responding.
It is not apparent form your email whether you know that our form is , in fact, a law firm
rather than a venture capital firm. While we have experience in acting on both side of the
venture capital industry (both fo r investees and targets), our involvement is on legal basis rather
than from a stria commercial, venture capitalist approach.
Notwithstanding this, I attach below some responses to the questions which you raised.
It is not apparent
Q .l. D o you believe that there is a difference between the American and Asian style/definition
o f venture capital? If yes, please elaborate.
Ans: O ur experience o f venture capital in Europe suggest that there is a difference between the
style/ definition adopted in Europe and the approach in Asia. While there is generally a focus
on seed capital and start up capital in Western economies (moving on to development capital
and mezzanine financing), in Asia capitalists appear reluctant to encounter the greater risk
associated with this approach. Accordingly, venture capital appears more direaed towards
developm ent capital, backing expanding companies with a proven track record.
Q.2 Please state your opinion about the hindrances to the development of venture capital in
Asia?
Ans: The biggest hindrance, in my view, is the difference in valuation placed on targets by the
owners and the investors, owners are still valuing "pre-crash" while investors are taking a
longer term view and valuing on post crash asset values. This is one o f the biggest difficulties in
progressing venture capital activities. Another is the reluctance of targets to appreciate the goals
o f the capitalists. M any exists fo r capitalists require the investees to relinquish control of what
m ay be long standing fam ily companies. Capitalists require a rate of return on their money that
m ay not allow investees to continue to operate and develop the business in the way that,
historically, they m ay have operated.
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Q .2. W hat is your opinion about the effect of Asian crisis on venture capital market o f Asia?
Ans: The crisis has thrown up opportunities for venture capitalists and focused targets minds
on the different m eans o f fund raising available to them. However, the differences in valuation
prove a hindrance.
Q.3. W hat is your opinion about the involvement of venture capitalist in the affairs of the
portfolio com panies? Please elaborate.
Ans: It is surprising to us, with experience of the European market, that venture capitalists in
Asia have, historically, been willing to take minority positions without management control.
Even post crash, this seem s to be the case. This appears to us to be an historic hold over, based
on the culture o f A sia owners unwilling to relinquish any form of control over their business.
While capitalists w ork around this, it is likely, in our opinion, that greater emphasis is likely to
be placed on obtaining management control in the future, primarily in order to protea
investments made in these turbulent times.
Q .4. What kind o f activities do you think are best suited for the venture capitalist to be
involved in its portfolio companies?
Ans: Venture capitalists do not want day to day involvement in portfolio companies.What they
seek is the ability to shape development in order to secure their return. Accordingly, strategic
involvement in business developmentis, probably, the m ost important area in which venture
Capitalists would seek to be involved.
I hope that the above comments are helpful. They are given to you only for collation with
other com m ents you receive and to be used in your thesis without d irea quotation or
attribution. These are m y views and not necessarily those of the Firm. Please keep this
inform ation strictly confidential and do not reveal the source in your thesis.
I shall be delighted fo r an opportunity to review the information you have obtained as a result
o f your research. I hope that my input is helpful.

ID E N T IT Y : C O N F ID E N T IA L (O N R EQ U EST)
D A T E : A P R IL 19,1999
CO UNTRY: H O N G K O N G
Since I am responsible fo r the China business, my comments only pertain to m y experience
there:
Q .l. W hat are different sources of potential venture capital deals?
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Ans: Sources - contacts o f all sorts, lawyers, deal brokers, investment bankers, accountants,
govt. etc. etc.
Q.2. What investm ent evaluation criteria do you use to select projects for financing?
2Ans: Evaluation criteria - business sector, internal discipline, deal structure, risk

evaluation,

references, etc.
Q.3. What is the normal IR R and the average holding period in venture capital financing?
Ans: IR R 25% o r above
Q.4. W hat exit routes are normally employed by venture capitalists?
Ans: Exit, put option, sale to business partner, trade sale.
H ope the above is useful

ID E N T IT Y : ST A N D A R D C H A R T E R E D A SIA D E V E L O P M E N T CA PITAL LTD .
D A T E : A P R IL 21,1999
CO UNTRY: H O N G K O N G
So n y to tell you that I haven't checked my e-mail for sometime and you are not alone.
Anyway, here is a brief reply:
Q .l. What are different sources o f potential venture capital deals?
Ans: Sources o f V C deals are mainly three for me (1) investment banks, (2) fellow V C firms,
and (3) personal connections.
Q 2 . What investment evaluation criteria do you use to select projects for financing?
Ans: It varies but m ost would emphasize (1) track records, (2) management quaky, (3) growth
potential, and (4) exit m echanism
Q.3. What is he normal IR R and the average holding period in venture capital financing?
Ans: IR R fo r m y company is 30% and holding period 1 to 5 years.
Q.4. W hat exit routes are normally employed by venture capitalists?
Ans: E xits are m ainly through IPO . However, 3rd party sales sometimes occur and the deal
structure always include redemption by the issuer if IPO /exit does not take place within the
holding period.
Q.5. W hat do you see are the hindrance to development of venture capital in Asia
Ans: Hindrance include the low market valuation fo r some sectors in certain markets e.g.
industrial sector in Hong Kong. Another one is the mental resistance of giving up equity to
outside parties.
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Q.6. W hat do you believe will be the effect o f Asian crises on venture capital?
Ans: Asian Crisis caused many investments to fold mainly due to F X losses and tightened
credit. O n the other hand, it also opened doors for V C in som e of the more restricted
countries such as K orea and Taiwan with bargain hunting opportunities.
Q.7. What do you believe is the future of venture capital Asia?
Ans: Finally, the V C industry in A sia will become more popular and sophisticated. However,
it'll also drive up the pricing o f deals as many more funds flow in.

ID E N T IT Y : C O N F ID E N T IA L (O N R EQ U EST)
D A T E : A P R IL 2 ,2 0 0 0
C O U N T R Y :H O N G K O N G
Q. 1. Is Asian venture capital culture different form venture capital culture in the United States
and Europe? In what respect?
Ans: 1: The main differences are:
1) In the U S and Europe the Private equity investor normally has a clear control position in the
company. In A sia it is normally a minority interest. It is much harder in Asia to enforce a
positive agenda on a company.
2) Given that in U S/E u rop e management is motivated by options and has no other significant
interests, in A sia M anagement is often the dominant shareholder and often has other interests
including. This makes it much harder to align economic incentives between Financial investors
and management.
Q.2. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia are having an easier time as compared to
their counterparts in Europe/U nited States?
Ans: N o , I have done M BO ’s in the U SA and Europe and the Private equity Business is harder
in Asia. There is a much more substantial educational exercise to teach partners and managers
what exits and shareholder value really mean.
Q.3. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia allocate more time and efforts toward
involvement in portfolio companies than venture capitalists in the United States and Europe?
W hy/W hynot?
Ans: In A sia there is too much emphasis on doing deals. Investors need to be more
interventionary and add more value to portfolio companies. This is the main reason why the
issues at Q 1 are so vital
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Q.4. What factors have hindered you in building up an ideal value-added relationship with your
portfolio company?
Ans: M anagement obsession with an imperialistic sense of "control", lack of transparency
about use o f capital and business perform ance and problems in aligning interests.
Q.5. D o you agree that the value-added role of venture capitalist is more hype than reality?
W hy/W hy not?
Ans: In the U S and Europe there is no Hype about added value; it is being created and that is
why high returns are made. In Asia it is the main weakness in the area where mangers need to
walk the walk rather than talk the talk!

ID E N T IT Y : G O D W IN PO N , IN V E ST M E N T M A N A G ER , A G R I-FO O D E Q U IT Y
FU N D
D A T E .-APRIL 4 ,2 0 0 1
C O U N TR Y : C A N A D A
Hello. I'd appreciate it if I could get a complete copy of your report. I would be happy to
participate in your survey. In your analysis of the venture capital market in Asia, did you break
the funds down m y sectors?? I'd be interested to know where some of the dollars are going
into. O ther factors such as size of investment, structure, and stage the company was at (start
up/expanding/restructuring) would be useful as well. Here are my responses.
Q .l. H ow do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: A s one o f our conditions with our investments we always request a seat on the company’s
board o f directors. Sometimes depending on the company that seat/option we have will be
just as an observer or it may be in an active capacity, ie as a full board director. Other value
added services we provide are training sessions to our invested companies C EO s. Training
sessions such as Corporate Governance, IPO , etc We consider this all as value added service.
During these special outings where we get the C EO s together we encourage them to identify
any synergies within one another and network opportunities.
Rem em ber as a V C you are essentially like a partner to the company. So as a partner what else
do you have to o ffer (clients, referrals, services to the company.
Q 2 . What conditions are necessary fo r a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his

portfolio company?
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Ans: I think it is extrem ely valuable and important. A venture capitalists must be able to
provide more than just financing. We tell our clients and encourage them to see other vc...to
see what they have to offer, all vcs offer $...But what else sets them apart from one another.
Q .3. What conditions are necessary fo r a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits
from the value-added efforts of venture capitalist?
Ans: T o value the feedback vcs provide. Sometimes it takes a company in crisis before they
will start to listen to outside advice.
Q .4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies
perform any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: I think this depends on the relationship between the vc and company. There is no way
that the vc can understand the business as good as the CEO . Otherwise if we have this
situation the vc shouldn't have invested in the company anyways.

Overall I think if the

relationship between the two is good, yes...I think that the company performs better. We do
not take an active interests to be involved in the day to day activities... I don't want to know
what their hours o f operations are. As an investor I trust my C E O to take care of the day to
day stuff..
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is
a principal/ agent relation? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: N ot sure I understand.

ID E N T IT Y : C O N F ID E N T IA L (O N R EQ U EST)
D A T E : A P R IL 4, .2000
C O U N T R Y : TA IW A N
We are one o f m any V C firms in Taiwan. M y comments only represent what we see in Taiwan.
The above comm ent is just to let you know the reality in Taiwan. Please do not quote me.
Q . 1. Is Asian venture capital culture different form venture capital culture in the United States
and Europe? In what respect?
Ans: V C s here are different among ourselves. Some of us follow the US V C practice,some
others m ay choose to follow the traditional way
Q .2. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia are having an easier time as compared to
their counterparts in Europe/U nited States?
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Ans: I don't understand what do you mean by "easier tim e". It is not easier to make the right
investment decision in Taiwan. The capital market is not as mature as we have in US. The
valuation m ethod is U S is well developed while in Taiwan it is very different and is still
developing.
Q.3. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia allocate more time and efforts toward
involvement in portfolio companies than venture capitalists in the United States and Europe?
W hy/W hy not?
Ans: M ost o f the startups in US are backed by VCs only. The lead investor is the only helping
hand besides the management. In Taiwan , there is usually a "chairman" act as the lead
investor. The V Cs are helping only. In case that the V C is the lead investor, V C usually spend a
lot o f time on the company. In U S, those co-invest "VCs" are not much involved neither.
Q.4. W hat factors have hindered you in building up an ideal value-added relationship with your
portfolio company?
Ans: M ost V Cs do provide value-added service to our companies. We help in business
connections, hiring, strategy consulting... very similar with our U S counter parts. In some cases,
VCs do spend not much time in their company. These are late stage investments. F or late stage
investors, they are different with startup investors. We may have more late stage investors in
Taiwan claim to be V Cs than in U S.
Q.5. D o you agree that the value-added role o f venture capitalist is more hype than reality?
W hy/W hy not?
Ans: Value-added is the job o f VCs. It is a general practice, not a hype. In Taiwan, some
management do not have close relation with their V C investor. They sometime do not willing
to disclose their problem s with their V C investor. V C in this case are just mostly minor
investors. There m aybe more co-invest V Cs in Taiwan than in US. Those VCs that take lead in
Taiwan, still very active in management involvement.

ID E N T IT Y : C O N F ID E N T IA L (O N R EQ U EST)
D A T E : A P R IL 15,2000
CO UNTRY: H O N G K O N G
Q .l. H ow do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: W e always as a policy focus investments on few industries where we can help our
com panies. We strengthen our assistance when cash is finishing and new round of financing is
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required, when there are organisational problems (vacant positions, not right people...), when
budget is not respected.
Q.2. What conditions are necessary fo r a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his
portfolio company?
Ans: H ave netw ork o f contacts, know the industry, have management experience, have gone 2
3 tim es through whole investment process
Q.3. What conditions are necessary fo r a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits
from the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans: Right equity ownership (not too much not too little), have V C representative sitting on
board, try to understand V C fund portfolio and experience so that he can ask for help in
relevant situations
Q.4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies
perform any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: Y es if V .Capitalists have experience in the company industry
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is
a principal/ agent relation with you as principal and the owner as your agent? Why/Why not?
Ans: N o , because if it is perceived like that, people cannot collaborate in the right way.
Sometim es it is like that because management does not have right attitude.

ID E N T IT Y : H A R JE E V K A N D H A R I, N EW M E D IA SPARK
D A T E : A P R IL 18,2000
C O U N T R Y : U N IT E D K IN G D O M
In response to your request fo r some information from NewMedia SPARK, Harjeev has put
forward som e answers for you:
Q .l. H ow do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: Com panies can always use the assistance o f their V C Some need more help than others
and we assess this through performance metrics and milestones met.
Q.2. W hat conditions arc necessary fo r a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his
portfolio company?
Ans: V C needs expertise, contacts etc that are relevant to the company. V C needs to be on the
Board and have regular contact with the company.
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Q.3. W hat conditions are necessary fo r a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits
from the value-added efforts of venture capitalist?
Ans: The com pany needs to be open to their V C adding value. Some companies resent VCs
meddling. Personality issues are very important here. They need to understand where the V C
is com ing from . Som e companies feel that the VCs interest and their interest is not aligned
This som etim es m ay be true but V Cs have only one objective and that is clear. We are after
financial returns and will do what we have to maximise that. That usually dovetails with the
interests o f the entrepreneurs.
Q.4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies
perform any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: Y es V Cs that are more involved in their portfolio companies do perform better. This is
because they can solve problems and fight fires before they become life threatening to a
company. A lso the more knowledge they have about a company the more they can help them
re biz dev, re networking etc. Finally the better they know their companies the better they can
cham pion them internally when it com es to subsequent rounds etc.
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is
a principal/ agent relation? W hy/W hy not?
Yes.
We look forw ard to receiving a copy of your finished project, please send it to the attention of
H arjeev Kandhari.

ID E N T IT Y : C O N F ID E N T IA L (O N R EQ U EST)
D A T E : M A Y, 7 ,2 0 0 0
CO UNTRY: H O N G K O N G
Q. 1. Is Asian venture capital culture different form venture capital culture in the United States
and Europe? In what respect?
Ans: Y es. V C culture is probably less developed in Asia than in the U S, less history of V C in
Asia, few er players, more limited track record
Q.2. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia are having an easier time as compared to
their counterparts in Europe/U nited States?
Ans: N o reason to believe that V Cs in Asia are having an easier time than VCs in the US. In
som e respects, they are having a more difficult time than their counterparts in the US because
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VGs in Asia did not make the kind o f returns that their counterparts in the US did over the last
few years.
Q.3. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia allocate more time and efforts toward
involvement in portfolio companies than venture capitalists in the United States and Europe?
"Why/Why not?
Ans: N o, I have no reason to believe that in general VGs in Asia allocate more time to
portfolio com panies than VGs in the US do nor any reason to believe that they allocate less.
Something like this will vary greatly from V C firm to V C firm and from portfolio company to
portfolio company.
Q.4. What factors have hindered you in building up an ideal value-added relationship with
your portfolio company?
Ans: Lack o f time is probably the primary reason.
Q.5. D o you agree that the value-added role o f venture capitalist is more hype than reality?
W hy/W hynot?
Ans: N o, do not believe that. I do believe that VGs can and in many cases do add significant
value to portfolio com panies.

ID E N T IT Y : C O N F ID E N T IA L (O N R EQ U EST)
D A T E : A U G U ST 15,2000
C O U N T R Y : SIN G A P O R E
Q .l. H ow do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: M y own knowledge and experience.
Q.2. What conditions are necessary fo r a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his
portfolio company?
Ans: Skills.
Q.3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to denve most benefits
from the value-added efforts of venture capitalist?
Ans: Com pany m ust work as a partner with V C and needs to communicate the company’s
need to the V C, and visa versa.
Q .4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies
perform any better? W hy/W hynot?
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Ans: Y es, because more talent and expertise in different areas that the V C brings to the table
complem ent the com pany founders. V C also brings networks and the knowledge of growing
multiple com panies. V C ’s can share industry and economic information across the portfolio of
companies avoiding som e replication of efforts. Etc.
Q .5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is
a principal/agent relation? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: N o. It is a partnership to achieve a common goal o f growing a business in order to
achieve high shareholder value.

ID E N T IT Y : SIM O N H O , C R O SB Y A SSE T M A N A G EM EN T
D A T E : A U G U S T 17,2000
C O U N T R Y : SIN G A P O R E
Here is our response to your questions:
Q .l. Plow do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: O ur assistance is part of a long-term relation, starting with the investment and
shareholders agreem ent, milestones and warrants, development of final business plan,
participation in board meetings, regular business reviews and reporting. In addition, we arrange
meetings and sem inars fo r our portfolio companies on various topics, networking meetings,
arrange contacts, discussion partner in licensing negotiations, providing scientific and industry
business intelligence, exit planning, trade sell, IPO , etc
Q .2. What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his
portfolio com pany?
Ans: In-depth and breadth industry know-how covering many aspects; scientific, medical,
business m anagement, pharmaceutical operations, financial, patents, licensing negotiations, etc
and lots o f contacts.
Q .3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits
from the value-added efforts of venture capitalist?
Ans: Strong operation management team with in-depth and breadth pharmaceutical industry
know-how, covering many aspects; scientific, medical, business management, pharmaceutical
operations, financial, patents, licensing negotiations, etc. Focused efforts on agreed business
strategy, business plan, milestones, open and flexible mindset. And contacts.

266

Q .4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies
perform any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: Both pro's and con's to have a tight involvement. Regular contact is important, not
necessarily tight control if everyting is on track O ur philosophy is not to take a board member
seat ourselve, we often assign an external person who have the right expertice. Agreed business
plan and m ilestone and good working climate is key for success.
Q .5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner o f your portfolio company is
a principal/ agent relation? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: Neither, parties should share same objectives but have different roles. Investors and
Founders/M anagem ent m ust share the same agenda, both short-term and long-term, i.e. exit
strategy m ust be clear from the beginning.

ID E N T IT Y : C O N F ID E N T IA L (O N R EQ U EST)
D A T E : A U G U ST 19,2000
C O U N T R Y : SIN G A P O R E
Pis. find below som e brief comm ents/answers.
Q .l. H ow do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
They always do.
Q.2. What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his
portfolio company?
Ans:
•

Understand what competencies we have as VC's. Ensure that the V C is organised in a way
that these competencies are transferred to the portfolio company (thus avoiding the partner
prom ising all the things we can do and then, post-investment, send in a junior person to
m onitor the portfolio company....

•

Thorough discussions with entrepreneur and other shareholders on what the ambition is
fo r the company, our value added, how we work with a portfolio company

•

Trust

Q .3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits
from the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans:
•

O penness
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•

Trust

Q .4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies
perform any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans:
•

D epends very much whether it is a start-up/early stage V C (yes, certainly or a leverage
buy-out (hands-on involvement less important.

•

F o r the form en It should be the case as the company needs strong support to realise the
opportunities. In m y experience, the key elements (of value-added) are: Strategic sparring
partner, recruitment (senior management), funding and speed.

Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is
a principal/agent relation with you as principal and the owner as your agent? Why/Why not?
Ans: N o t sure that I follow you on this one as I am part owner of the portfolio company.
Maybe I should read it as me vs. the CEO /entrepreneur (often significant shareholder, but far
from always).

ID E N T IT Y : C O N F ID E N T IA L (O N R EQ U EST)
D A T E : A U G U ST 2 3 ,2 0 0 0
C O U N T R Y : SIN G A P O R E
Q .l. H ow do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: B y getting and staying close to the company, we take a board seat on every company we
invest in and speak several times a week with the chairman or ceo. We also have an analyst
pool who assist in business planning. We undertake regular performance reviews and attend
every board meeting
Q .2. W hat conditions are necessary fo r a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his
portfolio company?
Ans: M anagem ent team open to investor input. Expertise on the part of the venture capitalist we are sector specialists and the typical profile of our executives is MBA, accounting
background.
Q .3. W hat conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive m ost benefits
from the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
A ns: A vc who has a true value added philosophy to investment. Sector specialism

good

relationships between com pany and investor
268

Q.4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies
perform any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: N o evidence to support, but emphatically yes, depending on the competence of the V C
In our case, we have built an investment team with this in m ind In many cases, our input is
about adding value, in others it is about avoiding the destruction of value. It is all about staying
close to the company.
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner o f your portfolio company is
a principal/agent relation with you as principal and the owner as your agent? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: N o idea

ID E N T IT Y : C O N F ID E N T IA L (O N R EQ U EST)
D A T E : A U G U S T 2 3,2000
C O U N T R Y : IN D IA
Q. 1. Is Asian venture capital culture different form venture capital culture in the United States
and Europe? In what respect?
Ans: Y es -the U S is a very mature market. Entrepreneurs and vcs have far more experience
and do not make as m any mistakes.
Q.2. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia are having an easier time as compared to
their counterparts in Europe/U nited States?
Ans: N o.
Q.3. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia allocate more time and efforts toward
involvement in portfolio companies than venture capitalists in the United States and Europe?
W hy/W hy not?
Ans: D epends from vc to vc and what stage they are investing at. early stage investments
typically require the vc to spend more time. In India, the vc may need to spend more time
regardless as entrepreneurs often have less experience than their counterparts in the US.
Q.4. What factors have hindered you in building up an ideal value-added relationship with your
portfolio com pany?
Ans: O ur fund is not yet up, so we cannot comment.
Q.5. D o you agree that the value-added role of venture capitalist is more hype than reality?
W hy/W hynot?
Ans: D epends from vc to vc and their network and relationships.
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ID E N T IT Y : C O N F ID E N T IA L (O N R EQ U EST)
D A T E : A U G U ST 23,2000
G O U N TR Y : H O N G K O N G
Q. 1. Is Asian venture capital culture different form venture capital culture in the United States
and Europe? In what respect?
Ans: Gould be different, but it depends on the cultures of different firms. Some Asian shops
invest global pool o f m oney and they value global team work and need N Y/London approval.
Some are Asia dedicated funds and they have total autonomy but can also share ideas with the
counterparties in Europe or U S.
Q.2. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia are having an easier time as compared to
their counterparts in Europe/U nited States?
Ans: N o. Acutually more difficult due to lack o f very capable management in Asia and also the
disclosure fo r A sian companies is not as good as in the US or Europe.
Q.3. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia allocate more time and efforts toward
involvement in portfolio companies than venture capitalists in the United States and Europe?
"Why/Why not?
Ans: N ot sure. D ifferent firms do differently.
Q.4. What factors have hindered you in building up an ideal value-added relationship with your
portfolio company?
Ans: Tim e priority.
Q.5. D o you agree that the value-added role of venture capitalist is more hype than reality?
W hy/W hynot?
Ans: D epends. M ost of the V Cs really add value, a mutually beneficial situation.

If the V C

does not add value, why does it expect itself to make money?

ID E N T IT Y : C O N F ID E N T IA L (O N R EQ U EST)
D A T E : A U G U ST 29,2000
G O U N TR Y : SIN G A P O R E
Q . 1. Is Asian venture capital culture different form venture capital culture in the United States
and Europe? In what respect?
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Ans: Smaller com m unity (le players) to date though changing fast. The smallness has allowed
potential investees to do more due diligence on the V C and to hold them to their word slightly
longer.
Q.2. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia are having an easier time as compared to
their counteipaits in Europe/U nited States?
Ans: N o. Few er exists, thought that is changing, and def. fewer good A N D available investee
choices.
Q.3. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia allocate more time and efforts toward
involvement in portfolio companies than venture capitalists in the United States and Europe?
W hy/W hy not?
Ans: They devote more time but I believe less time adding "tough love" to getting the right
decisions im plem ented
Q.4. What factors have hindered you in building up an ideal value-added relationship with your
portfolio company?
Ans: D ifficulty in recruiting / adding senior staff assuming needed along the life cycle or from
the beginning.
Q .5. D o you agree that the value-added role of venture capitalist is more hype than reality?
W hy/W hy not?
Ans: More mism atched than hype. V C needs a return on investment in a short period o f time.
Anything else is hype. All other stakeholders with the same goal are lucky. Any others, walk a
right rope. A s returns plunge and more money is thrown to the region by the largest players,
the com petition will make for even more bad deals.

This creates a cycle to push V C to

demand even more returns and allow fo r fewer chances in management led decision making.

ID E N T IT Y : E L D E R D LA N D , G IM V N.V.
D A T E : A P R IL 4,2001
C O U N TR Y : B E L G IU M
Q .l. H ow do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: Board meetings (12 + per year), regular contact with mgt (e-mail, phone, diner)
Q .2. What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his
portfolio company?
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Ans: M arket knowledge, understanding o f com pany/organisation, hands with approach (close
contact with mgt and other key staff), corporate network, financial structure, costs
Q.3. W hat conditions are necessary fo r a portfolio com pany to able to denve m ost benefits
from the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans: Structuring its own dem and without becoming too formal, open communication, follow
up on contacts provided by V Q becom ing part o f VC's network.
D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies
perform any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: Y es, especially in the current bear market, a hands with and involved V C (value adding)
can reduce the num ber o f failures and build survivors. More positive, I even believe that such a
value adding V C can accelerate the growth o f the venture.
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is
a principal/agent relation with you as principal and the owner as your agent? Why/Why not?
Ans: N o as the com pany has to execute it does not mean that it can not require something
from the V G support, network etc.

ID E N T IT Y :
PA RTN ERS

JO H N T. H O G A N , P H D . PRIN CIPA L,

BCV C A SSO C IA T ES; BCV C

S E N T : A P R IL 06,2001
C O U N T R Y : U N IT E D ST A T E S
N aqi: I am pleased to be able to assist you in your doctoral research. I have worked with over
350 m asters and doctoral students in the United States at Antioch University and The Union
Institute fo r the past nine years as an Adjunct Professor. I have a Ph.D. in Business
Adm inistration with concentrations in Venture Capital Management, Entrepreneurship, and
Strategic M anagement. I am also a practicing Venture Capitalist for five years in one of the
leading mid-west Venture Capital firms.
In addition to the Executive Summary of the findings of your research and the chapter you
offered to

mail within two months, please mail me a completed copy of your

th esis/d issertatioa Y ou m ay share m y responses with anyone and everyone.
M y responds to your research questions:
Q .l. H ow do you determine whether your portfolio com pany needs your assistance?
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Ans: I decide by assessing the salient issues the Com pany needs to address in order to
experience success. I coach the management team, and sometimes other Board members, on
the strategic and tactical approaches to address those salient issues. If I am uncomfortable with
the Com pany’s perform ance, I tell the management team and the Board that I am
uncom fortable and request both the management team's and the other Board member's
assistance in gaining com fort. If I continue to experience dissonance, I either leam to
live with it o r build consensus with other Board members an d/or investors, who are also
uncom fortable, to change things, whatever those things are that need to be changed. I attempt
to make this w ork to everyone's benefit. If I can not do this to everyone's benefit, and if the
change still needs to be made fo r the benefit o f the shareholders, I will force the issue, through
power, either legitimate o r perceived power, and will either win or lose on my change initiative.
In all cases I m ust exert leadership as a Board member and investor.
Q.2. "What conditions are necessary fo r a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his
portfolio company?
Ans: Conditions necessary to add more value...be in a position of power to affect change in the
Com pany, have a deep understanding o f the tools o f general management, know how to use
these tools, when to use these tools, and the fortitude to use them when required.
Q.3. ’What conditions are necessary fo r a portfolio company to able to derive m ost benefits
from the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans: Conditions...that the management listen, evaluate, and implement the coaching given, of
course only if the coaching will lead to the success of the company, that I can bring value to
the Com pany that the Com pany is unable to access from other sources at a lesser cost to the
Com pany than what m y involvement costs the Company, that our relationship, (among the
m anagement, investors, and Board) is truly built upon shared goals and shared gains.
Q.4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies
perform any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: The studies I have been able to find lead me to the conclusion that the level of
involvem ent o f the Venture Capitalist makes no difference in the final outcome o f the success
o r lack o f success o f the Company. M y experience, however, leads me to the conclusion that it
depends on the quality level of performance that the V C and the Board delivers to the
Com pany and that high quality performance by the V C and the Board makes a very large
difference in the success of the Company. This, from m y experience, is due primarily from the
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experiential base the VGs and Board contribute to the leadership of the Company and the
value that is added to the management team, by the V C and Board.
Q .5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is
a principal/ agent relation? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: I do not understand the question in relation to principal/agent relationship; consequendy,
I will not respond past the following thought. As a Board member I am responsible to all
owners (shareholders), not just one, not just the majority owner, and not just my ownership
position. I f I am not a Board m ember and just an investor, which I try never to be in this
position because it lacks in power, then I am much more passive and I represent only my
ownership position.
Wishing you the best of luck in your research and completion o f your doctoral program

ID E N T IT Y : M IC H E L R E , E X E C U T IV E V IC E-P R ESID E N T ,
B U SIN E SS D E V E L O P M E N T B A N K O F CA N A D A

IN V ESTM EN TS,

D A T E : A P R IL 2 0 ,2 0 0 1
CO UNTRY: CA N AD A
D ear Sir:
With reference to your request please find listed below my answers to your questions:
Q .l. H ow do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: Skills o f management, strength o f the Board, Monitoring Issues identified at investment
authorization.
Q.2. What conditions are necessary fo r a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his
portfolio company?
Ans: Skilled people. Workload of the individual taking into consideration the monitoring to be
done.
Q .3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits
from the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans: H aving a Board that is well managed. Let V C work with management in various strategic
comm ittees
Q .4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio
com panies perform any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: Y es, Experience in growing companies. Quality o f the network
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Q .5. D o you believe that the relation between you End the owner of your portfolio company is
a principal/ agent relation? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: G e ar com m unication is a must. Com m on objectives are important.

ID E N T IT Y : T O M LA M BS, BA RCLA Y S CA PITA L
D A T E : A P R IL 20,2001
C O U N T R Y : U N IT E D K IN G D O M
Q l. H ow do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: O ne o f our ow n executives will usually be a non executive director on the board of the
investee com pany- we are already therefore actively involved each o f our investee companies.
Q.2. W hat conditions are necessary fo r a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his
portfolio com pany?
Q.3. W hat conditions are necessary fo r a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits
from the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans 2 &3 : O ur input is usually as a sounding board as an N E D mainly on strategic matters the exec m anagem ent always run the business day-to-day. Obviously the executive
management o f the business need to be receptive to input from the N E D V C - usually they
recognise that the V C representative and the V C house is experienced at dealing with issues of
growing com panies. Where the investee company is making an acquisition or exiting then the
V C m ay be more actively involved in appraising/negotiating/dd/legals as these are core V C
skills. The V C can also influence/ input by helping to select an appropriate independent
chairm an, particularly where there is a change in culture/style/ restructuring required. The V C
m ay also need to becom e more actively involved when a change o f executive management is
needed.
Q .4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio
com panies perform any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: A hands on style is more likely to produce a more successful investment. Firsdy any
problem s are identified and dealt with more quickly - this is key to not losing investment value.
Secondly a close relationship with management is more likely to allow the V C to influence the
exit tim ing - again this is important in realising returns.
Q .5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is
a principal/ agent relation? Why/Why not?
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Ans: N o . Both parties have are effectively part owners of the business and have an economic
interest in building and realising shareholder value - they are both principals. However the V C
is purely a financial investor whilst the managers are also em ployees/directors and may have
m otivations other than shareholder value (eg career aspirations, emotional attachment to the
business, job security, ego , fam ily succession etc) These can sometimes eventually put the V C
and ow ner/driver at odds with each other - eg over the exit o r strategy.

ID E N T IT Y : C O N F ID E N T IA L (O N R EQ U EST)
D A T E : A P R IL 24,2001
C O U N T R Y : U N IT E D K IN G D O M
Q l. H ow do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: Review o f perform ance: is it performing to its potential, is there a clear strategy
Q.2. What conditions are necessary fo r a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his
portfolio company?
Ans: A strong working relationship with management but if management are the obstacle the
ability to change management
Q.3. What conditions are necessary fo r a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits
from the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans: D itto, they m ust feel that the V C is contributing and see it as a partnership.
Q .4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies
perform any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: D epends, we back management to run companies and the level of V C input depends on
the depth and strength o f the team. V C input may just be making sure team is right and then
letting them get on with it. More V C involvement is not necessarily constructive.
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner o f your portfolio company is
a principal/agent relation? Why/Why not?
Ans: It is more like a partnership.
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ID E N T IT Y : K U R T K A R L SSO N , D IR E C T O R ,
SW E D FU N D IN T E R N A T IO N A L A B

IN V E ST M E N T

O PERA TIO N S
’

D A T E : A P R IL 2 4 ,2 0 0 1
G O U N TR Y : S W E D E N
Q l. H ow do you determine whether your portfolio com pany needs your assistance?
Ans: If the m anagem ent o f a portfolio company does not meet the agreed goals in the business
plan and this happens more than once, the venture capital company should act and either
reform ulate the business idea or replace the managers who underperform.
Q 2. W hat conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value to in
his portfolio com pany?
Ans: I do not fully understand what you mean with "conditions”. Generally speaking the
venture capitalist should be located close to the portfolio company (<L hour drive by car) in
order to be able to have a close and frequent contact with the management. Ideally, the venture
capitalist has an extensive network within the industrial sector and personal contacts with
banks as well as with potential suppliers and customers to the portfolio company.
Q 3. What conditions are necessary fo r a portfolio company to be able to derive most benefits
from the value-added efforts o f the venture capitalist?
Ans: The m anagem ent o f the portfolio company should have open minds and be responsive to
suggestions from the venture capitalist. The management should not hesitate to ask the venture
capitalist fo r help. The shareholders of the portfolio company should try to find one or two
external Board D irectors to get unbiased opinions about the development potential of the
com pany and to get feedback from the market.
Q 4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies
perform any better? Why? Why not?
Ans: In general I believe that involvement of the venture capitalist up to a certain limit
im proves the perform ance o f the portfolio company. However, the venture capitalist must
restrict itself to act only within its role and not try to take over the responsibilities and duties of
the M anaging D irector.
Q 5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of the portfolio company is a
principal/agent relation with you as the principal and the owner as your agent? Why? Why not?
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Ans: N o , the relation should be on a more equal level. I see the owner and the venture
capitalist as two business partners working together towards a common goal, the development
o f a profitable and competitive company.

ID E N T IT Y : T IM
G R O W TH F U N D

H A Z E L L , IN V E ST M E N T E X E C U T IV E , BA R IN G E N G L ISH

D A T E : A P R IL 24,2001
C O U N T R Y : U N IT E D K IN G D O M
D ear Sayed
Thank you fo r your enquiry regarding your research on venture capital which G eoff Edge has
passed to me fo r comment. We have no current interest in the Asian venture capital market,
all our funds under management are targeted at the U K market alone. We have no problem
regarding confidentiality.
Q .l. H ow do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: We maintain a close relationship with all portfolio companies through monthly meetings,
the regular receipt o f management accounts and various ad hoc discussions. For most of the
time, we add value through playing the role of a professional non-executive, calling the
executives to account for their actions and using our experience to suggest alternative
approaches. All portfolio companies receive such assistance so no decision is required
Occasionally, we are required to be more active, normally when there is a significant problem
or opportunity. Such issues tend to be obvious and take priority over other work. Again, there
is no real decision required There are a few specialist areas where we can add further value.
These tend to be in the fields o f long term strategy, corporate finance and mergers and
acquisitions. The decision as to which portfolio company might benefit from such assistance is
a com bination o f the executives judgement as to whether he can add value and the
perform ance o f the company to date against plan (under performance tends to provoke greater
assistance).
Q .2. W hat conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his
portfolio company?
Ans: Significant value is added when management recognise their own shortcomings and are
receptive to external advice or where the venture capitalist has the means to force the issues.

278

O ur cynical view is that, venture capitalists can only add significant value to weak management
team s.
Q3. What conditions are necessary fo r a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits
from the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans: See answ er to Q2
Q .4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies
perform any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: Involvem ent in the portfolio gives early sight of potential problems and opportunities,
there should be few er surprises, which has to be positive. In addition, involvement with the
portfolio helps build the goodwill between portfolio management and V C which can be very
important when further negotiations are required (i.e. on exit). Some V G have a specialist
insight into certain sectors (i.e. technolog)) and may add additional value, we are more
generalist and would not pretend to have such insights.
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner o f your portfolio company is
a principal/ agent relation with you as principal and the owner as your agent? Why/Why not?
Ans: N o , the owner or owners, who are likely to be the executive management team, have
more pow er than is implied by the classic principal/agent relationship.

They tend to see

them selves as the dominant stakeholder with the VC as a valued supplier of capital rather than
the principal fo r whom they act. Obviously, it depends on the relative equity shareholdings
and the other elements o f control possessed by the V C

ID E N T IT Y : P A N O S L IO U U A S, PA R TN ER , AVC V EN TU R E CAPITAL.
D A T E : A P R IL 25,2001
C O U N T R Y : SW IT Z E R LA N D
Q . 1. Is A sian venture capital culture different form venture capital culture in the United States
and Europe? In what respect?
Ans: D o not know the difference
Q .2. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia are having an easier time as compared to
their counterparts in Europe/U nited States?
Ans: N o. L ess competition but more hurdles and less exits.
Q .3. W hat is your opinion about the hindrances to the development of venture capital in the
Asian region?

279

Ans: I w ould guess a critical m ass o f experienced and credible Venture Capitalists.
Q.4. What factors are necessary fo r both parties. i.e. venture capitalist and portfolio company
to build up an ideal value-added relationship?
Ans: Venture Capitalists m ust have the credibility that they can add values, to have operational
experience and m ust be willing to do the real building w ork
Q.5. D o you agree that the value-added role o f venture capitalist is more hype than reality?
W hy/W hy not?
Ans. Everybody says they are the ones that are very valuable to the company success. The
value that is brought to the table is real not only money.

ID E N T IT Y : D A V ID W Q U Y SN E R , M A N A G IN G D IR EC T O R , A BIN G W O R TH
M A N A G E M E N T L IM IT E D
D A T E : A P R IL 27,2001
G O U N TR Y : U N IT E D K IN G D O M
Q .l. What factors are necessary fo r both parties. i.e. venture capitalist and portfolio company
to build up an ideal value-added relationship?
Ans: A s with m ost relationships, mutual respect, a congruence o f goals and the ability o f each
to satisfy a need o f the other. Value added requires real and relevant skills which, because there
is mutual confidence and trust can be effectively applied.
Q.5. D o you agree that the value-added role o f venture capitalist is more hype than reality?
W hy/W hy not?
Ans: D efine your terms. Venture capital under the U K definition is a very broad church
ranging from early stage technology investment through to large buy-outs that are
indistinguishable from investment banking. In many o f these areas the skill sets o f the "venture
capitalists" are predominantly financial and their own organisational structures and objectives
are such that there is little scope to add value in any other area M y own company is one o f
several in the U K and many in the U SA which focus on a narrow range o f activity (in our case
biotechnology). We em ploy scientists with business skills rather than accountants or bankers
and our U 5P is that we can bring skills and experience which will be needed to convert
intellectual property into commercial reality. For instance, in addition to general financial
assistance (including the provision o f locum financial management) we will commonly assist in
patent searches; IP R protection; inward and outward licensing; recruitment o f key hires;
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provide interim management o f R & D ; make available our network of high-level contacts in
academ ia, the pharmaceuticals industry and elsewhere; and generally provide the experience of
som eone (through Board representation and otherwise) who has been through large parts of
the movie before. H ope this helps. I regret that I can not extend my comments further.

ID E N T IT Y :
B IL L
M A N A G EM EN T

FREZZA ,

G EN ERA L

PA R TN ER ,

ADAM S

CAPITAL

D A T E : A P R IL 27,2001
C O U N TR Y : U N IT E D ST A T E S
Q .l. H ow do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: We are early-stage investors, so they always need our assistance. We do not make latestage or passive investments. If entrepreneurs did not need our assistance and all they truly
needed was cash, the valuation o f the company would likely exceed our investment threshold.
O ur investment strategy, and means o f earning above-market returns, is to invest both our
m oney and our time. O ur time is usually what is in shortest supplyas we have plenty of money.
Q.2. What conditions are necessary fo r a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his
portfolio company?
Ans: M any years o f actual operating experience and domain knowledge. In addition, a limit on
the num ber o f boards the V C sits on. (We limit our partners to 6 boards maximum) A director
who sits on 12 boards can only add marginal value. A 28 year old associate who has never had
a real job outside o f the venture capital industry acting as a director can only add marginal
value.
Q .3. What conditions are necessary fo r a portfolio company to able to derive
m ost benefits from the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans: Senior management must be coachable and primarily interested in creating capital gains
rather than building empires, proving they are right, or servicing their own egos.
Q .4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies
perform any better? W hy/W hy not?
A ns: Y es, provided they have solid domain experience.
Q .5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is
a principal/agent relation? W hy/W hy not?
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Ans: I ’m not sure I understand the question. The shareholders own the portfolio company.
M anagem ent works fo r the shareholders, whose interests are represented by the board The
board is responsible fo r hiring and firing senior management, including the founders who were
"ow ners" only up until the day they sold preferred stock to a third party. The percentage of the
com pany owned b y the founders is irrelevant as the concept remains the same.
M ost o f our boards contain two VGs, two representatives from management, and one
independent director (an outside industry expert) nominated by management and approved by
the VGs. This group is responsible fo r maximizing shareholder value.

ID E N T IT Y : V IJA Y A N G A D I, M A N A G IN G D IR E C T O R IC F A N D T R EA SU R ER O F
T H E IN D IA N V E N T U R E C A PIT A L A SSN .
D A T E : M A Y 2,2 0 0 1
C O U N T R Y : IN D IA
Q .l. Is Asian venture capital culture different form venture capital culture in the United States
and Europe? In what respect?
Ans: quite different from U S.xould be similar to europe or to late stage funds in the US...
-lack o f tech talent pool in r& d/academ ia to cross-pollinate ideas, check tech, help develop
tech... vc's do not work together as in the us., keep deals to themselves..
Q .2. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia are having an easier time as compared to
their counterparts in Europe/U nited States?
Ans: difficult to say. there aren't a lot o f high quality opportunities in India... lots of companies
but o f low quality so inexperienced VC's can lose money easily... ..lots o f problems in investing
in com panies in A sia that are not typically found in U S/Europe: ethics (have to be extremely
careful about doing business in Asia), intentions are not always aligned with V C .it is not
uncom m on to have companies that want to spinoff divisions into separate companies etc.
Q .3. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia allocate more time and efforts toward
involvem ent in portfolio companies than venture capitalists in the United States and Europe?
W hy/W hy not?
A ns: N o., m ost have financial/investm ent banking backgrounds and neither have the contacts
nor the skills to help a company...
Q .4. W hat factors have hindered you in building up an ideal value-added relationship with your
portfolio company?
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Ans: depth o f team , can often be lacking so time is spend is doing too many mundane/low
end w ork rather than use contacts to do alliances etc.
Q.5. D o you agree that the value-added role o f venture capitalist is more hype than reality?
W hy/W hynot?
Ans. no., absolutely necessary if one is investing at early stage..... becomes less important in
later stages.

ID E N T IT Y : F R É D É R IC D E L A M IN N E , G E N E R A L M A N A G ER , E-CAPITA L
D A T E : M A Y, 2 ,2 0 0 1
C O U N T R Y : B E L G IU M
Being a fairly recent fund (launched in late 1999), we have only limited experience.
Q .l. H ow do you determine whether your portfolio com pany needs your assistance?
Ans: Som etim es, we react to a dem and coming from the company (additional funding
needed,..) but we try to be pro-active and to raise issues
Q.2. What conditions are necessary fo r a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his
portfolio company?
Ans: It depends on (a) the m aturity of the portfolio com pany if it is young and is under
staffed, it is easier fo r the V C to add value by bringing additional knowledge and (b) the
abilities o f the V G if it is specialized in a sector an d/ or has a good network of interesting
people, it can add value by bringing together the portfolio company and other companies
Q.3. What conditions are necessary fo r a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits
from the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans: The m anagement o f the portfolio cy must be open to discussion and it should not beleive
that it knows better its own business, both the management and the VC must be convinced
that they share the same interest
Q .4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio
com panies perform any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: Y es: that is why we try to be more and more "hands-on”
Q .5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner o f your portfolio company is
a principal/agent relation with you as principal and the owner as your agent? Why/Why not?
Ans: It is im portant that both parties share the same interest and act in the same direction to
avoid the principal/ agent relationship.
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ID E N T IT Y : N IK L A S H E D B O R G , V E N T SH A R E M A N A G E M E N T AB
D A T E : M A Y 2 ,2 0 0 1
G O U N TR Y : S W E D E N
Q .l. H ow do you determine whether your portfolio com pany needs your assistance?
Ans: We always w ork closely with our portfolio company.
Q.2. What conditions are necessary fo r a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his
portfolio company?
Ans: Network, financial knowledge, strategic advice, restructuring possibilities.
Q.3. What conditions are necessary fo r a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits
from the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans: Open-m inded management, sharing the same shareholder's agenda.
Q.4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies
perform any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: Y es, as long as they are able to divide the operations performed by the management from
the strategic w ork made by the board/ow ners.
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is
a principal/ agent relation with you as principal and the owner as your agent? Why/Why not?
Ans: O f course this relation is in som e ways a principal/agent relation, but which relation is
not today?

ID E N T IT Y : H A R A LD U N D L A R , CO M M UNICATIONS M AN AG ER, B-BU SIN ESS
PA RTN ERS
D A T E : M A Y 4 ,2 0 0 1
G O U N TR Y : B E L G IU M
Q .l. H ow do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: We never determine this. One o f our USPs is, that portfolio companies can benefit from
our hardwired network of investors like ABB, SEB, Hewlett-Packard, Investor etc.... They
have joined forces to provide capital an know-how. Thus, if a portfolio company needs help,
they w ould a s k ... Companies we invest in always remain independent... that's our philosophy
Q .2. W hat conditions are necessary fo r a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his
portfolio company?
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Ans: Adding value in our industry means to build companies. A s mentioned before, we provide
capital and knowlege, using a hardwired network of investors. We have a committment to built
- we are not a pure finance company. This is, what makes us different.
Q.3. What conditions are necessary fo r a portfolio com pany to able

to derive most benefits

from the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans: They sim ply have to be open. A com pany we invest in does have all necessary pre
conditions fo r building a company. First of all they have to fit our business model. If they are
working in an area, where one o f our partners works also, we could create synergies, that others
can only dream of.
Q.4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved

in their portfolio

companies perform any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: Yes, but its not a one-way-street. If V Cs and portfolios regard business as partnership,
they can benefit from all advantages they combine.
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner o f your portfolio company is
a principal/agent relation? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: N o - independence is vital for building a business.

ID E N T IT Y : C O N F ID E N T IA L O N R E Q U E ST
D A T E : M A Y 5,2 0 0 1
C O U N TR Y : F R A N C E
Q .l. H ow do you decide whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: Though we do not manage the companies we have in portfolio, we have extremely close
relationships with their management. Therefore we know pretty well what are the needs of the
com pany and will propose our advice if we believe it can help.
Q.2. What conditions are necessary fo r a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his
portfolio company?
Ans: First the Venture Capitalist needs to spend time with the company and be available in
order to establish the relationship necessary in every investment.. This is part of his job but it
has to be reminded because it implies that a single V C cannot follow 40 investments at the
sam e time. Even if there are many opportunities he has to be selective when investing in order
to anticipate the phenomenon.
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Second, experience is the key thing. Technical experience will allow the V C to have a clear
vision on the business and the technological challenges the management will face. This m ay be
o f great help when the management team is focussed on a very specific aspect o f the business
development without having a strategical view o f the situation. Experience in a field also
implies a network o f expertise you can use to establish contacts between the com pany you
invested in and potential partners (financial institution, experts, key people fo r recruitment,
customer). O f course this is just an help that makes the contact easier. O nce the two parries
talk together, it is up to the com pany to convince the other and take the m axim um benefit o f
the opportunity.
Q.3. What conditions are necessary fo r a portfolio com pany to able to derive m ost benefits
from the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans: When investing in a com pany we pay great attention to the management's ability to listen
to external advices. It means that your relation won't be fruitful with som ebody that never
listen to your suggestions and believes he is always right. O n the contrary, som ebody too open
with no personal opinion on what you say who follow s everything you say won't be
independent enough to run a com pany by himself. O nly a balanced management will get the
maximum of a V C investment.
Q.4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies
perform any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: Theoretically yes. The pieces o f advice an experienced clever V C brings can only be a
plus. There are so m any outside aspect that influence the success o f a business that it is not a
warranty but it has definitely a positive impact.
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner o f your portfolio company is
a principal/agent relation with you as principal and the owner as your agent? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: It is a real business partnership, thus we are at the same level as shareholders sharing the
sam e goals o f success.
I hope this will help you to have a better view on the position of a V C in Europe. Looking
forward to having a first draft on your picture on the Asian V C business, which is not that
developed according to what I can see from Paris (Australia...Japan...Taiwan...Singapore).
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ID E N T IT Y : C O N H D E N T IA L (O N R EQ U E ST )
D A T E : M A Y 08/2001
C O U N T R Y : U N IT E D ST A T E S
Q .l. H ow do you decide whether your portfolio com pany needs your assistance?
Ans: It depends on the needs o f the portfolio company.
Q.2. What conditions are necessary fo r a venture capitalist to be able to add m ore value in his
portfolio company?
Ans: The ability to intervene requires either a strong board position o r shareholders agreem ents
requiring the investor's consent fo r certain m ajor decisions such as senior staff appointm ents,
capex, acquisitions, borrowing, exit (sale o r flotation); this can also som etim es be achieved
more informally subject to the relationship the venture capitalist has with the investee
company. The venture capitalist's experience in the fields o f financing structures, acquisitions
and sales and a particular sector should be helpful also.
Q.3. What conditions are necessary fo r a portfolio com pany to able to derive m ost benefits
from the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans: Should be receptive to V C advice.
Q.4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio com panies
perform any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: Yes but depends on the V C as w ell
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner o f your portfolio com pany is
a principal/agent relation with you as principal and the owner as your agent? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: I believe it more like a partnership although in certain cases it can becom e a
principal/ agent relation.

ID E N T IT Y : F R A N K B A C H IN SK Y , M A N A G IN G P A R T N E R , V IR ID IA N V E N T U R E S
D A T E : M A Y 10,2001
C O U N TR Y : U N IT E D ST A T E S
Q .l. H ow do you decide whether your portfolio com pany needs your assistance?
Ans: I w ork with all o f them on a one-to one basis.
Q .2. W hat conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his
portfolio company?
Ans: no com m ent
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Q .3. What conditions are necessary fo r a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits
from the value-added efforts of venture capitalist?
Ans: no com m ent
Q .4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies
perform any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: Y es. All companies can benefit from active V C participation.
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is
a principal/ agent relation with you as principal and the owner as your agent? Why/'Why not?
Ans: N o. I view the relationship more as a partnership with the entrepreneur.

ID E N T IT Y : K E V IN
P A R T N ER S.

C O N N O R S, G E N E R A L P A R TN ER , SPRAY V EN TU R E

D A T E : M A Y 16,2001
C O U N T R Y : U N IT E D ST A T E S
Q .l. H ow do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: A s an early stage investor, we are active in nearly all of our projects. At the very early
stages, the com pany m ay not have a C E O or has an incomplete management team. Later, the
team m ay need help in financing or corporate deals. As an active VC, we are involved in these
activities every week across our portfolio, whereas a portfolio company management team
raises capital every 1-2 yrs.
Q.2. W hat conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his
portfolio company?
Ans: Experience, congruent goals, and compatible operating style and people skills.
Ans: See Q 5
Q.3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits
from the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?[
Ans: Sam e as Q 2 See Q 5
Q .4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies
perform any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: Please define involvement. Depends on the experience of the CEO. I believe that if a
board o f directors is involved, is working with the C E O and management, and is qualified, the
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company’s odds o f success arc improved. If the company is orphaned and no one is helping
the C E O , probability o f success is reduced.
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is
a principal/ agent relation with you as principal and the owner as your agent? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: Neither.

We arc partners and co-owners with the founders and management of our

portfolio company. We all act in the best interest of all the shareholders. We would not get
involved if this "partnership" was not possible.
We w ork hard to not have the "adversarial" relationship that your questions imply.
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